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Interpreting Mysticism 
An evaluation of Steven T. Katz’s argument against a common core 
in mysticism and mystical experience 
 
In his 1978 article “Language, epistemology, and mysticism”, Steven T. 
Katz presents his theory of the interpretation of mystical experience 
reports in which the foundational epistemological claim is that “there are 
no pure experiences”. Around this claim, a theory of interpretation is 
developed that implies the rejection of a common core in mystical 
experience. This also involves a criticism against the so called perennial 
interpretations of mystical experience and of the phenomenal 
characteristics that are considered to be prevalent in mystical experiences 
across traditional religious boundaries. Katz’s theory has been interpreted 
and criticised as a ‘constructivist’ theory of meaning, implying cognitive 
relativism and non-realism for the experiences of mystics, though in the 
light of Katz’s own claims, his theory should be understood as a 
‘contextualist’ theory which allows for reality to impact on the individual 
mystics experience. As a theory of interpretation, purporting to be superior 
to the perennial models of interpretation, Katz’s theory is evaluated in 
terms of ‘scientific value’ for the interpretation of mystical reports.  
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Part I: Method 
 
Chapter 1 
Methodological considerations 
 
 
 
Introduc t ion  to  chapter one  
 
Research on ‘mysticism’ has been conducted within diverse disciplines, 
through a vast diversity of methodological applications, and with a 
variety of phenomena in mind. Psychologists and sociologists of religion 
have primarily focused on the psychological mechanisms and qualitative 
aspects of mystical experience, as well as on the pathological and 
therapeutic outcomes of experiences classified as ‘mystical’. These 
investigations largely circle around the experiences of mystics and the 
states of consciousness confirmed by their reports, by the results of 
various neurological and biological measures, and by any post-
experiential attitudinal and/or behavioural changes that may have been 
reported or observed. Exegetical approaches, on the other hand, focus 
less on the experiences of mystics and more on their writings – and 
perhaps other expressive modes such as art or music – which, of course, 
are not always about their mystical experiences per se. Hermeneutical 
methods as well as theories of language and of mystical truth-claims 
dominate the exegetical disciplines.  
This brief introduction to the field indicates that in interpreting the 
experiences, activities and declarations of mystics, the investigator of 
mystical phenomena has a variety of disciplines and methods to choose 
from. And while there is no general agreement as to how mysticism and 
mystical experience should be defined, many of the methodological 
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approaches mentioned above are grounded upon the assumption that 
there are common experiential and/or descriptive characteristics of 
mystical experiences across religious traditions. In 1978, with what 
turned out to be a pivotal article on the subject, the philosopher Steven 
T. Katz posed a challenge to this widely (and long) held point of view.  
Katz’s frequently qoted article, “Language, epistemology, and 
mysticism”,1 posited that rather than being universal phenomena that 
transcend religious and sociocultural boundaries, mystical experiences are 
particular and largely tied to the specific religious tradition from which a 
given mystic springs. It is this ‘Katzian’ perspective, and the wave of 
agreement, disagreement, controversy and confusion it has generated, 
that will be the focus of this thesis. 
In his article, Katz criticizes the ‘perennial’ notion that diverse mystical 
experiences display a common core, and proposes his ‘contextualist’ 
understanding as a viable alternative to this view. According to Katz’s 
contextual approach, the experiences of mystics in each of the world’s 
great mystical traditions are, in large measure, predetermined2 by the 
‘context’ of their specific religious training and education. In other 
words, it is the mystic’s background of particular religious understanding 
that shapes, educates and/or conditions her to have the experiences she 
                                                
1 The most recent reference being in John Hick’s; The new frontier of religion and science – 
religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent, where Hick refers to the work done on 
the epistemological issues concerning mysticism in Katz’s edited anthology from 1978 
(Mysticism and philosophical analysis) in which “Language, epistemology, and mysticism” is 
included. (See Hick 2007, p. 14) In Geels 1998, the reference is also to the above 
mentioned anthology, where Geels emphasises the importance of considering the 
‘novelty’ in Katz’s perspective by quoting Katz on the weaknesses of the past research 
done on mysticism. (Geels 1998, pp. 11-12) It would be overreaching to say that Katz’s 
article is introducing the new interpretational paradigm, though since it is claimed to 
stand in sharp contrast to the ‘old’ view (the ‘perennialist’ view, as Katz calls it), 
perhaps it is not very misleading to characterise Katz’s position in these terms. 
References to the contents in Katz’s works are seldom critical, but are rather taking for 
granted the philosophical presuppositions embedded in the ‘contextualist’ theory 
presented by Katz. The various reactions to this ‘new’ view (like Robert Forman’s 
criticism and William P Gregory’s defense) also indicate that this has become a matter 
of ‘choosing sides’, allthough if the philosophical unclarities in Katz’s position are taken 
into account this may not be the case. This issue will be illucidated in the coming 
chapters.   
2 In fact, “over-determined”, as we can read in Katz 1978a, p. 47. 
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has. Different religious contexts thus produce different types of mystical 
experiences that cannot be equated one to the other by some kind of 
‘common core’.  
For the last three decades, Katz has maintained the validity of the 
contextual thesis originally presented in “Language, epistemology, and 
mysticism”, and complemented it with a series of articles concerning the 
character of mystical experience (1983), the ethical involvement of 
mystics in eastern and western traditions (1992), the functions of the 
language of mystics (1992), and the interpretation of mystical literature 
(2000). Over that same period, his theory has elicited a chorus of positive 
and negative reactions from the scholarly community regarding both the 
details of his theory and the somewhat harder to grasp totality of his 
work on mysticism.  
A quick glance at the comments on Katz’s theoretical stance affords two 
preliminary observations: first, there appears to be no consensus 
concerning how to interpret certain details of his contextual approach 
(which, of course, affects the remarks of both critics and supporters 
alike); and second, there are apparently widespread concerns regarding a 
number of significant issues that continue to remain unresolved 
(primarily with respect to methodology). In consideration of these 
factors, as well as the fact that Katz considers his contextualist 
interpretations and explanations of mystical experience to be most 
accurate, the aim of this investigation is to take a critical look at Katz’s 
contribution to the understanding of these phenomena.  
This first chapter consists of a preliminary examination of Katz’s ideas 
and a presentation of the problems that have sparked the controversy. It 
also highlights the methodological problems entailed in analysing Katz’s 
position from a phenomenological perspective and introduces the 
approach employed in this thesis to uncover the fundamental 
weaknesses of his theory.  
 
1.1. The problems in abstract 
In assessing the “common-core” or “perennialist” perspective, as he 
interchangeably terms it, Katz calls into question a number of 
philosophical systems and methodological approaches. As such, authors 
  
 14  
on mysticism as diverse as William James, Aldous Huxley, Walter Stace 
and others are bundled under one heading and viewed as having made 
similar errors in judgment, all of which appear somehow connected to 
the ‘mistaken’ notion that there is a common core in mystical experience. 
Among these errors in judgment, Katz includes: 1) the assumption that 
there is such a thing as a ‘pure’ (unmediated) experience; and, 2) the 
devaluation of the difficulties entailed in drawing a distinction between 
experience and interpretation. In Katz’s analysis, these two errors have 
been instrumental in the failure of perennialists to appreciate the 
differences in the mystical experiences (and mystical experience reports) 
of mystics coming from diverse confessional settings.  
In “Language, epistemology, and mysticism” (1978), Katz calls upon his 
readers to understand his perspective as a “plea for the recognition of 
differences”,3 these being the differences in phenomenal4 content 
between the experiences of different mystics. In other words, where 
proponents of “common core” see phenomenal similarities in the 
experiences of mystics, Katz’s sees phenomenal differences. This 
contrast between the perennial common core account and Katz’s 
contextual approach is the most striking and prominent feature of Katz’s 
theory. Closer examination of his position, however, reveals a number of 
interrelated problems concerning the phenomena of mystical experience, 
and experience in general.  
Why does Katz see differences where other interpreters of mysticism see 
similarities? According to Katz, the problem with perennial typologies of 
mystical experience is that they fail to “delineate what mystical 
experience actually is”5 and are too unsophisticated “in their recognition 
of the contextual basis of language which makes them incapable of 
sorting out the actual meaning of mystical reports”.6 Whether or not 
                                                
3 Katz 1978a, p. 25. 
4 The postulated common-core characteristics of mystical experience have been 
commonly termed ’phenomenological characteristics’ in the literature on mysticism. As 
this is inapropriate for several reasons in the context of this thesis, I reserve the term 
‘phenomenological’ for what relates to the theoretical content of phenomenology, and use 
the term ‘phenomenal’ to designate characteristics of experience.  
5 Katz 1978a, p. 51. 
6 Katz 1978a, p. 51. 
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Katz is correct in his assessment, clearly the attempt to differentiate 
between various mystical experiences and to probe the meaning of 
various mystical reports are essential aims of those interested in resolving 
the complex of problems surrounding the interpretation of mystical 
phenomena. It is also clear that questions concerning differentiation 
must first be answered before anything genuinely meaningful can be said 
about mysticism, mystical experience and/or mystical experience reports. 
The first step in “sort[ing] out the actual meaning of mystical reports” is 
to sort out which mystics are specifically being referred to. For instance, if 
it turns out that the mystics referred to by Katz in his theoretical writings 
are different from those studied by ‘perennial’ philosophers, there will be 
obvious problems in attempting to ascertain “the actual meaning of 
mystical reports”, and also to reach some sort of consensus. Moreover, 
even if we manage to delineate what “mystical experience actually is”, 
and thus identify the same class of mystics, we must still relate this 
experiential ‘isness’ to “the actual meaning of mystical reports”—an 
enterprise not entirely free from obstacles.  
The difficulties involved in ascertaining the “actual meaning of mystical 
reports” go beyond those concerning the nature of the experiences of 
mystics. First, there is the issue of the ‘mystical reports’ themselves, 
which do not necessarily contain direct descriptions of given ‘mystical 
experiences’. Second, even when they do (something not always easy to 
determine), one requires an account of the process of translation 
between an experience and its linguistic description, that is, an account 
of how the experiences are represented in textual form. The ‘perennial’ 
account of this relation (i.e. the relation between experiential and 
linguistic meaning) is more or less as follows: while a given mystic’s post-
experiential linguistic interpretations may reflect his or her religious 
and/or sociocultural context, the experience itself exhibits certain 
structural features that link it to the experiences of mystics from other 
traditions and transcend the textual particularities of the tradition in 
question. In other words, despite the diversity of Realities found in 
mystical experience reports, these descriptions also reveal fundamental 
experiential factors: a ‘common core’ that unites them all. 
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In Katz’s understanding of the perennial position, this ‘common core’ is 
often equated with the notion of ‘pure experience’. An example of this 
can be found in Forman (1999), where “unitive” experiences, cognitive 
yet non-conceptual experiences, and “pure” experiences (non-intentional 
or “object-less” experiences) are thought to be found in the reports of 
mystics from several different traditions. Katz is generally dissatisfied 
with this type of account,7 and proposes instead that “there are NO pure 
(i.e. unmediated) experiences”.8 Moreover, if, as Katz claims, all 
experience is inescapably mediated by the concepts of the mystic, there is 
no need for an account of the process of translation – i.e. the mystic 
describes her experience with the same conceptual set that made her 
experience what it was. The only account Katz can give regarding the 
relation between an experience and its report – the extant textual 
‘evidence’ – is that they are difficult to distinguish.  
Katz’s proposition that there are no ‘pure’ (unmediated) experiences also 
appears to undermine the frequent claims of both mystics and 
perennialists regarding the ineffable nature of mystical experience.9 If 
there is no fundamental difference between the experiences of mystics 
and their reporting of such experiences, the problem of ineffability 
                                                
7 In his Introduction to the anthology, “Mysticism and Religious Traditions” (1983), 
Katz describes this view as follows: “Tragically, the mystic must descend from his 
height and then, caught up again in the fetters of tradition and history, space and time, 
he must express what is truly inexpressible in the inadequate symbols and syntax of his 
particular faith community. Thus the One becomes the many and the absolute becomes 
Krishna and Allah, God and Tao, and is alluded to through such inadequate symbols as 
Torah and Koran, Mantra and Gospel, Koans and Chants.” And in “Mystical speech 
and mystical meaning” he says: “Trapped by the unclosable abyss between experience 
and utterance, the adept uses a language he or she knows to be necessarily inferior, 
hopelessly inadequate to the task at hand. Such futilely employed language is most often 
the familiar tongue of a particular religious tradition and specific sociohistorical 
environment, but this is merely an unavoidable contingency” (Katz 1992a, p. 3).  
8 Katz 1978a, p. 26. 
9 In this regard, Katz notes that, “contrary to their own sincere declamations regarding 
ineffability, the structural logic of such theories necessarily tells us more than 
proponents of apophasis recognize. And this fact should be taken as paradigmatic of mystical 
systems universally; despite their avowal of neti neti the reality is otherwise. That is, mystics 
reveal, however unintentionally, more of the ‘truth’ they have come to know in 
language than their overt negations of meaning and content would suggest” (Katz 
1992a, p. 25). 
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appears to vanish: the reports are ‘evidence’ of the experience and we 
thus ‘know’ about the experiences of mystics through their reports.10 
Moreover, if the mystics have experiences that are shaped by the 
religious traditions that the mystics have inherited, the degree to which 
an experience can be said to be ineffable must reflect the degree to 
which the religious tradition of the mystic is ineffable – i.e. not at all. 
According to Katz, mystics report exactly what they experience, that is, 
there is a one-to-one relation between the report and the experience, and 
the experiences are reflections of the mystic’s religious background and 
training.11 
In addition to the problem of the relationship between a mystical 
experience and a mystical experience report, there appears to be the 
problem of establishing the exact relationship between the experience 
and the pre-experiential “conditioning” of consciousness. In this regard, 
Katz’s understanding appears to teeter between two explanatory poles. 
On the one hand, he implies that the mystic’s experience is highly 
                                                
10 Regarding the experiences of mystics, Katz claims that “the only evidence we have, if 
we are not mystics ourselves, and even mystics really do not have a privileged position 
here, is the account given by mystics of their experience. These are the data of study 
and analysis” (Katz 1983a, p. 5). It is helpful to bear in mind that in Katz’s view, not 
only is the mystical account a refection of the mystic’s experience (in a precise ‘one-to-
one’ relationship), but the mystical experience is itself a reflection of the mystic’s 
conceptual inheritance.   
11 For example, in his article “The conservative character of mystical experience” 
(1983), Katz states that “there is a one-to-one relationship between inherited and 
shared doctrine, and the ‘model’ experienced”. We discuss Katz’s understanding of the 
term ‘model’ in chapter five, but for now it can suffice to say that for Katz ‘models’ are 
the ‘idols’ of particular religious traditions, e.g., Jesus for the Christian or Muhammad 
for the Muslim. Also, in response to the perennialist claim that it is useful (although 
admittedly difficult) to distinguish between post-experiential descriptions and ‘core’ 
mystical experiences, Katz states: “To think that the ‘unitive’ mystic merely describes 
his experience in this way is to distort the situation which gave rise to the experience, 
the experience itself, and the report of the experience. Thus, for example, seriously to 
credit that Augustine did not have the unitive experience described in his Confessions 
(Bk. 9) but only used this language is unwarranted for two strong reasons at least; (1) 
surely an Augustine would not consciously misdescribe his experience; (2) the theory of 
misdescription due to orthodox pressures is untenable in Augustine’s case because, in 
fact, the unitive account he gives is more in conflict, though little did he seem to know 
it, with Christian orthodoxy than a relational description would have been” (Katz 
1978a, p. 42). These issues are discussed at more length in chapter three. 
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determined by the conceptual content of her religious tradition, and on 
the other, he holds out the possibility that said experience is somehow 
the experiencing of an independent Reality. Thus there appears to be a 
tension between Katz’s strong conviction regarding both the pre-
experiential and post-experiential conditioning of mystical experiences 
and his ‘Realist’ view that such experiences nonetheless involve 
something that goes beyond these determinants. As will be seen, it is the 
pull of these apparently contradictory positions that have rightly or 
wrongly contributed to the various criticisms of Katz’s contextual 
approach.     
Two problem areas need to be distinguished here: on the one hand, there 
are problems arising from Katz’s particular interpretation of the theories 
he criticises; on the other hand, there are problems arising from the 
application of his theory of mystical experience to the interpretation of 
mystical reports. As it turns out, these sets of problems are interrelated 
in Katz’s position, implying that in our examination of Katz’s philosophy 
of mysticism we will be concerned with both. It should be noted, 
however, that this thesis is not intended as an argument in favour of the 
perennial or common core theories of mysticism, although we might 
have to follow their lead since Katz presents his contextualist 
understanding as an alternative approach. In other words, when in the 
course of our investigation it is indicated that Katz has misinterpreted 
and/or misrepresented the perennialist view, this should not be taken to 
imply that we believe the perennial perspective to be right and his 
contextualist perspective to be wrong. Nonetheless, a thoroughgoing 
examination of the applicability and utility of Katz’s theory will hopefully 
lead to a more precise comprehension of where he stands relative to the 
subject of mystical experience. It should also clear up at least part of the 
misunderstanding that has surrounded Katz’s approach, inclining both 
critics and supports to variously label it as ‘constructivist’, ‘contextualist’, 
‘hermeneutical’, ‘phenomenological’ or simply ‘linguistic’. We will return 
to these issues in the next section, which contains a more detailed 
discussion of the applicability of Katz’s interpretational theory and the 
problems entailed therein. 
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1.1.1. A summary of the problems 
If Katz is correct, understanding mysticism may turn out to be quite 
simple, because we can eliminate the problem of translating experience 
into literature. If the reports of mystics are one-to-one descriptions of 
their experiences as Katz believes, the phenomenological content of the 
experience must be reflected in the report. As such, since mystics of 
diverse backgrounds report experiencing diverse religious Realities such 
as Brahman, Allah, Nirvana and so forth, they must be having the 
experience of these different religious Realities. In Katz’s view, 
perennialist thinkers fail to see this because they are too busy framing 
typologies of mystical experience to ask the more important question of 
“why the various mystical experiences are the experiences they are.”12 
They fail to see that the reports of mystics are merely evidential 
instantiations of the more general principle that the conditions of 
experience dictate what is or is not possible to experience and necessitate 
that experience is never ‘pure’ but always shaped by pre-experiential 
expectations, beliefs, and concepts:13 
Mystical experience(s) are the result of traversing the mystical way(s), 
whatever specific way one happens to follow, e.g. the Jewish, Sufi, or 
Buddhist. What one reads, learns, knows, intends, and experiences along 
the path creates to some degree (let us leave this somewhat vaguely stated 
as yet) the anticipated experience made manifest. That is to say, there is an 
intimate, even necessary connection between the mystical and religious 
text studied and assimilated, the mystical experience had, and the mystical 
experience reported. In each mystical tradition, as in each of the larger 
religious communities in which the mystical traditions inhere, there is an 
inherited theological-mystical education which is built upon certain agreed 
sources.14 
                                                
12 Katz 1978a, p. 25. 
13“The significance of these theoretical and methodological considerations is that they 
entail the view that the forms of consciousness which the mystic brings to an 
experience set structure and limiting parameters on what the experience will be, i.e. on 
what will be experienced, and rule out in advance what is ‘inexperienceable’ in the 
particular, given, concrete context” (Katz 1983a, p. 5). 
14 Katz 1983a, p 6. The ‘agreed sources’ being the Bible, Torah, Qur’an and other 
Sacred Scripture of the major religious traditions. 
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The mystics in each mystical tradition learn to experience what they 
experience through ‘agreed sources’, or:  
All these mystical personalities intended and experienced, they had 
knowledge by acquaintance, what their communities taught as knowledge by 
description. They had existential knowledge of what their co-religionists 
knew only through propositions.15 
As a result of this understanding, Katz views mystical experience as 
being fundamentally conservative in character as opposed to what he 
suggests is the “anarchic” perspective of the perennial philosophers he 
critiques.16  
Katz’s view that mystical experience is never ‘pure’ but always shaped by 
pre-experiential expectations, beliefs, and concepts has resulted in a 
number of consequences for the reception of his philosophy of 
mysticism. Some readers interpret it as being incompatible with mystical 
experiences that fall outside the traditional religious context, and even 
provide ‘evidence’ – also textually based – that mystical experience in 
general has a common phenomenal structure.17 It is here legitimate to 
ask whether or not Katz tends to reject the ‘evidence’ of these textual 
reports while accepting those that confirm his own position.18 Other 
critics, such as Robert Forman, challenge Katz’s understanding on 
methodological grounds and question the accuracy of the premises that 
have led to his point of view. In several essays,19 Forman argues that 
there are indeed such things as ‘pure consciousness events’ – events that 
are independent of any given religious tradition – and that, in certain 
                                                
15 Katz 1983a, p. 21. 
16 See ”The conservative character of mystical experience” (1983) 
17 This issue is discussed in chapter four.  
18 Part of the answer involves the delimitation of the term ‘mystical’, which will be 
discussed in chapter three. Another relevant component in Katz’s position on this issue 
is Katz’s view on ‘facilitation’, which is discussed in chapter four. Katz’s views 
regarding ‘evidence’ play an important role as well, and these will be discussed in 
chapter five.    
19 For example: The problem of pure consciousness (1990); Mysticism, mind, and consciousness 
(1999); and, “What does mysticism have to teach us about consciousness?” (1998). 
Some of Katz’s other critics are Michel Stoeber, “Constructivist epistemologies of 
mysticism; a critique and a revision” (1992) and Donald Evans, “Can philosophers limit 
what mystics can do? A critique of Steven Katz” (1989). For an overview of various 
criticisms as well as Katz’s responses, see Gregory 2006, pp 10-35. 
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respects, Katz’s mistake is to think that mystical experience is like 
ordinary experience.20 In Forman’s reading, and in the reading of many 
others, Katz is seen as more of a constructivist than a “contextualist”, 
with the unacceptable consequences of relativism, reductionism, and a 
view that is incompatible with the notion of an independent Reality 
having an impact on the mystic’s experience.21  
In his infrequent responses to such criticisms, Katz has basically denied 
all charges, claiming to have been more or less misunderstood. Thus at 
various times and in various papers he has asserted realist intentions and 
a belief in the cognitivity of mystical experience. Moreover, he has 
strongly rejected the notion that he is a ‘constructivist’ of the type 
defined by perennialists, and chooses the self-styled designation of 
“contextualist” instead.22 Indeed Katz counters the arguments of these 
critics by charging that it is actually the perennialists that are guilty of 
reducing the mystical to events in consciousness and devaluing the role 
of “Reality” in the experience.  
In his dissertation, Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism (2006), William 
P. Gregory builds a similar defence of Katz’s contextualism based on the 
fact that he has been wrongfully judged and labelled in certain 
fundamental respects, although Gregory does admit that this has been 
partly the result of Katz’s own ‘lack of clarity’ and ‘failure to 
communicate’:  
The impasse that has stood between him and his many critics can, in large 
part, be traced to this lack of clarity. Yet it also follows from failure of 
communication: Katz has hardly given a substantive response to his 
                                                
20 See for instance Forman 1993 and Forman 1999 (p.53).  
21 In Stoeber 1992 for instance (p. 108), Stoeber criticises constructivism in general, and 
not merely Katz’s specific approach; his criticism mainly concerns John Hick’s over-
emphasis on “the role of the socio-religious categories of the mystic.” 
22 The label “constructivist” is firmly rejected by Katz in “Mystical speech and mystical 
meaning” (Katz 1992, p. 34, note 9): “I have been, of late, referred to as a 
‘constructivist,’ but given the meaning attached to this designation by my critics, I reject 
this term, preferring to describe my approach as ‘contextualist.’ The most extensive use 
of the term ‘Katzian constructivism’ will be found in Foreman [sic], ed., Problem of pure 
consciousness.” Katz’s realist intentions are most clearly formulated in his reply to my 
questions (see section 2.2.) and in Gregory’s thesis (Gregory 2006). 
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critics. Over the last twenty years, he has authored only a handful of pages 
in reply to various commentators.  
     In reaction, Forman and others have interpreted this lack of 
engagement in a number of ways, suggesting, perhaps, that he is unwilling 
to engage them, that he is locked in ideology and thus dismissive of 
contrary views, or that power dynamics in the academy are at play. I 
believe none of these are the case. Rather, it seems to me that Katz has 
other priorities. In the study of mysticism, his goal has been a complete 
dismantlement of perennialism and the establishment of a fully explicated 
contextualist alternative, and this is a task at which he is still at work.23 
Parallel to our discussion regarding Katz’s perspective and its 
contribution to the interpretation of mystical reports, we will consider 
the degree to which “misunderstanding” may have contributed to the 
various criticisms of his approach.  The aim in this regard is to assist in 
the analysis and untangling of these misunderstandings, not to point the 
investigation in a specific evaluative direction.  
The fundamental contradiction in Katz’s position is that on the one hand 
he insists that the character of a given mystical experience is more or less 
wholly determined by the pre-experiential conditioning or context of the 
mystic, while on the other he insists that contact with an independent 
Reality is also somehow involved. One of the more unusual outcomes of 
this line of reasoning, and perhaps one of the primary causes of the 
criticisms levelled against him, is that textual accounts of mystical 
experiences appear to be influenced more by pre-experiential 
conditioning than by the experiences themselves. Another area of 
tension in Katz’s stance is that he denies the possibility of a ‘pure’ 
(unmediated) experience, which Katz associates with ‘givenness’, yet 
seems to affirm the primacy or ‘givenness’ of texts. One effect of this 
tension is that it inclines Katz towards a more literal interpretation of 
mystical reports in which his own role as ‘interpreter’ is never 
problematized. 
For purposes of analysis, we have organized the above identified 
problems into three groups or complexes, each of which will be 
sequentially discussed in chapters three, four and five. These three 
problem-groups can be summarized as follows: 
                                                
23 Gregory 2006, p. 292. 
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(1) The epistemological and other problems that surround and/or 
emerge out of Katz’s plea for the recognition of differences in 
mystical experience and his denial of a common core that unites 
the experiences of diverse mystics.  
(2) Those problems that arise out of Katz’s understanding of the 
facilitation and pre-experiential conditioning of mystical 
experience.   
(3) Those problems that relate to Katz’s insistence that although 
mystical experiences are largely determined by pre-experiential 
religious conditioning and thus of a conservative character, 
contact with a Reality that transcends that conditioning is also 
somehow involved.  
Before beginning our investigation, however, the remaining sections of 
this chapter will examine the methodological problems entailed in the 
analysis of Katz’s position (section 1.2), the basic interpretational 
framework that will guide our analysis (section 1.3), and Katz’s position 
vis-à-vis the delimitation of mysticism and religion (section 1.4). 
Regarding chapter two, it largely consists of a concise, straightforward 
presentation of the points made by Katz in his original 1978 article – the 
one that has stirred up all the epistemological, exegetical and 
philosophical dust. Chapter two closes with the presentation of a 
personal email exchange with Katz in which a series of questions were 
posed and answered with regard to the issues outlined above.   
 
1.2. Methodological problems 
Before initiating the project of clarifying Katz’s position on the one 
hand, and evaluating its interpretive value on the other, it is necessary to 
consider the connection between our aim and our method, as well as the 
problematic relation of these to our object of investigation.  
To systematically analyse a given theory, one requires a set of criteria 
against which that theory can be evaluated. However, with regard to 
what those criteria should be, no scholarly consensus has been reached, 
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even with respect to a standard that would be minimally applicable to all 
theories in all contexts and for all purposes.24 
The four evaluative criteria to be shortly presented in subsection 1.2.1 are 
not held to be applicable either to all types of theories or to all of the 
problems that a theory might aim to solve. These criteria have been 
specifically designed with Katz’s theory of textual interpretation in mind. 
Moreover, they have been designed to coincide with what are thought to 
be Katz’s own requirements for a scientific theory, largely gleaned from 
the conclusion to his 1978 article, “Language, Epistemology and 
Mysticism”:  
…our position is able to accommodate all the evidence which is 
accounted for by non-pluralistic accounts without being reductionistic, i. 
e. it is able to do more justice to the specificity of the evidence and its 
inherent distinctions and disjuctions than can the alternative approaches. 
That is to say, our account neither (a) overlooks any evidence, nor (b) has 
any need to simplify the available evidence to make it fit into comparative 
or comparable categories, nor (c) does it begin with a priori assumptions 
about the nature of ultimate reality.25 
It is points (a), (b) and (c) above that have served as guidelines in the 
formulation of the criteria by which we will attempt an evaluation of 
Katz’s contextual approach. Further insight as to his position on these 
matters has come from his initial letter of invitation to the symposium, 
published under the name Mysticism and philosophical analysis: 
The aim of the collection is to investigate various aspects of the subject 
[of mysticism] from a sensitive yet rigorous philosophical perspective. The 
object is to try to advance the discussion and analysis of the subject 
beyond James and Otto, Stace and Zaehner. We would like to have essays 
which investigate and clarify basic aspects of the subject so that we can 
move beyond the position which is philosophically unsophisticated and 
fails to distinguish between various types of mystical experience on the 
one hand and the logic and language of different types of mystical claims 
                                                
24 See, for instance, Robert E. Mason’s “Grounds of acceptable theory in education” (in 
Studies in Philosophy and Education, vol. 1, no. 2, January 1961, Springer Netherlands). 
Mason discusses the discrepancy between a theory’s grounds for acceptability in a 
scientific community and its practical application (or acceptance) in the relevant 
community.    
25 Katz 1978a, p. 66. 
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on the other. Alternatively, we want to avoid the extremes of positivist-
like rejections of such experience as ‘nonsense’ as well as the position 
which rejects logic, criteria, and analyses on the dubious ground that they 
are out of place in the discussion of mysticism.26  
The following subsection introduces these evaluative criteria and offers a 
brief explication of each. 
 
1.2.1. Evaluative Criteria 
The four evaluative criteria to be applied in our assessment of Katz’s 
contextual understanding of mystical experience are as follows: 
1) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must be capable of precisely identifying and demarcating the 
phenomena it aims to interpret and/or explain. In other words, it 
must establish precise demarcation standards.  
2) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must rest upon on a coherent theoretical foundation without 
intrinsic contradictions. In other words, it must exhibit theoretical 
consistency.27 
3) Any theory that chooses the ‘subjective experiences’ of certain 
mystics as its ‘object’ of study must avoid the tendency to interpret 
those experiences in ways that fundamentally distorts or disregards 
the self-understanding of those mystics. In other words, it must 
show regard for the validity of self-understanding.28 
4) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must be capable of advancing current understandings relative to 
                                                
26 Katz 1978, p. 3. 
27 In Popper’s formulation, in order for a proposition to be considered scientific it must 
be both falsifiable and testable. If a theory has no coherent theoretical foundation, if it 
is fraught with logical inconsistencies, it can be neither verified nor falsified. 
28 In Wolff (1997, p. 577), following a suggestion made by Wilfred Smith (1971), the 
author offers the following definition of a ‘validating criterion’ that is similar to our 
own: “the capacity of an individual’s interpretation to be ‘existentially appropriated’ by 
those to whom it applies.” On a more personal note, I want to mention that I try to 
adhere to this particular evaluative criterion myself. Thus in the course of analysing Katz’s 
contextual approach I intend to be sensitive to his own sense of self-understanding. 
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the phenomenon under investigation. In other words, it must 
extend the understanding of the field. 
 
Establishing Precise Demarcation Standards 
Simply put, the establishment of precise demarcation standards means to 
set down those characteristics by which one intends to distinguish one 
phenomenon from another. To fulfil his aim of advancing the discourse 
on mystical experience beyond the understandings of such figures as 
James, Otto, Stace and Zaehner, Katz’s approach would have to do more 
than merely identify the salient features of such experiences, as these 
individuals have already attempted to do. To begin with, it would have to 
be sophisticated enough to draw a clear line of distinction between 
mystical and non-mystical experience. Without this preliminary act of 
demarcation, it would seem exceedingly difficult to distinguish between 
different types of mystical experiences and the logic and language of 
different types of mystical claims.29 Thus the establishment of precise 
demarcating criteria would seem a necessary step in the development of 
any ‘philosophically rigorous’ theory of mysticism.30 Let us look into this 
matter in a bit more detail. 
                                                
29 Stace, among others, has identified a number of phenomenal characteristics to aid in 
distinguishing between mystical and ordinary experience. Over time, these criteria have 
been developed to distinguish mystical experience from psychotic episodes, dream 
states, hallucinations and other types of phenomenally categorized experiences. Ralph 
W. Hood who has developed recognitional criteria from Stace’s categories even 
distinguishes between mystical and religious experience (we discuss this in section 1.4). 
One problem that will be discussed at several points in this thesis concerns the fact 
that, as of yet, Katz has not replaced Stace’s criteria with any other; nor has he 
addressed, in any of his writings on mysticism, the question of how such an alternative 
set of criteria might be developed. 
30 The discussion concerning demarcation criteria in Karl Poppers philosophy of 
science mainly concerns the demarcation of scientific investigation relative to other 
areas of theory-making – such as religion, for instance. (This can be compared to the 
logical-positivist view that science is demarcated from religion by its empirical 
foundation, and stands in stark contrast to it.) The aim of this investigation is not to 
develop demarcation criteria for how scientific inquiry should be undertaken; nor is it to 
demarcate science from other areas of human activity on a metatheoretical level. In 
terms of this dissertation, the term ‘demarcation’ relates to the clear identification – 
largely through definition – of the phenomena that are being interpreted or 
investigated.  
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Every scholarly investigation, regardless of the methodology employed, 
must have an object of investigation, whether that object is a theoretical 
entity (such as a philosophical problem) or a particular phenomenon of 
interest. In the case of mystical experience, Katz’s area of interest, one 
must be skilled enough to ascertain which experiences qualify as 
mystical, who the mystics are, and which of the many textual samples are 
relevant for a theory of mysticism. This is because the outcome of the 
investigation and the conclusions derived therefrom are highly 
dependent upon the initial body of evidence that one selects as the 
object of study.  
If, for instance, one sets about to interpret the complete works of Franz 
Kafka, one begins the task with an empirically demarcated object of 
interpretation: it is limited in time and through publicly displayed 
instantiations; and it is a body of texts that can be interpreted in a variety 
of ways by various types of interpreters. If, on the other hand, one wants 
to interpret the complete published works of ‘mystics’, the task of 
identifying the relevant texts would run into considerable difficulty 
unless one is able to ascertain who the ‘mystics’ are.  
The creation of a theoretical framework is not required in order to 
identify Kafka or his writings (unless a dispute arises regarding the 
authorship of a particular text). This, however, cannot be said when it 
comes to the identification of ‘mystics and their writings’. Indeed, a 
persuasive case could be made for including even Kafka among this 
group. One’s identification of ‘mystics and their writings’ thus depends 
upon the criteria selected to identify experiences that are, or may be 
called, mystical; the same would be true in identification of mystical 
experience reports.  
Of course, this is not to say that each individual who has an experience 
that meets the standards of a mystical experience is a mystic. On the 
other hand, there would appear to be a necessary connection between an 
individual identified as a mystic and an experience identified as mystical 
– the experiential dimension. Sustaining a prolonged and intense interest 
in mystical phenomena might make one a mysticism expert, but that 
alone does not make one a mystic; the experiential dimension is required. 
Thus whether it is actively sought or simply occurs, the ‘mystical’ experience 
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appears to be a necessary condition for the identification of both mystics 
and mystical experience reports. As such, the list of identifying criteria 
should be able to specify those aspects of experience that qualify as mystical.   
A principal question asked in this thesis concerns the standards 
employed by Katz for the identification of those mystics and mystical 
experience reports he has selected for study. This is important because it 
is the literary output of mystics that Katz relies upon as ‘evidence’ for his 
various claims – especially those related to the fact that pre-experiential 
conditioning is almost entirely determinative of the actual experience of 
the mystic.  As such, the finding of poor, limited or imprecise standards 
of demarcation would certainly represent a significant weakness in Katz’s 
approach. As an example of how this might work, take the case of 
Robert Forman, who claims to have freed himself from the shackles of 
pre-experiential conditioning in order to have had at least one “pure 
consciousness event”.31 Should his report of a mystical experience be 
taken less seriously than those that are more religiously-based? Should 
his mystical experience report be included or excluded as significant data 
in the study of mysticism? And if a given approach to the interpretation 
of mystical experience reports does exclude experiences such as 
Forman’s from the class of ‘mystical experiences’ (as does Katz’s) can 
one legitimately claim (as does Katz) that no relevant evidence has been 
overlooked?32  
 
Theoretical Consistency 
Unless a given approach exhibits theoretical consistency – i.e., unless it 
resolves any and all intrinsic contradictions – it will be unable to 
precisely identify and demarcate the phenomena it aims to interpret 
and/or explain. The fundamental criteria for a scientific theory in the 
Popperian paradigm are its falsifiability and testability; if a theory 
contains logical inconsistencies and has no coherent theoretical 
foundation it can be neither verified nor falsified. Moreover, if the 
                                                
31 See Forman’s Mysticism, mind and consciousness (1999) for instance.  
32 Whether Forman and Katz refer to the ‘same’ type of experience in addressing ‘pure 
experience’ and ‘PCE’ will be discussed in section 1.3, where we discuss different 
conceptualizations of ‘pure experience’ and also what it means to say that one thing is 
‘the same as’ or ‘similar to’ another.  
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differentiation of phenomena is one of the aims of a theory, it must be 
assumed that unless it is consistent and coherent it will not succeed in 
properly establishing precise demarcation standards (the first of our 
evaluative criteria). 
A prime example of inconsistency in Katz’s theoretical approach, and 
one that will be treated in depth and from various angles throughout this 
thesis, involves the dual assertion that the character of a given mystical 
experience is almost wholly determined by the mystic’s pre-experiential 
conditioning and partially shaped by the mystic’s encounter with an 
independent Reality: the problem of Katz’s contextualism vs. his realism 
(twice mentioned above). Other examples of potential inconsistency 
involve the countervailing impact on important aspects of Katz’s theory 
of his assertion that one cannot distinguish between experience and 
interpretation, and also to a certain extent the incompatibility of his 
assertion that there are no pure experiences with his view concerning the 
role of ‘models’ in mystical traditions. 
Although it does not fall precisely in the category of an inconsistency, 
and is not examined at length in this thesis, another problem bears 
mentioning here as well. It is the problem of the means that Katz 
employs to confirm his primary theoretical claim; what might be termed 
the problem of “model verification”. Stated simply, it involves the fact 
that the basic evidence presented by Katz in support of his 
understanding consists of the textual reports of mystics regarding their 
experiences. From these he draws the general conclusion that the various 
mystical experiences he has studied are not similar but different in 
character.33 Katz refers to this textual evidence as ‘empirical’ and 
employs it to establish that his contextual interpretation is superior to 
that of the perennialists in terms of its ability to understand and 
distinguish between mystical experiences. The question is whether or not 
it is justifiable for one to describe a selection of textual material as 
                                                
33 Also for discerning ‘same’ and ‘different’ phenomena one must have a clear idea of 
the given phenomenon that is to be discerned from, or assimilated to, another given 
phenomenon. The notions of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, and their not entirely 
presuppositionless character, will be discussed in section 1.3.6. The argument for 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in experiences based on the ‘evidence’ will be taken up in 
chapter two, where we look at the content of Katz’s article from 1978. 
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‘empirical evidence’ and then attempt to use one’s interpretation of that 
selected material to ‘prove’ or ‘establish’ the correctness of one’s 
interpretive approach.34 As noted by Nelson Pike in his supplementary 
study, “Steven Katz on Christian mysticism”.35  
Katz claims to have ‘demonstrated’ the truth of his construction theory 
of mystical experience by reference to something he refers to as ‘the 
empirical evidence.’ And in so far as I have been able to follow the 
thread of the reasoning, the ‘demonstration’ in question has the form of 
an argument that begins with the description of a fact and proceeds to 
its conclusion via a Kantian-like abductive inference, that is, via the 
contention that the circumstance mentioned in the conclusion is the 
only (or at least the best) explanation of the fact described at the outset. 
 
Showing regard for the Validity of Self-understanding 
Maintaining respect for the validity of self-understanding is important to 
ensure that in the interpretation of a mystical experience, the subjects of 
study as well as the linguistic expressions they use are not left out of the 
equation. By this is meant that even when texts have been written by 
persons who can no longer correct or explain potential misreadings 
and/or misunderstandings, their linguistic expressions should not be 
interpreted in distorted ways that would, for instance, exclude them from 
being considered in the discussion of mysticism and mystical experience. 
Something of this sort, for example, might be taking place in the 
misunderstandings between Katz and Forman: on the one hand, Forman 
claims to have experienced a PCE, a pure consciousness event; on the 
other hand, Katz might decide not to include Forman’s report as 
legitimate data, since, in his view, there is no such thing as a pure 
                                                
34 Katz refers to ‘the evidence’ in several contexts. However, as noted above, there is a 
problem with using ‘evidence’ to prove that one’s interpretation of that same ‘evidence’ 
is correct – a problem that he seems to disregard in the conclusion to his 1978: ”A 
strong supporting element in favour of our pluralistic account is found in the fact that 
our position is able to accommodate all the evidence which is accounted for by non-
pluralistic accounts without being reductionistic, i.e. it is able to do more justice to the 
specificity of the evidence and its inherent distinctions and disjuctions than can the 
alternative approaches” (Katz 1978a, p. 66). In Anders Jeffner’s criteria one finds an 
additional requirement for a definition of religious sentences: “Nothing must be 
introduced in the definiens which anticipates the analysis” (Jeffner, 1972, p. 4). 
35 In Mystic union (1992, pp.194-207) from a supplementary study called “Steven Katz on 
Christian mysticism” (Pike, 1992, p. 201). 
  
 31  
(unmediated) experience. Katz’s account might thus a priori exclude the 
type of phenomena that Forman claims to be a relevant part of 
mysticism research. Forman presents himself as a mystic and claims that 
the experiences he has had are genuinely mystical. If Katz rejects the 
validity of such claims, does he then fail to show regard for Forman’s 
self-understanding? Is Katz willing to fairly entertain the notion that 
reports such as Forman’s might represent legitimate data that throw his 
own understanding into question? These are the types of questions that 
will be broached in relation to this third evaluative criterion.  
 
Extending the Understanding of the Field of Study 
The fact that Katz takes up the study of mystical experience with a desire 
to ‘advance’ mysticism research is made clear in his introduction to the 
anthology in which his 1978 article appears. There it is asserted that “the 
object is to try to advance the discussion and analysis of the subject 
beyond James and Otto, Stace and Zaehner”.36 The question is whether 
or not Katz has succeeded in achieving this ambitious aim. And this 
question bears an important relation to the one regarding the 
establishment of precise demarcation standards. If in the identification of 
relevant mystical texts Katz has been too selective – including those that 
support and excluding those that contradict his contextual interpretive 
approach – this would certainly not be helpful in terms of extending the 
understanding of mystical experiences. Taking the example of Forman 
once again, one can see how such a difficulty might arise.  
Katz, who is familiar with Forman’s report of a ‘pure consciousness 
experience’, nonetheless seems to reject it as a textual source that 
potentially contradicts his central assumption that there is no such thing 
as a pure experience. This gives the impression that Katz is unable to 
entertain the possibility that reports such as Forman’s can advance the 
discourse on mystical experience – perhaps even beyond his own 
contextual approach. It also calls into question Katz’s assurance that he 
has “not overlooked any evidence”, leading to a further impression that 
Katz’s understanding of what a mystic is excludes individuals like 
Forman, and individuals that have non-religiously affiliated backgrounds. 
                                                
36 Katz 1978, p. 3. 
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In pursuing his own interpretive aims, Katz relies exclusively on the 
mystical reports of mystics embedded in one major religious tradition or 
another, and from these he draws the conclusion that mystics in general 
are conditioned by their traditional religious backgrounds. It would be 
interesting to know precisely why Forman’s report is not considered 
adequate ‘evidence’ to the contrary. In what sense does Katz’s believe his 
theory to have extended the discourse if it excludes certain forms of 
mystical experience from being evidentially approved?  On what grounds 
does Katz maintain that his contextual approach provides a more 
accurate understanding of mystical experience than do common core 
theories, and in what sense has he disproved the perennialist claim for 
cross-cultural similarities among mystical experiences? The answers to 
these and other such questions will be pursued in the course of this 
thesis. 
In summary, the evaluative criteria to be employed in analysing the 
theoretical worthiness of Katz’s contextual approach are here restated in 
the form of four questions: 1) Does Katz’s theory establish precise 
demarcation standards; 2) Does it maintain theoretical consistency; 3) 
Does it show regard for the validity of self-understanding; and finally, 4) 
Does it extend our understanding of the phenomenon of mystical 
experience? 
 
1.2.2. Misunderstanding Katz 
In Steven T. Katz’s philosophy of mysticism, William P. Gregory provides an 
extensive description of how Katz’s critics have accounted for Katz’s 
position. Gregory claims that most of the literature referring to Katz is 
of a critical nature and attempts to address these criticisms by posing the 
following question: “What precisely is the philosophical position Steven 
T. Katz intends to advance in the philosophy of mysticism?”37 In answer, 
Gregory argues that Katz’s critics have basically misunderstood his 
position, and that this in turn has shaped their critical interpretation of 
his writings: 
Interlocutors have repeatedly judged his accounting of mystical 
experiences to be reductionistic, his epistemology idealist or solipsistic, 
                                                
37 Gregory 2006, p. 7. This is a question of ours also. 
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and his fundamental stance with respect to mystic’s claims to objectively 
know transcendent referents agnostic if not sceptical.38 
As an example of a critic who has interpreted Katz’s theory of mysticism 
as reductive and incapable of accounting for a number of relevant 
phenomena, one can quote Michael Stoeber: 
In overemphasising the role of the socio-religious categories of the 
mystic, constructivist epistemologies are not compatible with the view 
that a reality impacts upon the mystic in any creative and original way. It 
will become clear that as a consequence of this over-emphasis of pre-
experiential categories, constructivism can not adequately explain 
significant phenomena associated with mystical experience, namely, 
mystic heresy on the one hand and the similarities of mystical experience 
between different traditions on the other.39  
Whether or not Stoeber and others are correct in doubting Katz’s self-
described contextualism,40 one thing is certain: if it is true that by 
“overemphasising the role of the socio-religious categories of the 
mystic” Katz abandons the possibility of accounting for “reality’s impact 
upon the mystic in a creative and original way”,41 his theory would lack 
theoretical consistency, despite his attempt to incorporate both 
propositions in his thought. Even if one were to grant the intuitive basis 
of Katz’s decision to admit the role of Reality in a mystical experience, 
this admission cannot be at the cost of the overall theoretical consistency 
of his approach. Otherwise, almost any proposition can be true and the 
theory can say nothing of genuine value about mystical experience – i.e., 
it cannot extend the understanding of the field. Moreover, it appears that 
Katz’s approach to the problems of mystic heresy and cross-traditional 
similarities is to basically explain them away by claiming that the former 
                                                
38 Gregory 2006, p. 6. Since Gregory has made an excellent job of gathering the critical 
evaluations of Katz’s theory, many of the critical accounts will be referenced by way of 
him.  
39 Stoeber 1992, p. 108. Even though Stoeber is here primarily referring to John Hick’s 
constructivism, he includes Katz’s theory in this methodological category, and 
introduces the problem of constructivism (first page of his paper) with reference to 
Katz’s theory. 
40 Katz 1992a, p. 34, note 9   
41 Stoeber 1992, p. 108.  
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largely exist in the minds of perennial interpreters and the latter do not 
exist at all.42  
On a first reading, the above criticisms of Katz’s contextual approach 
appear more or less reasonable. In addition, Katz appears to display little 
sensitivity to either the reality-claims of mystics or to the claimed 
cognitive character of mysticism. In an effort to further clarify these 
issues, I made direct email contact with Katz with the aim of posing a 
few relevant questions.43 These questions along with Katz’s answers 
appear in chapter two, directly after the analysis of Katz’s 1978 article. 
Because his answers leave matters largely unresolved, the analysis of his 
position must rely upon available material. Out of regard for the validity 
of Katz’s own self-understanding, however, the aim will be to follow 
Katz’s argumentation without attaching labels or making precipitous 
assumptions. In other words, if Katz claims that his theoretical approach 
is ‘contextual’, we take him at his word; and if he claims his 
epistemological approach to be that of a ‘realist’, we accept that as well. 
However, we do reserve the right to inquire as to precisely what all this 
means, and what its implications are for the interpretation of mystical 
reports.  
 
1.2.3. The problem of method 
A major question regarding interpretation concerns the degree to which 
the interpreter’s own preconceptions and interpretive pattern affect her 
interpretation. By “interpretive pattern” we mean: 
                                                
42 See “The conservative character of mystical experience” (1983), where Katz explains 
that it is not his intention to claim that mystical experience is only conservative in 
character, though he wants to examine this characteristic to balance the 
overemphasised ‘heretic’ characterization. Moreover, in “Ethics and mysticism in 
eastern mystical traditions” (1992), Katz completely rejects the characterization of 
mystics as “rebels and heretics, antinomians and spiritual revolutionaries” and 
characterizes this view as a “misapprehension” that “needs revision” (Katz 1992b, p. 
253).   
43 These questions and Katz’s answers are presented in section 2.2 structured as 
questions and answers. However, they are also presented in an appendix in their 
original format.  
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Interpretive Pattern: The cognitive foundation that is systematically 
employed by a person at a given point in time in order to understand a given 
sentence or phenomenon of experience. 
Preconceptions as to what is ultimately real or true (or unreal and false) 
must necessarily be part of the interpretive pattern of any given person 
who takes the role of interpreter.44 Here we do not mean to imply that 
one’s interpretive pattern is something ‘static’; in a personal system one’s 
cognitive foundation can be in a constant flux, with the acquirement of 
new elements and the rejection of others. Thus between one time period 
and another, a person’s interpretive pattern may undergo such profound 
change that, even in family-resemblance terms, it would be difficult to 
equate the former with the latter. The interpretive patterns presented by 
science are generally somewhat more ‘rigid’ in that they contain basic 
theorems formed as rules (or other law-like modes of expression) that 
make them axiomatic and logically interconnected. As such they are 
much more difficult to overthrow, change or contradict. Not that there 
is any absolute value in overthrowing rules, axioms or theorems. 
However, if they exclude certain phenomena, certain other ‘rules’, or 
                                                
44 My use of the term interpretive pattern is similar to the use of cognitive scientists of 
the term ‘cognitive structure’: “a persistent, significant class of patterns of organization 
of knowledge components” (www.agiri.org/wiki/index.php?title=Category:Cognitive 
Structure). Batson et al (1993) describe the functions and implications of ‘cognitive 
structures’ (pp. 90-93). A popular discussion of basic components of interpretive 
patterns can be found in Sander 2000. Peter Winch uses the descriprion “the rule 
according to which judgements of identity are made” (Winch 1958) to which I shall 
return in short. Also, an interesting discussion on the functions of a ‘cognitive schema’ 
can be found in McIntosh 1995. 
     Other terms employed in the philosophical literature are Frank Smith’s “the theory 
of the world in the head” and Hjalmar Sundén’s ‘role’ in his role theory. The 
‘interpretive patterns’ serve to give meaning to what otherwise would amount to a 
number of unrelated events and experiences (which in William James terms is the 
‘bloom of confusion’). The compatibility of and translatability between various 
interpretive patterns is widely debated (see for instance Donald Davidson’s critique that 
the notion of ‘cognitive structure’ is a dogma of empiricism). On the issue of ‘truth’ and 
interpretive patterns, we have to note though that any comparison between interpretive 
patterns that seem to contradict each other must primarily rest on an understanding of 
the interpretive patterns to be compared. This means that even though both agreement 
and disagreement presuppose a foundational understanding, it is not necessarily so that 
one must agree with an interpretive pattern as soon as it is understood.      
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even ‘interpretative patterns’ that disturb the ‘order’ of the original 
system or contradict its basic rules and theorems (‘anomalies’ in Kuhn’s 
terms, ‘heresies’ in social science’s), this is bound to lead to conflict. 
Heresy and anomaly must be ‘explained away’ or rejected so that the 
identity of the original interpretive pattern is preserved.  
In terms of the above description, Katz’s theory of interpretation can be 
viewed as a particular interpretive pattern through which we are invited 
to interpret mystical phenomena and mystical language. First of all, 
however, Katz must deal with the problem of demarcation and provide a 
precise account of what the phrases ‘mystical phenomena’ and ‘mystical 
language’ are meant to denote. Without this we will be unable to identify 
the objects to which the rule-system applies. Anthropologist Peter 
Winch states it succinctly when he says: 
A regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of the same kind of 
event on the same kind of occasion; hence statements of uniformities 
presuppose judgements of identity. But this takes us to an argument, 
according to which criteria of identity are necessarily relative to some rule: 
with the corollary that two events which count as qualitatively similar 
from the point of view of one rule would count as different from the 
point of view of another. So to investigate the type of regularity studied in 
a given kind of inquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which 
judgments of identity are made in that enquiry.45   
The rule-system employed by Katz to identify the mystics of his study 
seems incommensurable with that of the perennialists (his self-described 
opponents).46 Whether or not this incommensurability also applies to the 
‘mystics’ themselves is a question of delimitation that will be discussed 
below. Katz’s class of ‘mystics’ and ‘mystical experiences’ do not seem 
compatible with the class of ‘mystics’ and ‘mystical experiences’ studied 
by the perennialist interpreters. This apparent incompatibility calls for an 
examination of “the nature of the rule according to which judgements of 
identity are made” in Katz’s philosophy of mysticism.  
                                                
45 Winch 1958, p. 1.  
46 The meanings we ascribe to the terms ‘incommensurable’ and ‘paradigm’ come from 
Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy as well as from philosophers that criticize the notion of 
incommensurability, such as Feuerabend, Quine and Davidson. Their discussions on 
the existence of differing paradigms, and the degree to which translatability is possible, 
are both interesting and valuable. 
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Katz begins by more or less rejecting the approach – the particular 
paradigmatic character – of the perennial investigation of mysticism, and 
suggests a ‘paradigm shift’ to his ‘contextual’ approach instead. This shift 
involves the establishment of new rules of identification concerning who 
is and who is not considered to be a mystical personality.  These rules 
leave some (like Robert Forman) on the borderline and perhaps others 
entirely out.  
As the ‘orientalism debate’ has shown, it is not very helpful to study 
certain phenomena if the interpretive pattern of the interpreter severely 
distorts the interpretive pattern of the subjects that are being studied.47 
This is because such an approach invariably ends in portraying the given 
phenomenon as something it is not, thus contributing to ignorance 
instead of proper explanation, knowledge and genuine understanding. 
The following subsection provides an example of how the supposedly 
same phenomenon or set of behaviours can be identified and/or 
interpreted in three very different ways.  
 
1.2.4. An example of three interpretive patterns  
Because it would be inappropriate in the context of this thesis to make 
an exhaustive analysis of a given interpretive pattern, what follows is a 
general comparison of three different perspectives regarding the 
ingestion of peyote: 1) that of a Native American; 2) that of a Western 
psychiatrist; and, 3) that of a seventeenth century Jesuit missionary. By 
highlighting the central features of the interpretive pattern of each of 
these perspectives, it is hoped that the different models through which 
what is alleged to be the same act is interpreted will be revealed.  
From a traditional Native American perspective, the act of ingesting 
peyote is comparable to the sacramental use of the Eucharist:  
                                                
47 See Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), where Said criticises the West’s understanding 
of Arab culture as well as the construction of an ‘oriental’ identity. Further relevant 
discussions can be found in Richard King’s Orientalism and religion, Routledge 1999; 
Alexander Macfie’s Orientalism, Longman 2000; John MacKenzie’s Orientalism – history, 
theory and the arts, Manchester University Press 1995.   
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Peyote itself is regarded as a sacramental substance that has divine powers. It 
is often called ‘medicine,’ and it is believed to have powerful healing ability.48 
A well-known anthropological description of this activity is: “eating the 
flesh of the Gods”.49 Apart from this, members of the Native American 
Church described the use of peyote as follows: 
Ancient Spiritual tenets are to heal the body and spirit. Further, to teach 
impeccability, correct ‘seeing’ and power of Beingness. Peyote is not used 
to obtain ‘visions’ but to open portals to Reality. Always seeking centeredness 
within this existence. Peyote is the road back to the true Self. This should 
suffice in order to allow personal comprehension of this Sacrament.50  
A salient feature of this interpretive pattern is that it reflects a view that 
integrates both religion and medicine – a perspective extremely alien to 
the modern secular West.  
This Native American interpretive pattern will now be contrasted with 
that of the Western psychiatrist (who is informed by a medical 
interpretive pattern) and the seventeenth century Jesuit (who perspective 
is informed by a Catholic interpretive pattern). 
For a Western psychiatrist, actions such as ingesting peyote are usually 
characterized as “ingesting psychoactive substances”. According to the 
Western Psychiatric Associations’ Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (DMS-IV),51 the ingestion of peyote is associated with 
hallucinatory states that imply a number of psychopathological effects. 
The official diagnosis is termed “Hallucinogen dependency”; and the 
term ‘hallucinogen’ is explained as follows:  
                                                
48 This is quoted from a text by Timothy Miller of Kansas University and refers to how 
the Native American Church describes its use of peyote. It can be found at the website, 
http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/nachurch.htm. (Italics are my own.) 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act on Peyote law begins with the following 
statement: “The use of ‘sacrament’ is contained within the community. Any other use 
of this would not be a correct use of the ‘medicine’.” (The italics are my own.) 
49 See for instance Flesh of the gods – the ritual use of hallucinogens, an anthology edited by 
Peter T. Furst (1972), where the perspective of Native Americans is highlighted in 
several articles on the ritual use of various ‘hallucinogenic’ substances.  
50 Quoted from the “Statement for Understanding” found in the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act at the website, www.nativeamericanchurch.com (Italics are my 
own.) 
51 Western Psychiatric Associations (Europe and North America). 
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What is a hallucinogen? Hallucinogens are drugs that cause distortions in a 
user’s perceptions of reality. Users often see images, hear sounds, and feel 
sensations that seem real but do not exist. Some hallucinogens produce rapid, 
intense mood swings. The most common hallucinogens are LSD, PMA, 2 
C-B, peyote, and certain varieties of mushrooms.52 
In this psychiatric interpretive pattern there is not even a hint of context-
sensitivity to the effects of hallucinogenic substances like peyote, 
although some – like LSD-25 – have been used within therapeutic 
contexts as ‘healing devices’.53 This fact, however, does nothing to 
change the modern professional milieu in which DSM-IV sets the 
standard model of interpretation, and in which there is no account of 
‘healing properties’ at all.54  
Now imagine the interpretive pattern of a seventeenth century Jesuit 
missionary in the New World as he observes the ‘heathens’ ingesting 
peyote. Fortunately, Richard Evans Schultes and Albert Hoffman’s 
detailed account of such an encounter has made the exercise 
unnecessary. What follows is a quote that captures the essence of their 
finding:55  
Several seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuits testified that the Mexican 
Indians used Peyote medicinally and ceremonially for many ills and that 
                                                
52 Quoted from: http://www.savvyce.com/DSM.asp (Italics are my own) This 
description (or definition) of a hallucination is slightly misleading since, surely, even a 
psychiatrist would consider the sensations to be ‘real’, though perhaps the experiencers 
inference about the causal factor that has influenced the sensation might be mistaken in 
various ways. 
53 See, for instance, Snelders/Kaplan, 2002 for a review on the use of hallucinogenic 
substances within medical practice. Transpersonal psychotherapist Stanislav Grof has 
also authored a number of books related to the subject. See, for instance, his LSD 
Psychotherapy – Exploring the frontiers of the hidden mind (Hunter House 1980). 
54 See also Lukoff, 1985, where he proposes various means for differentiating between 
positive and negative ‘psychotic’ experiences: “current psychiatric practice does not 
attempt to distinguish between psychotic episodes with growth-potential and those 
which indicate a mental disorder”. See also anthropologist Michael Winkelman’s article, 
“Therapeutical effects of hallucinogens”, published in Anthropology of Consciousness (1991, 
vol 2, no. 3-4).   
55 For an introduction to the missionaries’ treatment of the Native American (Indian) 
population with respect to their ritual activities, see for instance Richard Evans Schultes 
and Albert Hoffman’s Plants of the Gods – their sacred, healing and hallucinogenic powers 
(Healing Arts Press, 1992). 
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when intoxicated with the cactus they saw “horrible visions”. Padre 
Andréa Pérez de Ribas, a seventeenth-century Jesuit who spent sixteen 
years in Sinaloa, reported that peyote was usually drunk but that its use, 
even medicinally, was forbidden and punished, since it was connected with 
“heathen rituals and superstitions” to contact evil spirits through “diabolic 
fantasies”.56   
Note that terms such as ‘evil spirits’, ‘diabolic fantasies’, ‘heathen rituals’ 
and the like appear in this testimonial as normative interpretative features 
of the ritual use of peyote, despite the contextual awareness displayed by 
rejecting its medicinal value and possible good effects.  
The problem with viewing these interpretations as ‘aspects’ of a ‘single 
truth’ about the ingestion of Peyote is that they are incompatible in 
certain respects. The interpretive pattern of the psychiatrist excludes the 
possibility that peyote visions are in any sense ‘real’,  whereas the 
interpretive pattern of the Native American suggests that those visions 
provide an opening of the ‘portals of reality’.57 For the psychiatrist, the 
ingestion of peyote distorts reality and makes one experience things that 
‘seem real but do not exist’; but for the Native American, peyote 
ingestion allows one to experience reality as it really is. Moreover, the 
Native American’s account of peyote’s ‘healing properties’ remains 
unaccounted for in psychiatric interpretations of the same phenomenon.  
Within the narrow framework of this example, there is thus far no 
problem with Katz’s suggestion that when interpreting experiences we 
should take the context of the interpreted into account. Doing this 
would grant the interpreted the right to be ‘sane’, ‘good’ or ‘functional’ 
within the context of his or her own existence. On the other hand, the 
apparent contextual sensitivity of the Jesuit in accepting that peyote 
ingestion induced ‘real visions’ did not seem to redeem the Native 
American’s behaviour in his eyes.  
One might reasonably ask why, despite the Jesuit missionary’s apparent 
contextual sensitivity, terms like ‘diabolic’ and ‘evil’ keep cropping up in 
                                                
56 Schultes/Hoffman 1992, in chapter titled “The tracks of the little deer”, p. 2. 
57 The understanding that peyote is not used to obtain ‘visions’ per se, but rather to 
open the ‘portals of reality’ suggests that the aim of peyote ingestion is not necessarily 
the ‘visions’ – which may be an aspect of the experience, but not the desired one.   
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his explanation of peyote ingesting behaviour? An answer as good as any 
other might be that from the perspective of his interpretive pattern the 
only material objects that are able to contain the ‘body of God’ are the 
bread and wine of the Communion. If God can only appear via the bread 
and wine of the Communion, then it is axiomatic that God cannot 
appear via peyote. For the Jesuit missionary, “the road back to the true 
Self” is understood to be only Jesus and absolutely not Peyote.  
If the Native American’s use of the word ‘sacrament’ in relation to 
‘peyote’ is seen as his attempt to ‘translate’ the actions into terms 
employed by the Jesuit, the attempt must be considered to have failed 
because the Jesuit’s interpretive pattern admits no referential points for 
‘sacrament’ other than bread and wine. The ‘logic’ or ‘sense’ of the 
notion ‘sacrament’ is the same for both the Native American and the 
Jesuit: it designates the partaking of divine ‘flesh’. The references, 
however, differ. The Jesuit rigidly believes that if the Native American 
wishes to partake of divine truth he can do so only through the ingestion 
of the bread and wine of the Holy Communion. But how is he to explain 
this to the Native American? On the other hand, how is the Native 
American to explain to the Jesuit that, for him, the ingestion of bread 
and wine might make for an odd meal, but corresponds not in the least 
to the experience of divine communion he receives by ingesting peyote?  
Turning once again to the differing interpretive patterns of the 
psychiatrist and the Native American, we find the same problem. The 
Native American attempts to explain to the psychiatrist that peyote is 
not used to obtain ‘visions’ but to ‘open the portals of Reality’ – and that 
what the psychiatrist considers an hallucination is in fact a true and 
genuine perception. Unfortunately the attempt is bound to fail because 
the psychiatrist has already ‘explained’ that ingesting peyote involves 
‘seeing things’ that “seem real but do not exist”. From the perspective of 
the psychiatrist’s interpretive pattern, the Native American is merely 
involved in an act of self-deception that leads him to believe those 
‘things’ to be real.  And even if we were to grant the possibility of 
contextual sensitivity in the psychiatrist’s interpretive pattern, the 
pathological implications embedded in the notion of ‘reality-distortion’ 
would prevent an interpretation of the Native American’s peyote 
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‘visions’ that properly accounted for the Native American’s conviction as 
to the ‘healing potencies’ of the ‘medicine’ he is ingesting.58 
Nothing said thus far is meant to imply that a given person can have 
only one occurrent interpretive pattern. Moreover, any number of 
persons may share the same interpretive pattern concerning the same 
phenomenon. Interpretive patterns serve as classificatory systems for 
objects, so in this sense they are also systems of identification. In the 
above example, however, the Native American, the Psychiatrist and the 
Jesuit each interpreted the identified phenomenon of ingesting peyote 
differently. A parallel outcome can be seen in the duck/rabbit perception 
tests used in Gestalt-psychology, where the “same” data can be viewed 
according to two interpretive patterns, each interpreting the data in a way 
that is said to be incongruent with the other.59 In the case of conflicting 
interpretive patterns within the larger system of one individual, it is up to 
that person to give primacy to one of these in order to interpret the 
phenomenon at hand. This giving of primacy is generally motivated by 
such considerations as relevance, authority, sentiment, rationality 
standards, and so on. Taking the duck-rabbit perception test as an 
example, one might say that it would be ‘rational’ to interpret the image 
as a picture of a duck if it appeared in the context of a picture of a pond 
filled with ducks. In general, however, rationality standards would only 
be one of many possible foundations for interpretation.  
                                                
58 This is a very complex issue, for as mentioned earlier ‘hallucinogens’ have been used 
in therapeutic contexts (se Snelders/Kaplan 2002). Moreover, the chemical properties 
and neurological effects of  substances that modern medicine classifies as 
‘hallucinogenic’ bear a marked chemical resemblance to the ‘mood stabilizers’ that are 
regularly prescribed by modern medical practitioners for therapeutic purposes. Upon 
the ingestion of mood stabilizers serotonin synthesis increases; this same result has 
been observed with regard to the ingestion of peyote (the psychoactive ingredient in 
peyote being ‘mescaline’). Additionally, manipulation of the serotonin level is 
considered the primary factor in bringing about the onset of hallucinatory states. Thus, 
at present, there can be no settled understanding concerning whether hallucinogens 
should be classified as therapeutic or pathological.       
59 See for instance Furberg/Andersson 1972, who problematized their pelican/antelope 
version of the duck/rabbit examination by comparing two interpreters, each of whom 
lack the interpretive pattern necessary to identify a pelican and an antelope respectively. 
In such cases, context sensitivity does not appear to make much difference. 
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It is important to note though, that there is a problem in determining 
whether two interpretive patterns are in disagreement (or agreement) 
concerning fundamental beliefs, or if the primary issue of understanding 
has not been solved. Initially, it seems to be a matter of disagreement if 
the Native American interpretive pattern includes the claim that peyote 
opens portals to reality and the Psychiatrist’s interpretive pattern includes 
the claim that peyote distorts perception of reality. This disagreement 
though, presupposes that they are talking about the same phenomenon, 
but how is this (or how can we know if this is) the ‘same’ phenomenon if 
such diverse interpretations can be given to it? To Katz, different 
interpretations add up to different experiences (and also different 
phenomena of experience), which would imply that the Psychiatrist and 
the Native American are talking about different phenomena, in spite of 
their belief that they refer to the same event when disagreeing. Though if 
they are not talking about the same phenomenon, can we say that they 
disagree with eachother or rather that some form of misunderstanding 
has taken place?     
While agreement or disagreement both presuppose some form of 
understanding (at least that the ‘same’ phenomenon is refered to by 
both), understanding does not presuppose agreement. The issue though, 
is not to evaluate to what extent the Psychiatrist and the Native 
American agree or disagree with eachother, but rather to have a means 
of measuring to what extent they understand eachother. And it seems, as 
the example above indicates, that there are some problems of 
understanding which precede the problems of disagreement. These 
problems are apparently connected to the criteria by which both the 
Psychiatrist and the Native American make judgements of identity – i.e. 
their respective interpretive pattern. It seems that even if understanding 
does not presuppose agreement, there has to be some form of 
compatibility between the interpretive patterns in order to have 
something to agree about. And if two interpretive patterns are in 
conflict, it becomes impossible to make judgements of identity that 
denote the same phenomenon or experience, in which case agreement or 
disagreement cannot come into question. (The same problem arises in an 
incoherent interpretive pattern where for instance two conflicting ideas 
are held as equally true.)   
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What then must the Native American do to explain his actions to 
someone who has chosen to interpret what he is doing according to 
criteria that are in fundamental conflict with his own? One could argue 
that the Native American has made a sincere attempt to translate his 
actions so as to be understood in terms of the interpretive patterns of 
both the psychiatrist and the Jesuit. In other words, he has attempted to 
describe his practice in words that both the psychiatrist and the Jesuit 
can assimilate: words like ‘medicine’ to account for the ‘healing’ 
properties of peyote, and ‘sacrament’ to refer to the ‘spiritual’ element in 
its use. The Native American can also be seen as showing some form of 
understanding for the interpretive patterns of both the Psychiatrist and 
the Jesuit, despite the fact that his own interpretive pattern is 
incompatible with various elements of theirs. Nonetheless, the Native 
American still appears seriously unable to translate his actions such that 
they appear acceptable to the respective interpretive patterns of the 
Psychiatrist and the Jesuit.  
What would the Psychiatrist and the Jesuit have to do in order to 
enhance the level of understanding between them and the Native 
American? By the same token, if we wanted to understand Katzian 
contextualism without succumbing to the above outlined problems and 
merely contradict a construction of Katz’s theory which is not 
compatible with Katz’s self-understanding, what would we have to do? 
And what would Katz have had to do in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
misunderstanding in his attempt to understand and theorize about 
mystics? 
 
1.2.5. The phenomenological reduction 
In our view, there is a possible answer to these questions: anyone that 
wishes to understand a given phenomenon must first set aside the 
specific interpretive pattern through which she intentionally or 
unintentionally apprehends it and eventually apprehend it from the self-
understood perspective of the subject that is being studied.  
Thinking of this in terms of the example discussed in the previous 
section, to understand the Huichol’s ritual behaviour, both the 
psychiatrist and the Jesuit would need to set aside their own interpretive 
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patterns and enter into the natural context of that behaviour with as few 
preconceptions as possible. The setting aside of one’s own interpretive 
pattern (at least partially and in important respects) seems to be a 
necessary precondition for eventually doing what anthropologists refer 
to as ‘going native’. From our perspective, this means that the interpretive 
pattern of the interpreter must be replaced by the interpretive pattern of the 
subject being studied. In “The Idea of a Social Science” Peter Winch 
challenges J. S. Mill’s view that “understanding a social institution 
consists in observing regularities in the behaviour of its participants and 
expressing these regularities in the form of generalizations”.60 Instead he 
proposes that in order to understand what is going on in an activity that 
is shared by a given social community (be it of a scientific or of a 
religious character), the researcher must – among other things – learn 
“the criteria according to which [that community] make[s] judgements of 
identity”.61 In the following passage Winch explains that if Mill is right, 
…the concepts and criteria according to which the sociologist judges that, 
in two situations the same thing has happened, or the same action 
preformed, must be understood in relation to the rules governing sociological 
investigation. But here we run against a difficulty; for whereas in the case of 
the natural scientist we have to deal with only one set of rules, namely 
those governing the scientist’s investigation itself, here what the sociologist is 
studying, as well as his study of it, is a human activity and is therefore 
carried on according to rules. And it is these rules, rather than those 
which govern the sociologist’s investigation, which specify what is to 
count as ‘doing the same kind of thing’ in relation to that kind of 
activity.62 
Winch continues by suggesting that “a historian or sociologist of religion 
must himself have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the 
religious movement he is studying and understand the considerations 
which govern the lives of its participants”; likewise, “a historian of art 
must have some aesthetic sense if he is to understand the problems 
confronting the artists of his period; and without this he will have left 
out of his account precisely what would have made it a history of art, as 
opposed to a rather puzzling external account of certain motions which 
                                                
60 Winch, 1958, p. 3.  
61 Winch, 1958, p. 2. 
62 Winch, 1958, p. 3. 
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certain people have been perceived to go through”.63 Thus if one wants 
to have some internal ‘sense’ of the interpretive pattern of the ‘other’ one is 
attempting to understand, one must be capable of temporarily setting 
aside one’s own potentially conflicting interpretive pattern. Winch does 
not express this in terms of what phenomenologists refer to as 
‘phenomenological reduction’ – i.e., the ‘bracketing’ or temporary 
suspension of the metaphysical (and other) assumptions with which one 
approaches the world. Nonetheless, this sort of suspension of one’s 
assumptive framework seems to be a precondition for the type of 
situations that Winch uses to exemplify his point: 
…a psychoanalyst may explain a patient’s neurotic behaviour in terms of 
factors unknown to the patient and of concepts which would be 
unintelligible to him. Let us suppose that the psychoanalyst’s explanation 
refers to events in the patient’s early childhood. Well, the description of 
those events will presuppose an understanding of the concepts in terms of 
which family life, for example, is carried on in our society; for these will 
have entered, however rudimentarily, into the relations between the child 
and his family. A psychoanalyst who wished to give an account of the 
aetiology of neuroses amongst, say, the Trobriand Islanders, could not 
just apply without further reflection the concepts developed by Freud for 
situations arising in our own society. He would have first to investigate 
such things as the idea of fatherhood amongst the islanders and take into 
account any relevant aspects in which their idea differed from that current 
in his own society.64  
Whether or not it is actually possible to suspend one’s own interpretive 
pattern, and to what extent one can do this and still understand the 
phenomenon in question, is a matter of great complexity that cannot be 
treated exhaustively here. It can be said, however, that it is a matter of 
the degree to which one is able to achieve an understanding of different 
                                                
63 Winch, 1958, pp. 4-5. It may not be that the one understanding a religious attitude 
must necessarily have some religious feeling of his own, that all depends on what type 
and level of understanding he tries to reach. The difference may sum up to the 
difference between being semantically informed on the state of alcohol intoxication and 
actually experiencing alcohol intoxication; a ‘root’ understanding of the phenomenon of 
alcohol intoxication may require that the interpreter is (or has on occasion been) 
actually intoxicated, while it must be admitted that even without personal experience of 
intoxication it is possible to understand a drunken state merely by having relevant 
information about such states.  
64 Winch, 1958, p. 5. 
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levels of meaning. This is because the degree to which one is able to set 
aside one’s own judgments regarding a given ‘object’ directly affects 
one’s ability to enter into the self-understanding of the subject under 
investigation. To determine whether or not it is possible to set aside 
one’s own interpretive pattern, one would have to have some idea of the 
procedure that might be involved. In the remainder of this section we 
will attempt to explore this question, being guided by the 
phenomenological epistemology of Edmund Husserl. 
If a philosopher, scientist or psychologist wants to adopt a 
phenomenological approach, the first requirement would be to 
temporarily suspend his or her metaphysical judgements about whether 
or not, and in what way, a so-called external or objective reality exists.65 
According to Husserl, this does not mean anything like denying, rejecting or 
doubting the existence of the natural world. It only means that “each 
judgement on spatio-temporal being is completely suspended”.66 Husserl 
explicates this idea as follows: 
Thus all sciences which relate to this natural world, though they stand never so 
firm to me, though they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am 
far from any thought of objecting to them in the least degree, I disconnect 
them all, I make absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single one 
of the propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value is 
perfect, I take none of them, no one of them serves me for a foundation – so long, that 
is, as it is understood, in the way the sciences themselves understand it, as 
a truth concerning the realities of this world. I may accept it only after I have placed 
it in the bracket. That means: only in the modified consciousness of the 
judgement as it appears in disconnexion, and not as it figures within the science 
as its proposition, a proposition which claims to be valid and whose validity I recognize 
and make use of.67 
In analytical terms, we could describe this as an analysis of the truth-
conditions (or meaning) of a sentence while its truth-value is bracketed. 
Seen from this perspective, if the exchange of exclamation marks for 
                                                
65 These ideas are extremely difficult to convey, but for now this will have to suffice as 
a working definition. 
66 My translation of “jedes Urteil über räumlich-zeitliches Dasein völlig verschliesst”, in 
Husserl 1913, p. 56.  
67 Husserl, 1913, §32, translation by W. R. Boyce Gibson: Ideas – general introduction to 
pure phenomenology, George Allen and Unwin Humanities Press, 1976, p. 111. 
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question marks in every sentence is all we need do to suspend our 
existential judgements, it would appear not so difficult a task. 
Nevertheless, it is this very issue – the issue of whether or not it is 
possible to ‘set aside’ our existential judgements (even temporarily) – that 
appears to invite the controversy, and almost never the issue of whether 
or not it is possible to assume a new interpretive pattern (to learn “the 
criteria according to which [the subject of study] make[s] judgements of 
identity”68).  
Arguments as to why ‘setting aside’ is impossible have been presented in 
different ways. If, for instance, we were to assume the Freudian theory of 
consciousness, in which there are aspects of an individual’s interpretive 
pattern that are unconscious, that individual would be logically unable to 
‘set aside’ those unconscious aspects because they are inaccessible. 
Another argument against the possibility of ‘setting aside’ is that if this 
were really done – if one were able to suspend all of one’s interpretive 
pattern – what would be left by which one could understand and/or 
interpret the phenomenon in question? 
In a model of consciousness where consciousness is transparent to the 
interpreter and all presuppositions are potentially accessible with a 
certain amount of effort, the relevance of her interpretive pattern can be 
minimized in certain relevant respects, if not reduced to zero. This 
condition is met in the case of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of 
consciousness, which will receive more detailed treatment in section 1.3. 
At this point, however, we will adopt Husserl’s method of ‘bracketing’, 
which, as we understand it, involves the suspension of judgement 
concerning the nature and quality of Ultimate Reality (or consciousness 
transcendent objects). 
In practice, ‘bracketing’ simply means that the linguistic expressions that 
we interpret are interpreted on the basis of an ontologically neutral 
foundation. Although the particular ‘propositions’ of the interpretive pattern 
that the investigator aims to understand are labelled ‘true’, she must still 
account for them in a bracketed form – i.e., she has to understand them 
truth-conditionally. In other words, she interprets through the context of 
                                                
68 Winch, 1958, p. 2. 
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the interpreted. For instance, the sentence “Jesus lives” is interpreted as 
a truth-claim in the context of a Christian interpretive pattern, and the 
phenomenologist does not call this into question. The meaning of the 
sentence “Jesus lives” is understood truth-conditionally through the 
interpretive pattern that enables the sentence to be true.  
Since the primary aim of this thesis is to understand and interpret the 
statements of Katz, this same method will be applied relative to his 
approach. On the other hand, since it is Katz’s contextual theory of 
mystical experience that is the object of our investigation, it is also our 
aim to examine whether or not his model of interpretation satisfies this 
as well as all the other evaluative criteria presented above.  
The next subsection will examine Katz’s views regarding the 
phenomenological approach. The purpose is to uncover the problems 
involved in interpreting Katz through a phenomenological model of 
consciousness and experience. 
 
1.2.6. Katz and phenomenology 
After the procedure of ‘bracketing’ has been successfully executed, what 
remains are the phenomena of experience, grasped through a formal 
interpretive pattern of the type Edmund Husserl presents in Logische 
Untersuchungen.69 Husserl argues that the laws of logic are not normative, 
meaning that they are not practical rules of how to reason, but purely 
logical laws.70 Husserl is here addressing psychologically oriented 
philosophers that make the mistake of equating pure logic with the 
psychological mechanisms of thinking (e.g., Mill and Sigwart). While the 
former – the logical laws – are of a purely ideal nature, and primarily 
serve theoretical purposes, the latter are judgements regarding the nature 
of what is real, and primarily serve methodological and empirical 
purposes. The logical laws are supportive of and foundational for the 
psychological mechanisms, but the two should not be conflated, as the 
                                                
69 This essentially has an Aristotelian basis, though Husserl redirects Aristotle’s 
ontological categories, matter and form, from the ‘out there’ into ‘experience’, which 
should not be confused with ‘in there’ as a psychological category (note the discrepancy 
between the phenomenologies of Brentano and Husserl).    
70 Husserl 1900/I, pp. 156, 159 (§41) 
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empirical psychologists are prone to do.71 The risks involved in equating 
the two are of methodological significance, since this would undermine 
the objective knowledge that is the aim of any scientific method. 
According to Husserl, its results would be merely subjective. When the 
rules of thought are regarded as psychological entities, they become the 
source of relativism and can in no way meet the standards that science 
sets for itself in terms of displaying objective content and meaning.72 
Interestingly, this is precisely the consequence Katz aims to avoid when 
he claims a partially ‘realist’ view regarding the experiences of mystics. 
The problem is that Katz does this, in part, by criticising phenomenology 
and the phenomenological method for being ‘merely subjective’ and 
arriving at ‘subjective truths’. This is because he considers 
phenomenological intuitions to ‘differ’ in content,73 thus allowing no 
room for mystical experiences and reports to be of a ‘true’ reality. This 
understanding creates difficulties for those wishing to comprehend 
Katz’s theory, since it seems to be based on a misconception of the 
phenomenological method and then framed as a contrast to this 
misconception.  
One of the central problems in interpreting Katz is his total rejection of 
phenomenology as a method of interpretation; in fact he defines his 
theory in negative relation to it.74 Speaking of this in phenomenological 
                                                
71 Husserl 1900/I, p. 159. 
72 Husserl 1900/I, p 159 (§41)  
73 Katz 1978a, p. 69: “Phenomenologists seem especially prone to this fruitless naivety 
– all intuit the ‘given’ but their intuitions differ significantly.” 
74 See Gregory 2006, p. 70, quoting Katz: “we have no trust in the phenomenological 
method”. Katz understands the phenomenological method as an “intuiting of 
essences”: “… every phenomenologist seems to intuit as the ‘essence’ of things 
something quite different from his phenomenological colleagues.  The result of the 
intuiting is only a coterie of unverifiable subjective impressions which seem to owe as 
much to what the particular phenomenologist wants to ‘intuit’ (i.e. he seems to find 
what he was looking for) as to any truly independent route-finding procedure into the 
nature of things. … We have no trust in the phenomenological method.” How closely 
Katz’s ‘intuiting of essences’ resembles a phenomenological method we need not 
discuss at the moment. Whatever the phenomenological method is – and we 
understand it primarily as the reductions – Katz cannot be applying it. It should be said, 
however, that Katz’s criticism of phenomenology targets a number of pseudo-
phenomenologists that have not taken the trouble to study Husserl’s phenomenology at 
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terms, Katz would appear to be thinking that phenomenological 
bracketing involves a bracketing of the particular ontology of the subject 
interpreted, when in fact it involves a bracketing of the ontology of the 
interpreter, allowing her to enter the context of the interpreted person 
without prejudice. Because of this apparent misunderstanding, Katz 
believes this approach to be extremely reductive in not taking into 
account the context of the interpreted, when in reality it is doing just 
that. In our examination of Katzian contextualism, for example, our aim 
will be to follow Husserl’s lead and work with Katz’s ideas without 
assuming, or even questioning or negating, the truth-value of his 
propositions. Our aim will not be to bracket Katz’s particular ontology, 
epistemology or context; these are the objects we are attempting to 
understand so as to make sense of how to account for his theory of 
interpretation. What we intend to bracket in this connection is our own 
theoretical context: our preferences, prejudices, etc. concerning how 
mystical experiences should be interpreted and understood. We also 
intend a more general phenomenological reduction by bracketing our 
own metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality or the 
existence or non-existence of God, and so forth. In this way we hope to 
approach our subject with an open frame of mind. 
The following section consists of a presentation of the basic 
interpretational framework that will guide our analysis of Katz’s 
contextual approach. Our ‘tools’ come mainly from Husserl’s 
phenomenological recommendations for a sound methodology. These 
should enable an analysis of the ontological and epistemological basis of 
Katz’s or, for that matter, any other perspective on religion and 
mysticism. 
 
1.3. A basic Interpretive Framework 
The interpretation of mystical experience has taken diverse forms, partly 
due to the various types of expression that are involved – from music to 
dance to art to text – and partly due to the various types of methodology 
that have been applied. Mystical texts, as opposed to other forms of 
                                                                                                              
the source, but instead have relied upon and accepted interpretations of 
phenomenology that have little to do with Husserl’s writings. 
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expression, carry their own interpretational challenges. For example, 
mystics are not as systematic as philosophers and interpreters of mystical 
literature would like them to be. Their literary expressions contain 
descriptions, analyses and theories embedded in metaphysical, religious, 
political and emotional categories of lived experience. Mystics combine 
descriptions of extraordinary experience with commentaries on sacred 
texts, indications of normative behavioural patterns, recitations of 
revelations, reformative additions to traditional systems of belief and 
predictions of future events. To uncover that portion of the contents of 
a text that is exclusively descriptive of the experience of the mystic is often 
a challenging task that requires precise methods for differentiating 
between strictly experiential descriptions and those that are related to 
other matters – e.g., commentaries on sacred texts. As Katz notes, 
without accessing descriptions of the mystic’s experience we cannot 
come close to understanding that experience. It is only the mystic that 
has access to her experience, and all second-hand interpretations are 
dependent upon the mystic’s report, that is, her description of the 
content of her experience.75 Thus to be able to identify and isolate that 
content which is directly descriptive of mystical experience is an essential 
part of understanding this phenomenon. 
The major problem encountered in attempts to develop effective 
methods of differentiation concerns the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the first-hand interpretative elements (the experiencer’s 
interpretation of the event) and the purely experiential elements. Second-
hand interpreters, such as philosophers of mysticism and other 
mysticism experts, describe the relation between the mystic’s experience 
and the mystic’s interpretation of the experience in different ways, 
among which two distinct types of theories are discernable: 1) experience 
and its first-hand interpretation are so intertwined that there is no way 
that the mystic can distinguish between them; and, 2) experience is ‘pure’ 
(interpretation-independent) and interpretation occurs either during or 
after the event in question, although the ‘event’ (the pure event) can be 
distinguished from the interpretation by the experiencer. Needless to say, 
                                                
75 By “first-hand interpretation” we mean the interpretation of experience, and by 
“second-hand interpretation” we mean the interpretation of the reports or first-hand 
interpretations.  
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the outcome of a second-hand interpretation of a mystical experience 
depends upon which of the above two views the second-hand interpreter 
adopts.  
The theoretical consequences of these two different views primarily 
concern the relation between the religious context of the mystic and the 
mystical experience itself. The idea that experience and first-hand 
interpretation are so intertwined as to be indistinguishable, combined 
with the idea that mystical experience is over-determined by religious 
beliefs, denies the possibility of finding a common experiential element 
across religious traditions and excludes the validity of the non-religious 
aspects of experience. Thus it makes no room for reports of 
extraordinary (near-death, nature, etc.) experiences that have no apparent 
connection to religion, but that have phenomenal characteristics and/or 
common experiential effects that are similar to those found in 
religiously-based mystical experiences. On the other hand, the idea that 
experience is pure or interpretation-independent, and that interpretation 
occurs either during or after the event, points to the possibility of a 
common experiential element to which either religious or natural 
interpretations can be applied. Whether or not the latter, non-religious, 
types of experiences are proper objects of study in mysticism research – 
whether or not they in some way inform us as to how to interpret 
experiences reported within the context of religious expressive forms – is 
a question of relevance for the theoretical basis of empirical 
investigations that may advance research on mysticism.  
In the coming chapters we will examine the theoretical consequences of 
these two views of mystical experience, and analyse the extent to which 
each shows regard for the validity of the experiencer’s self-understanding 
and increases our understanding of the phenomenon in question. The 
following subsections present the basic interpretive framework that will 
inform and guide this effort. Here the focus will be on providing an 
explanation of the terms ‘experience’ and ‘interpretation’ along with other 
terms that are related to these. The terms ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ will be 
covered in section 1.4. The purpose of offering these various definitions 
is to outline a theoretical terminology by which we can interpret the 
understandings of both Katz and the mystics and mysticism 
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philosophers he contends with. Being formed under the influence of the 
‘phenomenological bracketing’ discussed in the previous section, the 
following definitions will draw no ontological conclusions regarding the 
existence and/or nature of ultimate reality. 
 
1.3.1. Experience 
In commonsensical terms, ‘experience’ is generally referred to as that 
knowledge which is gathered through repeated personal encounters with 
everyday reality. The “experienced” individual “knows” things about the 
realities encountered. Taken one by one, each personal encounter is also 
referred to as an “experience”, or an instance of gathering knowledge. 
The relation between “accumulated knowledge” and “encounters” is 
problematic partly due to the ambiguity of the connection between the 
two: to what degree does “the accumulated knowledge” influence the 
“encounter” and to what extent does the “encounter” influence the 
“accumulated knowledge”? Thus the notion of ‘experience’ requires a 
more detailed analysis before it can be philosophically applied in the 
examination of mystical experience. In common parlance, “experience” 
is thought of as an “encounter”, a relation between a subject and an 
object or other subject (formalized as ‘sRo’). And yet ‘encounters’ differ 
from ‘experience’ in one fundamental respect: unlike stones that merely 
become wet when encountering water, subjects have a prominent feature 
that enables them to be aware of “being wet”, to reflect upon the fact, to 
position themselves in an evaluative relation to it (like it or dislike it), and to 
act in response to it. This characteristic is most commonly known as 
‘consciousness’, and although its specific nature remains elusive, it is a 
frequent conceptual ingredient in proposed solutions to the central 
problems of epistemology.  
Looking at the philosophical literature on consciousness we find very 
different accounts of its nature, functions, and even its existence. William 
James, who first considered the concept too familiar and obvious to 
define, later came to deny the existence of consciousness altogether.76 It 
                                                
76 In the article, “Does consciousness exist?”, published in 1904, James writes: “For 
twenty years past I have mistrusted ‘consciousness’ as an entity; for seven or eight years 
past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its 
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is unnecessary to take a position in the eliminativist debate in order to 
conclude that when the existence of consciousness is denied, the concept 
of ‘consciousness’ is used in a very specific way. Since some form of 
awareness (in some conceptualizations also ‘consciousness’) is required 
in order to deny the existence of anything, we must assume that 
eliminativists are also ‘aware’ (‘conscious’ in the ‘aware’-sense), but, if 
they are right, lack consciousness. For those who deny its existence, the 
term ‘consciousness’ seems sometimes to designate a substantial, often 
essentially pure, pole from which ‘awareness’ is supposed to emerge: that 
which is supposed to function as a unifier of experience and a residence 
of all experience; that which makes us aware of goings on in the field of 
consciousness events. Through the rejection of the notion of 
consciousness different conceptions of consciousness arise, and 
whatever may be meant by consciousness, its central role in 
epistemological accounts of experience remains intact.  
We next present an interpretation of Husserl’s theory of perceptual 
experience that will serve as a reference point in the coming discussion 
on mystical experience, pure experience and the cognitive foundation for 
experience in general. This does not mean that mystical experience – or 
even ‘pure experience’ or experience in general – must be perceptual (in 
the sense of being based on sensual perception). Husserl’s account of 
perceptual experience involves a role for consciousness that can be 
applied to non-perceptual experience as well.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                              
pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it 
to be openly and universally discarded.” [James 1904, p 4] In Principles of psychology (1890) 
James claims that “Everyone agrees that we [through introspection] discover states of 
consciousness”. Though this may seem as a contradiction, there need not be any 
contrast between denying consciousness as an entity and accepting the existence of 
states of consciousness.  
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1.3.2. A phenomenological account of ‘experience’ 
Husserl’s account of experience requires some acquaintance with his 
theory of the phenomenological reductions. The epoché adopted in the 
above section is primarily a suspension of the assumption that the 
objects of perception have a mind-independent existence.77 In 
phenomenological terms, this type of assumption is involved in 
apperception.78 A variety of other assumptions are also classified by some 
phenomenologists as apperceptions. Among these are the assumptions that 
the object in question is extended in space, that no other object can 
simultaneously be located in the same place, that it has an essential or 
substantial structural persistence through time, that it has certain innate 
qualities that occur independently of other objects or qualities, that it can 
be expected to behave/react in certain ways when exposed to certain 
types of procedure, that it has a reverse side that may display different 
qualities from those presented from the present point of view, and so 
forth.  
Although these types of apperception are all automatically present in 
experience, they are such that they are not readily presented as isolated 
elements to the experiencer. Consequently, an initial distinction is drawn 
between apperceived and appresented material. This distinction is meant to 
indicate that there are aspects of an experience that are not directly 
presented, but are in a sense perceived. Appresented material in a 
perceptual act is not itself apperceived because it is not objectified although 
it may be a constitutive part of the experience; it is experienced but not 
perceived because perception requires (or is) apperception.79 The notions 
‘apperception’ and ‘appresentation’ will be further illuminated in the following 
                                                
77 The Greek term epoche, borrowed from the ancient sceptics, is synonymous with the 
German term Einklammerung, in its English translation ‘bracketing’. Both ‘bracketing’ 
and ‘epoche’ will be used interchangeably throughout this section. 
78 In Husserl, 1900/II/2, p. 232 in § 4, under the headline “Beilage”, Husserl explains 
that all external objects are transcendentally apperceived in the natural attitude (and 
natural scientific mind-set). After discussing this in the context of internal and external 
perception, and the confusion that Brentano’s notion of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ has 
caused, Husserl claims that external perception is apperception (p. 233).  
79 Husserl 1900/II/2, p. 233.   
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discussion concerning the process of constituting intentional objects. 
They are mentioned here mostly to indicate what the phenomenological 
reduction is intended to do. Apperceptions are meant to be bracketed in 
order to make it possible to subject the ‘objective’ content to analysis. 
Husserl writes: 
Phenomenology is according to the theory of experiences in general, inclusive 
of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in experiences, 
and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly 
the theory of the essences of ‘pure phenomena’, the phenomena of a 
‘pure consciousness’ or of a ‘pure ego’: it does not build on the ground, 
given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of 
psycho-physical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no 
judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it 
establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or 
psychic – no psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense – and 
borrows no such truths as assumed premises. It rather takes all 
apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is 
given in adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the 
pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences 
they are in themselves: it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely 
descriptive examination into essence.80 
In Husserl’s understanding, the main reason to suspend metaphysical 
assumptions about the nature of reality is to reveal our own acts of 
consciousness and by this to enable an unbiased analysis of the 
phenomenal content of experience (noematic analysis). In a normal 
naturalistic attitude, the objects encountered in experience are not 
bracketed; they are experienced (apperceived) as ‘real’ objects that can be 
related to in various ways. We relate to objects according to the nature 
and properties that we ascribe to them, adopting particular attitudes and 
forms of conduct in relation to this or that natural object. The problem 
with this approach is that we may think or conduct ourselves improperly 
if we happen to be wrong about the nature of the object in question. If it 
is possible to be wrong about a perceived object, this indicates that 
objects are not given as they are in perception, they are given as 
perceived. What ‘perception’ is and what it does will be discussed 
forthwith. 
                                                
80 Husserl 1900/II/2, p. 235-6.  Translated by J. N. Findlay 1970, quoted from Logical 
investigations II, Routledge Keenan and Paul 1976, pp. 862-3. 
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In Husserl’s account, intentionality – that which is actively involved in 
constituting our objects of perception – forms the identification of 
objects in the field of experience. This identification of objects is 
necessary if we want to classify phenomena in terms of ‘sameness’ and 
‘difference’. Before looking at the process of identification, we want to 
emphasise that it is not our aim to engage in Husserlian exegesis. We 
have merely adopted a set of concepts from Husserl’s theory of 
consciousness that we believe will be useful in our analysis of Katz’s 
theory of interpretation. Our aim in this section is to form a clear idea of 
our account of ‘intentional object’ since it plays a major part in our 
future discussions concerning the experiences of mystics.  
Although Husserl adopted Franz Brentano’s term ‘intentionality’ (who in 
turn adopted it from the medieval Scholastics), he eventually rejected the 
meaning that Brentano had assigned it. Robert Solomon describes this 
relation as follows: 
Brentano believed that all acts were directed toward objects; and in order 
to maintain this thesis he wavered between Meinongian idealism and an 
unsatisfactory realism, populating his ontology with ‘unreal’ entities on the 
one hand, denying the reality of unfulfilled acts on the other. Husserl 
resolved this dilemma by denying the universality of intentionality in this 
sense. In place of the thesis that consciousness always takes an object, he 
substituted the thesis that consciousness is always directed.81 
The most important difference between the above two accounts of 
intentionality is that while in Brentano’s notion of intentionality “every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself”,82 in 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality, acts do not contain ‘objects’, they 
have, in Husserl’s terms, morphe and hyle.83 A consequence of this is that 
while Brentano’s intentionality is directed towards an object, or contains 
an object, Husserl’s intentionality is constitutional of objects. We will 
shortly attempt to explain what this means, but first we must emphasise 
                                                
81 Solomon 1977, p. 177.  
82 Brentano 1874, in English translation (from 1973) here quoted from Routledge 
edition 1997 p. 88.  
83 See Husserl 1913, foremost § 85. Spiegelberg defines hyle as “the immanent, non-
intentional material for an intentional act which by this act is formed into a 
transcendent, intentional object.” (Spiegelberg 1976, p. 718) 
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that it does not mean either that the mind creates (or constructs) the 
surrounding world or that it projects its psychological intentions to the 
world of experience; it means that a constitutional process takes place in 
which aspects of phenomenal experience are identified as objects. Aaron 
Gurwitsch’s interpretation of Husserl’s account of intentionality is that:  
Intentionality means the objectivating function of consciousness. In its 
most elementary form, this function consists in confronting the subject 
with senses, ideal unities, to which, as identical ones, he is free to revert an 
indefinite number of times.84 
The assumption that the phenomenal objects of perception are mind-
independently existent is also a feature of intentionality, and can as such 
be bracketed (or suspended). This procedure as applied to visual 
perception results in a phenomenal field that is not filled with ‘objects’ 
but with variously shaped patches of colour (or rather with light 
experienced in different angles with various degrees of intensity and of 
various quality – but these are rather difficult to talk about since we do 
not have the differentiating terms for these specific aspects of 
phenomenal experience). To go from this field of colours and shapes to 
the identification of ‘objects’ a process of organization must take place. 
We take a brief look at the process involved in individuating objects in a 
phenomenal field by analysing this process in terms of the concepts of 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. The purpose of this discussion is to form a 
conception of ‘intentional object’, a term that will frequently be used in 
our analysis and upon which many of our reflections and conclusions 
rest.  
Seen from the perspective of patches of colour in various shapes, it 
might not be a simple task to squeeze the juice out of the ‘yellow lemon’ 
that is sitting on ‘the brown table’. What I usually identify as a ‘lemon’ is 
now (after the suspension of existential assumptions) an indefinite 
number of shades of yellow in an indefinite number of shapes which I 
have no exact method of classifying geometrically. In this state, ‘the 
table’ being ‘brown’ (as I use to perceive it, in the natural attitude) 
appears to be a dramatic generalization of the innumerable shades of 
‘brown’ that are represented in my visual field. Some of the lighter 
                                                
84 Gurwitsch 1966, p. 138. 
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‘brown’ shades are actually very similar to the darker ‘yellow’ spots on 
what I usually would identify as a ‘lemon’, so similar that at times they 
seem identical. This phenomenally experienced identity of shade and 
shape does not enable me to identify the ‘lemon’: a certain configuration 
of form and colour that in all probability is continuously ‘shifting’ with 
continuously changing circumstances. Thus what I encounter in my 
phenomenal field of vision, that which is ‘given’ in a certain sense, is by 
no means a ‘lemon’, or even an ‘object’, but rather what in Husserl’s 
terms would be called the hyletic content of my lemon-experience.85  
However, as Solomon notes, the purpose of this analysis is not merely to 
restate the “epistemological platitude that we never simply ‘see’ material 
objects, but only material objects from a certain perspective, within a 
certain context, and so on”.86 Although it is in itself not meaningful until 
made sense of by an act (or a number of acts), hyletic material is regarded 
by Husserl as having the peculiarity of being a mediator between subject 
and object in the sense that it forms or restricts the number of 
interpretations we can give to an act of perception. The function of hyletic 
data within perceptual contexts is to provide one with information on 
consciousness-independent reality, although it cannot do that by itself 
since there are no ‘objects’ given in perception. In phenomenological 
terms, when one normally looks at a ‘lemon’ what one sees is an 
                                                
85 In Ideen einen reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Husserl warns 
against equating hyle with sense-data, because sense-data are generally associated with 
the impressions of ‘objects’, and hyle is by no means objects – not even intentional 
objects. ‘Objects’ (of whatever kind that may appear in experience) are always 
constituted, and hyletic material is assumed to function as the basis of their constitution, 
‘representing’ the features of a mind-independent world of experience. (See Husserl 
1913, § 85) In this connection, Husserl also adds that even what we generally regard as 
a ‘pure sensation’ (such as a pain or a patch of colour) also requires intentionality and 
constitution to be experienced.  
86 Solomon 1977, p. 171. Solomon argues that Gurwitsch’s analysis of Husserl’s 
concept of the noema is reductive in this way. The problem is that Gurwitsch assigns the 
concept of noema the status of a material object. In connection with his criticism of 
Gurwitsch’s interpretation, Solomon argues that “the sensory matter or ‘hyletic data’ of 
perception are not introduced on the noematic side of the act, but rather in the noesis 
itself. The purpose of this move is precisely to avoid making the sensory into an 
object.” (Solomon 1977, p. 170)  
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Abschattung (or ‘aspectual modality’87) of it because it manifests qualities 
that will disappear when seen from a different angle of vision.  
To constitute the identification of an ‘object’ with which one can interact 
and from which one can expect certain experiences, the Abschattung must 
be integrated with apperceptual and appresentational materials such as the 
conviction that it has mind-independent existence, that it has certain 
innate lemon-like qualities, that one remembers that the lemon has been 
placed on the table, and so forth. My ability to ‘look for’ the lemon rests 
entirely on the intentional characteristic of consciousness and, more 
specifically, on the noema of my intentional act.  
Solomon also notes that the concept of ‘noema’ has been interpreted in 
different ways in different philosophical traditions. The analytically 
oriented interpreters of Husserl have identified ‘noema’ with the ‘Sinn’ or 
‘meaning’ intended by Frege in his conceptual analysis; psychologically 
oriented interpreters, on the other hand, have identified Husserl’s noema 
with a ‘perceptual object’ – bracketed, but nonetheless perceptual.88 
Husserl’s analysis of intentionality is valid both in the context of 
perceptual phenomena and in that of logical/semantic analysis. Our 
purpose in this context is to develop a notion of ‘intentional object’ that 
can be applied in both logical and phenomenal analysis. 
Let us continue for a moment with Gurwitsch’s presentation of 
perceptual analysis, which sheds light on the process of identification of 
objects. Gurwitsch distinguishes the ‘real object’ from the ‘noema’ in the 
                                                
87 In phenomenological texts, the general English language term for abschattung is 
’adumbration’. Since the standard definitions of this word seem far removed from what 
Husserl intended by abschattung, I have chosen to replace it with the phrase ‘aspectual 
modality’, in the hope that it will be more meaningful.  
88 Solomon 1977, pp. 168-9. Solomon even claims that “Gurwitch’s examples, as well as 
his analysis, leave no doubt that the ‘objects’ he has in mind are in virtually every case 
material (perceptual) objects”, though I am not quite that sure that Gurwitsch identifies 
the ‘perceptual’ with the ‘material’. If it is bracketed Gurwitsch cannot be thinking of it 
as a ‘material’ object, he has no way of telling whether it is or not (and neither is it very 
interesting). This does not interfere with the fact that there is a point to Solomon’s 
distinction between different interpretations of the concept of noema.   
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precise sense that we have described the difference between the ‘lemon’ 
and its multiple-representations as experienced through a series of acts.89  
The noema, as distinct from the real object as well as from the act, turns 
out to be an irreal or ideal entity which belongs to the same sphere as 
meanings or significations. This is the sphere of sense (Sinn). The irreality 
of entities belonging to this sphere lies, first of all, in their atemporality, 
i.e., in a certain independence of the concrete act by which they are 
actualized, in the sense that every one of them may correspond, as 
identically the same, to another act, and even to an indefinite number of 
acts. Noemata are not to be found in perceptual life alone. There is a noema 
corresponding to every act of memory, expectation, representation, 
imagination, thinking, judging, volition, and so on. In all these cases, the 
object, matter of fact, etc., in itself, towards which the subject directs 
himself through the act, is to be distinguished from the object just, exactly 
just, as the subject has it in view, as, through the act, the object stands 
before the subject’s mind.90  
With reference to its ontological status, the noema seems to stand 
between the ‘real object’ and the act of consciousness, and it is worth 
noting that in Gurwitch’s account the noema is considered to be ‘irreal’ 
(ideal) because of its atemporal nature. In strict ontological terms, ‘real’ 
objects are temporal, particular and located in space. They can be 
counted (insofar as they have been identified), and they follow the laws 
of nature, not of logical reasoning. Real objects are countable because 
they occupy a certain space in time, and no two objects (say, two 
lemons), however qualitatively similar, can occupy the same space at the 
same moment of time. With respect to the question of ‘similarity’ and 
‘difference’, two objects are considered ‘similar’ if most of their 
phenomenal (experienceable) properties are shared; and if they share all 
properties they are (experientially) individuated by the specific location in 
space that they do not share with other objects – i.e., by their relational 
properties. Metaphysically speaking, they are ‘self-subsistent’, or 
‘independent’ of other objects. If I experience a ‘real’ lemon, its existence 
is not dependent either on my experiencing it or on other objects, such 
as ‘that other lemon on my brown table’. A corollary of this is that the 
colour and shape of the ‘real’ lemon are not objects, since they lack 
                                                
89 Gurwitsch 1966, p. 132. 
90 Gurwitsch 1966, p. 133. 
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independent existence. These methods of individuation can be applied to 
spatio-temporal objects, but what kind of individuation can be applied to 
an atemporal or ideal object/entity?  
What about the noema? Can noemata be quantitatively measured? Is there a 
relation of correspondence between noema and object, or are noemata – 
like objects – also individuated by acts? How many noemata would I have 
if I saw two lemons on the table? And if I were to think of a lemon 
(intentionally looking for it) and then be presented with a basket full of 
lemons, would I be able to find or recognize the lemon I was thinking of 
(or looking for)?  
In Gurwitsch’s account, acts are individuated occurrences and so are the 
noemata, which in turn stay the same through the variety of acts that may 
be directed towards an object.91 According to Gurwitsch, the relation 
that holds between acts of consciousness and noemata is not a one-to-one 
correspondence: 
To each act there corresponds a noema – namely, an object just, exactly 
and only just, as the subject is aware of it and has it in view, when he is 
experiencing the act in question. Consciousness is not to be mistaken for a 
mere unidimensional sphere composed of acts, as real psychical events, 
which co-exist and succeed one another. Rather, it ought to be considered 
as a correlation, or correspondence, or parallelism between the plane of acts, psychical 
events, noeses, and a second plane which is that of sense (noemata). This correlation 
is such that corresponding to each act is its noema, but the same noema may 
correspond to an indefinite number of acts. It is then not a one-to-one 
correspondence.  
     The noetico-noematic correlation is what the term intentionality must 
signify. In this light the formula consciousness of something is to be 
understood: a conscious act is an act of awareness, presenting to the 
subject who experiences it a sense, an ideal atemporal unity, identical, i.e., 
identifiable.92  
Here we are told that noemata are objects of awareness, “exactly and only 
just” as they appear to a subject when he experiences an act, and that a 
                                                
91 Gurwitsch 1966, p. 139. Gurwitsch writes: “Objectivity is identifiableness, i.e., the 
possibility of reverting again and again to what, through the present experienced act, is 
offered to consciousness and the possibility of so doing whether in the same or in any 
other mode of awareness. This holds good for real as well as ideal objects.” 
92 Gurwitsch 1966, p. 138.  
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relation of correspondence exists between the acts and their noemata. 
Although we want to pick up on the ‘objectivating’ or ‘individuating’ 
function of intentionality that Gurwitsch advances, there still are 
problems concerning the relationship between noemata and real objects, 
problems that can be traced to the individuation of the noema. This will 
be an important issue in the upcoming discussion on problems of 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in experience. To determine whether the 
objects in the experiences of mystics are the same, similar or different, 
one must first identify the elements that one wishes to compare.   
Even if the “same noema may correspond to an indefinite number of 
acts”, it is, in Gurwitsch’s account, the acts that constitute the 
individuation criteria for a noema – i.e., to each act there is one noema – 
and if acts are not countable then neither are noemata. And if noemata are 
uncountable, it is logically impossible to say what relations there are 
between the real object and the noema. In other words, the real objects 
cannot be correlated with the noemata or acts. My perception of one 
lemon may require a number of acts, but so does my perception of two 
lemons or a basket full of lemons. The fact that the noema stays ‘the 
same’ throughout the number of ‘different’ acts that constitute it can 
only mean that noemata are identifiable and thus ‘real’, in the sense that 
‘identifiable’ implies. Thus if it is not the acts that individuate the noema, 
what about the possibility that the noema are individuated by way of hyletic 
material? Pure hyletic material, however, is only a certain amount of 
chaotic nonsense until individuated (and made sense of) by acts, which 
means that with respect to hyle there are also problems of individuation 
for the noema. Hyle functions to restrict the number of shapes a noema can 
take and to mediate mind-independent reality. 93However, in its function 
as a mediator of mind-independent reality, it is incapable of revealing the 
‘real object’. The reason is that objects in general need to be revealed 
through a number of acts, with each act being based upon its own hyle. 
Moreover, it may very well be that these acts work by way of hyle to limit 
the possible outcomes in terms of noemata – and eventually individuate 
                                                
93 See also the discussion concerning the double function of hyle in Haglund 1977, pp. 
200-5.  
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the ‘intentional object’. However, if hyle is characterized as ‘sensual data’94 
it obviously cannot limit (or individuate) the noemata of non-perceptual 
experiences like thinking of a lemon. 
Nevertheless, numerical identity in the world of physical objects also 
requires demarcation criteria in terms of the qualitative features of the 
objects in question. The identification of an object requires recognitional 
criteria in terms of quality as opposed to property, if by ‘property’ we mean 
ontological criteria for object identification, and by ‘quality’ we mean 
phenomenological criteria for the same. The problems of fallible 
perception persist through the phenomenological reductions; they are 
neither eliminated nor solved, only set aside. We do not ask whether the 
qualitative aspects of our experienced reality correspond exactly to some 
essence or essential property in a ‘reality’ independent of experience; we 
take them at ‘face value’. With respect to the problems of fallibility, the 
phenomenological reduction (i.e., the ‘setting aside’ of existential 
judgements) functions to reveal the acts that constitute the objects in our 
experiences. This helps to determine the points where fallibility is, or 
may be, a factor. A real object may very well exist, yet still be partially 
misapprehended (be ascribed non-actualized properties). In such a case, 
its existence does not matter: it is improperly individuated and thus there 
is still no one-to-one correspondence between a real object and an 
intentional object. The responsibility for the fallible aspects of 
perception and thinking rests with the surplus of the noema, what we 
have called ‘apperceptive’ elements in the intentional object.  
Our intent in this limited context has not been to solve either the 
problem of the double function of hyle or the problematic status and 
individuation of the noema. These considerations have been discussed 
with the specific intent of providing an understanding of the notion of 
‘intentional object’ that will be useful in our analysis of Katz’s theory of 
interpretation of mystical experience. To summarize the perceptual 
                                                
94 Husserl warns against identifying hyle with ‘sensual data’ since, reasonably enough, 
sensual data also have an interpretive aspect if they are experienced. Hyle is supposedly 
‘pure’ (amorhphic) while ‘sensual data’ are not. See Husserl’s discussion in Husserl 
1913, §85.  
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process that has been described in phenomenological terms, we could 
say that: 
i) Non-qualitative data (hyle) function as a limitation to the forms that the 
noema can take.95 
ii) The objectivating function of intentionality makes hyletic material 
available to cognition by constitution and individuation of ‘objects’. 
iii) When the noesis is formed through the combination of hyle and morphe 
in the case of a perceptual act, the noema defines the perceptual content 
just, and only just, as it is presented to the perceiver.   
We have not yet said how apperceptual and appresentational content 
function in relation to the noema. As we initially indicated, the existential 
setting is a form of apperception, and this procedure is not given 
experientially, it can be performed independently of the ‘matter of fact’ 
condition of the ‘object’. In this respect, there is no distinction between 
imaginary and real objects. This, however, should not be misunderstood 
to mean that only imaginary objects are included in the 
phenomenological analysis – imaginary objects in a natural attitude 
being: unicorns, mermaids and other not non-spatio-temporal entities. 
They are included as intentional objects, and they may be intended or 
talked about ‘as existent’, i.e., they can be apperceived. The problem with 
these objects is that from an empirical standpoint they cannot be 
intersubjectively individuated, so that we can be sure that we speak of 
the same Santa, unicorn, or mermaid. That is, they can not be perceived, but 
they certainly are apperceived.96  
                                                
95 Compare this to Dick Haglund’s distinction in Haglund 1984, where he discusses the 
problems concerning the function of hyle to delimit the noema in combination with the 
fact that hyle lacks phenomenal properties. Haglund points out that the function of hyle 
is to limit the noema, although not completely since there would be no problem of 
fallible or illusive perception in that case. Haglund suggests that we should separate the 
two functions of hyle in order to enable the contradicting features of hyle to collaborate.  
96 Compare to Husserl’s “Ist ein äusserer Gegenstand wahrgenommen (das Haus), so 
sind in dieser Wahrnehmung die präsentierenden Empfindungen erlebt, aber nicht 
wahrgenommen. Indem wir uns über die Existenz des Hauses täuschen, täuschen wir 
uns über die Existenz der erlebten sinnlichen Inhalte schon darum nicht, weil wir über 
sie gar nicht urteilen, bzw. sie in dieser Wahrnemnung nicht wahrnehmen.” We cannot 
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Appresented material is also hyletically based, although we have not 
addressed the complicated question of how appresentations function in 
relation to memory – i.e., to what extent they can be retained. While an 
exhaustive discussion on this issue would be inappropriate here, suffice it 
to say that the bulk of problems posited by cognitive science circle 
around it. What we can say, however, is that both apperceived and 
appresented experiential content play a large part in memory and in the 
future constitution of objects, and also in judgemental processes 
concerning phenomena not presently perceived. A single perceptual 
identification-act might seem to require the involvement of memory in 
its constitutive process, and by that co-presented with the apperceptual 
(sense-based) content.  
It is in these terms that we want to define our notion of intentional objects: 
Intentional Object: The object apperceived through the synthesis of 
intentional acts, which – in the case of perception – is based on the presence of 
hyle. 
We began this subsection with Husserl’s definition of pure 
phenomenology as “the theory of the essences of pure phenomena, 
phenomena of a pure consciousness or of a pure ego”. On this basis we 
have learned that ‘pure phenomena’ appear when the intentional object 
is stripped of its apperceptive aspects (in perception we are left with an 
Abschattung of the object that we have discussed in terms of ‘patches of 
colour’). Before we move on to the notions of ‘pure self’ and ‘pure 
consciousness’ we need to clarify certain issues concerning the 
‘intentional object’ in relation to Katz’s epistemology of experience.  
 
1.3.3. Katz’s model of intentionality and objects  
Although Katz regularly emphasises the inadequacy of both the 
phenomenological method and of phenomenological analysis, his 
vocabulary often makes it appear as if he is speaking as a 
phenomenologist. However, the fact that Katz makes use of terms such 
as ‘intentional object’ and ‘intentional acts’ does not necessarily indicate 
                                                                                                              
be wrong or right about the sense-data (Empfindungen) since we do not make any 
judgements about them at all, and they are therefore not apperceived.   
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that he ascribes the same meanings to these terms as we do. Let us take a 
look at Katz’s account of intentionality:  
This entire area of the ‘intentionality’ of experience and language of 
experience as it relates to mysticism is a rich area for further study. By way 
of only introducing the significance of this topic for our concerns, I will 
merely suggest that, if one looks closely at the language of mystics, as well 
as at mystical devotion, practices, and literature, one will find that much 
of it is ‘intentional’ in the sense suggested by Husserl and Brentano. 
Though I am no great admirer of either with regard to their more general 
metaphysical positions, their discussion of ‘intentional language’ per se is 
instructive, for it calls to our attention, that certain terms such as ‘expects’, 
‘believes’, ‘hopes’, ‘seeks’, ‘searches’, ‘desires’, ‘wants’, ‘finds’, ‘looks for’, 
involve as Brentano said, ‘an object in themselves’. We must heed the 
warning that the linguistic intentionality does not generate or guarantee 
the existence of the ‘intentional object’, but we must also recognise the 
epistemologically formative character of intentional language mirroring as 
it does intentional acts of consciousness. Using the language modern 
phenomenologists favour we might say that ‘intentionality’ means to 
describe a ‘datum as meant’, i. e. to be aware that an action includes a 
reach for some specific meaning or meaningful content.97 
We see here that Katz bases his understanding of ‘intentionality’ on 
linguistic features, and connects it to the descriptive empirical 
psychology that Husserl leaves behind with the epoche.98 What we must 
ask in this circumstance is what it means that “linguistic intentionality 
does not generate or guarantee the existence of the ‘intentional object’”. 
If intentional terms “involve … ‘an object in themselves’” and this 
‘object’ is the ‘intentional object’ then how can it not exist? There seems 
to be a discrepancy in these terms that requires some explaining. If Katz 
means, with reference to Brentano, that intentionality includes or 
involves or contains an ‘object’, then it cannot be an ‘object’ that does 
not exist. Katz must mean that it is the natural referent of the intensional 
expression that does not exist, or, put differently, that the object that 
corresponds to the representation is not real. As we have said, Santa, 
                                                
97 Katz 1978a, p. 63.  
98 See for instance Die Idee der Phänomenologie where he explicitly states this after 
introducing the bracketing of existential settings: “We are finally leaving the ground of 
psychology, even that of descriptive psychology” (my translation). This is a major point 
in the totality of Husserl’s work.  
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mermaids and unicorns are all objects that do not exist, yet we talk about 
them and have intentional acts constituting them. This does not mean 
other than the truisms that “we can talk about things that do not exist” 
or “there are words in language that do not have natural referents”. This 
awkward usage of the term ‘intentional object’ turns out to be more 
significant than it would seem at first; it raises a problem which is at the 
heart of the most central difference between the positions of Husserl 
and Brentano. As will be shown, Katz’s position leans on a notion of 
intentionality that is mainly Brentano’s, and Brentano’s notion is 
informed by the pre-bracketed, natural attitude that Husserl claimed to 
be inadequate for an analysis of experience. According to Husserl, 
Brentano’s mistake was that when he considered the fallibility of 
perception, he included the ‘psychological phenomena’ as ‘objects’ in the 
analysed experiences: 
We are told that: Outer perception is not evident, and is even delusive. 
This is undoubtedly the case if we mean by the ‘physical phenomena’ 
what such perception perceives, physical things, their properties and 
changes etc. But when Brentano exchanges his authentic, and alone 
permissible sense of the word ‘perceive’, for an improper sense which 
relates, not to external objects, but to presenting contents, i.e., contents 
present as real parts (reell angehörigen) in perception, and when he 
consequently gives the name of ‘physical phenomena’, not merely to outer 
objects, but also to these contents, these latter seem infected with the 
fallibility of outer perception..99 
In the end, this view of the contents of experience must lead to a 
sceptical position regarding all elements of experience to the effect that 
even the self-evident phenomena are doubted. It is a reflection of the 
problems involved in assuming a natural attitude when entertaining 
epistemological concerns. The epoche is the solution to these problems, as 
no existential judgments are made concerning the phenomena of 
experience, and thus the phenomena stand on an equal ontological level 
of reality.  
Relating this difference between Husserl and Brentano back to Katz’s 
awkward usage of the term ‘intentional object’, it appears that his 
                                                
99 Husserl 1900/II/2, p. 237. Translation by J. N. Findlay 1970, in Logical Investigations, 
vol II, Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd 1976, p. 864. 
  
 70  
analysis of experience is formed in a natural (non-bracketed) attitude and 
that his sense of ‘intentional objects’ is quite different from the 
phenomenological sense intended in our definition of  this term.  
The following definitions will serve as a means of distinguishing between 
these two notions of intentional object:   
Real Object: A selfsubsistent entity in a mind-independent world of objects.  
If intensional language mirrors intentional acts of consciousness, then 
‘look for’, ‘seek’ and ‘search’ denote intentional acts, and consequently 
when Katz says that “linguistic intentionality does not generate or 
guarantee the existence of the ‘intentional object’”, he must mean that it 
“does not generate or guarantee the existence of the ‘[real] object’”. This 
would mean that we can seek, search and look for objects that do not 
exist. What then happens to the notion ‘object’ that linguistic 
intentionality is supposed to involve? What sense would it make to say, 
“That ‘object’ may not exist”? Do we seek, search and look for nothing? 
We can safely say that this is generally not the case.  
Looking at this from a semantic perspective: does the truth value of 
sentences of the type “P looks for o” change if o does not exist? Is P 
looking for nothing, or is P not looking at all? In intensional cases where 
the ‘intentional’ (i.e., ‘real’) object’ does not exist, there must be some 
other entity whose existence is beyond doubt in order to sustain the 
reality of the intentional act. Expressed differently, the truth-conditions 
of the sentence, “P is looking for o”, concern P’s looking for o, not the 
existence of o. Thus when Katz refers to the necessity of including an 
‘object’ in the intentional act (or intensional semantic context), the 
intentional object referred to appears to be some form of 
‘representation’ of objects – ideal entities that may or may not be 
correlated to any natural occurrences whatsoever. These objects are 
subjective in the sense that no one has access to them except the person 
who intends them. We call them ‘irreal objects’:     
Irreal Object: An object internal to consciousness that is psychologically 
represented as a real object – i.e. a non-existing, merely imagined real object. 
Katz does not explicitly use the terms ‘real’ and ‘irreal object’, and he has 
no definition or explication regarding what an ‘intentional object’ is. In 
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our view, Katz’s notion of the term ‘intentional object’ means something 
other than ‘intentional object’ in the phenomenological sense, and this 
for two fundamental reasons: first, the idea that the intentional object is 
a constituted entity does not appear to be represented in Katz’s 
perspective; and, second, Katz in no sense adopts the phenomenological 
epoche in his approach. If anything, he has shown great scepticism 
towards it.  
What nature the object of intention is ascribed in different accounts of 
experience plays a major role in the conceptualization of different 
notions of pure experience. Before discussing the different meanings 
that may be attached to the notion of pure experience, we explore the 
different meanings that may be attached to the notion of “self” or “ego” 
in the literature on mystical experience, also a major factor in different 
conceptualizations of pure experience. In this way we attempt to more 
exactly identify what it is that Katz denies in his statement, “there are NO 
pure … experiences”.100 
 
1.3.4. Empirical ego and pure self 
The discussion that initiated this section concerned the denial among 
certain philosophers that consciousness exists, and how it is in a very 
specific sense that the ‘existence’ of consciousness is denied. Again, we 
must distinguish the question of existence from the question of 
phenomenally experienced entities. We recently discussed the possibility 
that there may be both phenomenal experiences and discussions of 
things that appear not to exist. Here we bracket the question of whether 
or not a ‘pure self’ exists in order to open the way for a discussion on 
different conceptions of the self, and the manner in which the ‘self’ is 
phenomenally experienced, or, rather, constituted.  
We can begin our discussion by taking a look at Galen Strawson’s 
attempt to explicate man’s experience and conception of his “self”: 
What then is the ordinary human sense of self, in so far as we can 
generalize about it? I propose that it is (at least) the sense that people have 
of themselves as being, specifically, a mental presence; a mental someone; 
                                                
100 Katz 1978a, p. 26 
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a single mental thing that is a conscious subject of experience, that has a 
certain character or personality, and that is in some sense distinct from all its 
particular experiences, thoughts and so on, and indeed from all other things.101  
One problem with this account is the occurrence of ‘mental’ in relation 
to ‘presence’, ‘someone’ and ‘thing’. This implies a metaphysical position 
concerning the nature of this ‘self’ (viz. that of its being ‘mental’), and 
the best way to overcome this difficulty is to ‘bracket’ the term ‘mental’ 
in the above quotation. Whatever its nature, properties or factual 
existence may turn out to be, if we take Strawson’s proposal seriously 
(after excluding the term ‘mental’), the self is experienced as an entity, 
separate from other entities, and, as a starting point for our discussion, 
“distinct from all its particular experiences, thoughts and so on”. In a conception 
of ‘self’ as being the sum of, or equivalent to, particular thoughts and 
experiences, there is no need to posit a ‘self’ that is distinct from all that. 
Since it is difficult (if not impossible) to deny the occurrence of experiences 
and thoughts, a denial of the ‘self’s’ existence is generally a denial in this 
latter sense – i.e., a denial that it is something else (other than the 
experiencing and thinking person) who is having the experiences and 
thoughts. For the purpose of clarity and to facilitate our discussion on 
different accounts of the ‘self’ (accounts that can be found in both 
mystical literatures and philosophical investigations), we introduce a set 
of concepts to help distinguish between these separate notions of self 
(both of which have different functional and qualitative attributes):102 
Pure Self: The non-empirical, primitive, experience-transcendending self; 
consciousness as an entity separate from empirical qualities  
                                                
101 Strawson 2000 (in Models of the self, ed. Gallager and Shear, first published in Journal of 
consciousness studies 4, 1997. Models of the self, also contains several articles criticising 
Strawson’s conceptualization of the self. See for instance Hirstein’s and Ramachadran’s 
neuroscientific model in “Three laws of qualia: what neurology tells us about the 
biological functions of consciousness, qualia and the self”, where they argue that the 
experience of a unified self, distinct from all experience and thoughts, is an illusion 
caused by neurobiological processes.) 
102 The distinction between these two notions of ‘self’ is commonly made, although the 
terms used to draw the distinction tend to vary. As examples, there is Mead’s famous 
‘I’-‘Me’ and Fisher’s ‘Self’-‘I’.  
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Empirical Self: The experienceable and experiencing self; consciousness as 
the sum of a person’s intentional acts (particular experiences and particular 
thoughts). 
These should be viewed as technical terms that enable us to understand 
some of the conceptual manifestations of ‘pure self’, and should not be 
taken as designating different parts of the self. As has been emphasised 
several times, our aim here is not to establish the existence of any entity; 
rather it is to enable an understanding of the controversy surrounding 
some of the philosophical and mystical accounts of the self. And 
although the above distinction between the primitive self and the 
empirical self by no means exhausts the various ways of conceptualizing 
the ‘self’ in philosophical and mystical texts, the separation of the 
primitive from the empirical self has had several functions for 
philosophers and mystics. Among these functions we find the often 
emphasised one of unifying experiences into a system or complex that 
remains identical throughout the contingencies and changes over time 
that constitute the empirical self. The identification of the ‘self’ with the 
phenomena (more accurately ‘stream’) of thinking and experiencing is 
not uncommon among modern phenomenologists,103 and Husserl also 
held this view in his Logische Untersuchungen. After quoting Natorp and 
referring to investigators that had embraced Kant’s theory of the ‘pure 
self’ (those who give the ‘self’ the function of being the ‘pole’ of all 
experience), Husserl claimed that: 
I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego, 
this primitive, necessary centre of relations. The only thing I can take note 
of, and therefore perceive, are the empirical ego and its empirical relations 
to its own experiences, or to such external objects as are receiving special 
attention at the moment, while much remains, whether ‘without’ or 
‘within’, which has no such relation to the ego.104 
In a note inserted for the second edition of Logische Untersuchungen (1913 
– simultaneous with the publication of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie 
und phänomenologische Philosophie), Husserl adds, however, 
                                                
103 See for instance Gurwitsch’s article ”A non-egological notion of consciousness”, in 
Gurwitsch 1966,  
104 Husserl 1900/II/1, p. 361. Translation by J. N. Findlay 1970, in Logical investigations I, 
Routledge & Keegan Paul 1976, pp. 549-50.   
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I have since managed to find it, i.e. have learned not to be led astray from 
a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic.105 
There are perfectly sound phenomenological reasons to regard the 
notion of a pure self as irrelevant in phenomenological contexts, since a 
transcendental ‘self’ cannot be experienced and is thus phenomenologically 
irrelevant. We will not speculate as to why Husserl had the change of 
mind indicated in the above note. The important thing to emphasise 
(and perhaps part of the reason Husserl altered his view) is that this pure 
self is the same, and functions as a chain that links all diverse experiences 
into a unified system. In Ideen Husserl expresses this view and prepares 
us for the effect of the phenomenological reduction in connection with 
the pure Ego:   
So much is clear from the outset, that after carrying this reduction 
through, we shall never stumble across the pure Ego as an experience 
among others within the flux of manifold experiences which survives as 
transcendental residuum; nor shall we meet it as a constitutive bit of 
experience appearing with experience of which it is an integral part and 
again disappearing. The Ego appears to be permanently, even necessarily, 
there, and this permanence is obviously not that of a solid unshifting 
experience, of a “fix idea”. On the contrary, it belongs to every experience 
that comes in streams past, its “glance” goes “through” every actual cogito, 
and towards the object. This visual ray changes with every cogito, shooting 
forth afresh with each new one as it comes, and disappearing with it. But 
the Ego remains self-identical. In principle, at any rate, every cogiatio can 
change, can come and go, even though it may be open to doubt whether 
each is necessarily perishable, and not merely, as we find it, perishable in 
point of fact. But in contrast to the pure Ego appears to be necessary in 
principle, and as that which remains absolutely self-identical in all real and 
possible changes of experience, it can in no sense be reckoned as a real part 
or phase of the experiences themselves.106       
The pure self must remain unaffected by its acts, so as to remain the same 
through the contingencies of various experiences and thoughts. Actions, 
feelings and perceptions are empirical experienceable events; the pure 
                                                
105 Husserl 1900/II/1, p. 361. Translation by J.N. Findlay 1970, in Logical investigations I, 
Routledge & Keegan Paul 1976, p. 549. This note might be read as a direct comment 
on Strawson’s mentalistic position 
106 Husserl 1913, p. 109, §57  Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, in Ideas – general 
introduction to pure phenomenology, George Allen and Unwin, Humanities Press 1976, p. 
172. 
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self, even if it is included in each percept, does not participate as a true 
part of each percept, which is why it is possible for Husserl to claim 
phenomenological viability for the pure self; the pure self penetrates the 
empirical self (all intentional acts) and is as such a “transcendence in 
immanence”.107  
We have already mentioned how the pure self has several functions to 
fulfil in both philosophical and mystical literature. As such, it has also 
been at the centre of controversy in theological discussions, a conflict 
between mystical interpretations of the notion of the self and the 
orthodox views of the major world religions. Although we save the 
discussion concerning the relationship between mysticism and religion 
for the next section, we can here indicate that our position implies that 
each mystical/religious phenomenon/experience can be given both a 
‘mystical’ interpretation and an ‘orthodox’ (or ‘lawful’) interpretation. 
When framed in terms of this understanding, Katz’s argument is that we 
should interpret mystical/religious phenomena in an ‘orthodox’ fashion, 
i.e. that the ‘laws’ of religion also apply to the mystics in the respective 
tradition; his perennialists opponents, on the other hand, argue that a 
mystical interpretation should be given to experiences and phenomena 
that are related to both religious and secular contexts, and that mystics 
quite often go beyond the traditional beliefs of their religious traditions. 
It is a conflict with epistemological and methodological dimensions, and 
if this implies that we see mysticism as a ‘method’ or a ‘theory of 
interpretation’, it does not conflict with the rest of our position 
concerning mysticism. While these issues are discussed further ahead, we 
shall here briefly indicate how the notion of the pure self can be 
interpreted in either a ‘mystical’ or an ‘orthodox’ fashion.       
In orthodox interpretations of the Christian tradition, the pure self is 
interpreted as a personal soul, while in the usage of many Christian 
mystics the pure self becomes God. (This also seems true of the relation 
between the orthodox Islamic religionist and the Sufi, as the Sufi, by 
experiencing and becoming One with God, threatens the exclusiveness, 
externality and ‘wholly otherness’ of God.) We take a couple of examples 
                                                
107 Husserl 1913, p. 110, §57  
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from the Christian tradition to illustrate what is meant by this, starting 
with Eckhart: 
For it is of the very essence of the soul that she is powerless to plumb the 
depths of her creator. And here one cannot speak of the soul any more, 
for she has lost her nature yonder in the oneness of divine essence. There 
she is no more called soul, but is called immeasurable being.108 
And St. Catherine of Genoa: 
My Me is God, nor do I recognize any other Me except my God 
himself.109 
It is obvious that such views carry the potential of becoming major 
sources of theological conflict within a given tradition. From an 
orthodox theological perspective (of whatever traditional religion) it is 
madness to think that either the pure self or the empirical self is God. In 
the Christian tradition the merging of self with God has been termed 
“mystic union”. In secular context, reports of ‘a feeling of unity’ (with 
Ultimate Being, Nature, Universal Self, or whatever) are consequently 
treated as ‘mystical’ by the perennial philosophers of mysticism. The 
‘feeling of unity’ is, in fact, one of the phenomenal characteristics of 
mystical experience listed by Stace, and many philosophers of mysticism 
take this feeling to be the primary sign that the experience has been 
‘mystical’.110 The logic of the pure self does not permit it to be 
individuated in the manner of the empirical self. Without properties and 
instantiation the pure self of one mystic becomes the pure self of 
another, which is the same (meaning ‘identical’ or ‘one’, not similar in 
sharing the same properties) pure self that all men have a part of or have 
empirical selves as instantiations of. If the empirical self is the sum of all 
thoughts and experiences that constitute it, and that are the foundation 
                                                
108 Eckhart quoted from Huxley 1945, p. 12. The first chapter in Huxley’s Perennial 
Philosophy is a rich source of quotations on the issue of the ‘self’ in relation to God.  
109 St. Catherine of Genoa quoted from Huxley 1945, p. 11. 
110 See for instance Ralph Hood’s and Nelson Pike’s accounts. In Hood 2001, p. 3 (the 
article is titled “Conceptual criticisms of regressive explanations of mysticism”), Hood 
writes: “…it is the consensus among investigators of both Eastern and Western 
mysticism that an experience of unity is, in fact, the major defining characteristic of 
mysticism.” In the introduction to his Mystic Union Nelson Pike refers to this same 
characteristic.  
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for new experiences and their interpretation, is it then possible to have 
experiences without the empirical self? Is it at all possible to get rid of 
(or bracket, or suspend) the qualities of the empirical self – all the 
thoughts and memories of experiences, all the intentional acts that 
constitute it? If it is possible, will there be a pure self that survives the 
death of the empirical self, or is there merely Nothingness?  
 
1.3.5. Katz and the idea of a pure self 
The questions just raised are not questions we intend to answer here, 
since answering them implies a number of metaphysical considerations 
and discussions that we have excluded by applying the 
phenomenological reduction. They are nonetheless of relevance here 
because by classifying various possible answers we hope to make a 
characterization of mysticism possible and also to improve our 
understanding of Katz’s position on these matters. The 
phenomenological reduction might prevent us from engaging in 
metaphysics, but it does not stop us from discussing, analysing and 
comparing metaphysical systems (without determining the truth or 
falsehood of any particular one), since these systems are also a part of 
how an experience is interpreted. In this context, the focus will be on the 
semantic possiblities of the pure self. The denial of the existence of 
consciousness, pure self, God, and other empirically unobservable 
entities is certainly a part of some metaphysical system, and we will have 
to ask how Katz’s system of interpretation should be categorized in this 
respect. If the type of experience known as ‘mystic union’, which is often 
connected to the metaphysics of the pure self, is also intimately related 
to different accounts of ‘pure experience’, what does Katz mean by 
“there are NO pure experiences”? Does he mean that he does not 
believe in the metaphysical reality of the pure self? If ‘yes’, then how 
does this affect Katz’s theory of interpretation with respect to our 
evaluative criteria? If ‘no’, we may ask what Katz considers to be the 
nature and function of such a ‘pure’ self’. Is it a ‘thing’ like the ‘soul’ 
(qualitatively personal, instantiated), or is it more like the Universal Self 
of the mystics? If Katz has an agnostic attitude on these issues, then on 
what grounds does he support the assumption that there are no pure 
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experiences?111 All we know thus far is that Katz definitely denies the 
possibility of pure experience. And our aim is to find a reasonable 
explanation of what this might mean by comparing different possible 
interpretations and their general logical implications.                 
Another of Katz’s arguments leads us to conclude that Katz’s theory 
implies the non-existence of the pure self. It is his rejection of the 
possibility of suspending one’s existential judgements and entering into a 
non-interpretive state that is nevertheless experiential. Such a view is 
made plain in his opposition to Robert Forman, who claims the 
existence of a pure consciousness event (PCE) defined as “a wakeful but 
content-less (non intentional) experience.”112 Forman claims to have 
reached this state after many years of transcendental meditation, a 
method that can be described, in Arthur Deikman’s terms, as a process 
of “deautomatization”.113 Deautomatization implies that the interpretive 
pattern of the subject is successively reduced to different levels of 
intensity. For a Pure Consciousness Event, we assume it must be 
reduced to zero, as is indicated by Forman’s “non-intentional” and 
“content-less” experience. Katz, on the other hand, argues that this 
description of what happens to mystics is inaccurate, and that rather than 
deconditioning or unconditioning consciousness they (the mystics) are 
reconditioning consciousness.114 This means that their interpretive 
pattern is not undone but merely altered – exchanged for another 
interpretive pattern.  
The general technique indicated by Forman’s account – which resembles 
the phenomenological reduction and is performed in a variety of ways – 
is understood in the perennial and mystical interpretations of experience 
as the universal means of reaching ‘enlightenment’, meaning insight into 
a universal truth (be it of God’s nature, human nature or the nature of 
                                                
111 Katz claims that it is because of the way human beings are (Katz 1978a, p. 26) that 
there are no pure experiences, but to us it seems that this is a metaphysical claim with 
no argumentative value whatsoever. As such it cannot support an assumption of the 
kind made by Katz.  
112 Forman 1999a, p 367 (In Models of the self 1999), Forman describes PCE as 
“encounters with consciousness devoid of intentional content” 
113 See Deikman 1973 (1966) 
114 Katz 1978a, p. 57. We discuss the details of this further in chapter four. 
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Nature). These ‘methods’ to achieve illuminative experiences are based 
on the principle that the empirical self is an obstacle to the acquisition of 
universal knowledge because it is contingent and limited. The empirical 
self (thoughts, experiences, feelings, etc.) needs to be extinguished in 
order to ‘purely see’ (realize, ‘know’) the true nature of things without 
presuppositions or prejudice. Thus one can understand how Katz’s 
central epistemological assumption that “there are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) 
experiences”,115 can be viewed by certain critics as a type of non-
cognitivism concerning ‘universal truths’.116  
The fact that the above mentioned ‘methods’ may take different shapes 
under different contextual circumstances neither eliminates the 
similarities nor advances our discussion on the issues of concern here. 
As such this topic will not be pursued. What should be mentioned at this 
point is that certain religious contexts have certain requirements that must 
be met in order for a mystical experience to be accepted as genuine. 
Moreover, in some of the more orthodox of these religious contexts, one 
such requirement is that an experience must be ‘given’ in order to be 
regarded as ‘pure’. In other words, in order for the mystical experience to 
be considered a genuine experience of God, no sort of manipulation of 
the ‘self’ must be involved as an aid. In these religious traditions, or 
religious interpretive patterns, mystical experiences are accepted as 
‘genuine’ if and only if they occur spontaneously and are not induced or 
assisted by such ‘external’ means as meditation, fasting, drugs and so 
forth. According to these traditions, the employment of these sorts of 
means raises the possibility that the state of the experiencer has been 
affected such that it may not be the Truth that characterizes the 
experience, but delusion and deception instead. 
There are several indications that Katz holds some variation of this view 
(see chapters four and five); in light of this, how are we to understand 
the assumption that there are no pure experiences? Can it be interpreted 
as meaning that there are no ‘genuine’ mystical experiences? If this 
interpretation is correct, it would seem that such a conclusion would be 
more applicable in a theological or metaphysical context rather than one 
                                                
115 Katz 1978a, p. 26.  
116 See chapter two on criticisms against Katz’s position. 
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that is strictly philosophical. In this regard, we have already discussed 
how interpreting a certain phenomenon through the lens of a specific 
metaphysical pattern may limit one’s understanding of that phenomenon 
(see section 1.2). Taken to its maximum level of absurdity, such an 
approach can lead to an outright denial of the validity of the 
phenomenon in question – in this case, mystical experience. 
The issue of the pure self as seen through a ‘mystical’ model of 
interpretation indicates the direction to be taken in understanding the 
totality of Katz’s approach. Katz is explicit about being against the 
perennial interpretations of mystical experiences, not the experiences 
themselves. Even before introducing his epistemological assumption, he 
declares that “There is no philosophia perennis, Huxley and many others 
notwithstanding”.117 Here Katz refers to what he interprets as Huxley’s 
idea that there is a “common denominator among peoples of diverse 
religious backgrounds”, which Katz classifies as an “ecumenical desire” 
associated with missionary activity.118 The following is a comparison 
between Katz’s interpretation of the Buddhist experience of 
‘nothingness’ and Huxley’s interpretation of the Buddha’s notion of pure 
self. While Katz’s views are not explicit when it comes to the 
perennialists’ unorthodox interpretations of the primitive self as 
something Universal, his orthodoxy is explicitly manifest in the selection 
of interpretations he uses to exemplify the truth of his theory. We start 
with Katz’s comparative analysis of the Buddhist search for Nirvana: 
…when the Jewish mystic performs his special mystical devotions and 
meditations, kavvanot, he does so in order to purify his soul, i.e. to remove 
the soul from its entrapment in the material world in order to liberate it 
for its upward spiritual ascent culminating in devekuth, adhesion to God’s 
emanations, the Sefiroth. The Buddhist mystic, on the other hand, 
performs his meditative practices as an integral part of the Buddhist 
mystical quest, not in order to free the soul from the body and purify it, 
but rather in order to annihilate suffering by overcoming any notion of a 
substantial ‘self’ or ‘soul’ is the essential illusion which generates the entire 
process of suffering. Buddhist literature specifically represents the Buddha 
as criticising the belief in a permanent or substantial self (the Hindu 
doctrine of atman) as a false, even pernicious, doctrine which, 
                                                
117 Katz 1978a, p. 24. 
118 Katz 1978a, p. 24. 
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paradoxically, in so far as it encourages egoism in one’s pursuit of one’s 
own eternal happiness, makes the fulfilment of one’s happiness an 
impossibility.119 
Here Katz describes the general features of Buddhism – the doctrinal 
orthodox Buddhist traits that mark Buddhism as being distinct from 
other religious traditions – and designates them as “the Buddhist 
mystical quest”. Katz’s remark that “there is no philosophia perennis, 
Huxley…” is a direct challenge to Huxley’s perennialists-like 
interpretations, an example of which follows: 
I am not competent, nor is this the place to discuss the doctrinal 
differences between Buddhism and Hinduism. Let it suffice to point out 
that, when he insisted that human beings are by nature “non-Atman,” the 
Buddha was evidently speaking about the personal self not the universal 
Self. The Brahman controversialists, who appear in certain of the Pali 
scriptures, never so much as mention the Vedanta doctrine of the identity 
of the Atman and Godhead and the non-identity of ego and Atman. What 
they maintain and Gautama denies is the substantial nature and eternal 
persistence of the individual psyche. “As an unintelligent man seeks for 
the abode of music in the body of the lute, so does he look for a soul 
within the skandhas (the material and psychic aggregates, of which the 
individual mind-body is composed).” About the existence of the Atman 
that is Brahman, as about most other metaphysical matters, the Buddha 
declines to speak, on the ground that such discussions do not tend to 
edification or spiritual progress among the members of the monastic 
order, such as he had founded.120 
Here we are shown that two separate interpretations are made within 
Buddhism, depending on what is meant by anatman (anatta in Pali-
scriptures). If the atman is the ‘personal’ (or empirical) ‘self’, then 
realization of its non-existence may lead to the identification of the 
primitive self with the Universal Self (as in Shankara’s interpretation of 
the Upanishads), or it may lead to a realization of what is called the 
‘Buddha nature’ in Mahayana Buddhist sutras. This type of interpretation 
                                                
119 Katz 1978a, pp. 38-9.  
120 Huxley 1945, p. 9. 
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would be inaccurate according to Katz, and so he pleads for the 
recognition of differences.121  
We continue our investigation by examining the meanings that might be 
ascribed to the notion of pure experience, comparing different 
alternatives and possibilities that could potentially match Katz’s 
intentions. Thus far we can note that by not drawing a distinction 
between the empirical self and the primitive self, Katz’s model of 
interpretation cannot include certain phenomena that mystics and others 
claim to be mystical, a pattern that can eventually lead to a complete 
denial of the possibility of mystical experience.  
 
1.3.6. The notions of Pure Experience 
Relative to his statement that “there are NO pure (unmediated) 
experiences”, Katz neither explicitly defines the term ‘experience’ nor 
indicates exactly what is being denied – whether it be ‘self’, ‘pure 
consciousness’ or another such thing. In answering my question on this 
point, Katz’s indicated that he is denying the possibility of attaining  
…a direct form of knowledge of ‘the thing in itself’ without any 
conceptual (or other) mediation122 
The idea that a ‘pure’ experience is an ‘unmediated’ experience is one 
that Katz presents in “Language, epistemology, and mysticism” (1978). 
In this regard, his understanding of ‘mediation’ appears to approximate 
our understanding of ‘intentionality’, with an unmediated experience 
being as impossible as a non-intentional one. As previously noted, Katz 
sees intentionality as characterizing all experiences and explicates the 
                                                
121 Katz 1978a, p. 25: “… the phenomenological typologies of Stace and Zaehner are 
too reductive and inflexible, forcing multifarious and extremely variegated forms of 
mystical experience into improper interpretative categories which lose sight of the 
fundamentally important differences between the data studied. In this sense it might 
even be said that this entire paper is a ‘plea for the recognition of differences’.”  
122 See A3 in section 2.2. The question was: “What exactly is intended by the expression 
‘pure/unmediated experience’? In the article from 1978 there are several expressions 
used for this ‘phenomenon’, among which ‘the given’ is one. Is the notion of 
‘unmediated/pure experience’ to be understood as ‘the given’ of phenomenology as 
well as the ‘intuited’ knowledge of Lao Tsu? And is the Erfarung without Erlebnis of 
Kant, as well as ‘the original flux’ of James also included in the denial?” 
  
 83  
term with reference to the language of mystics. Katz thus regards 
intensional expressions such as ‘expects’, ‘believes’, ‘hopes’, ‘looks for’, 
etc. as indicating that in experience intentional acts contain “an object in 
themselves”.123 As it turns out, however, in Katz’s philosophy, the 
objects he refers to are not ‘intentional objects’, at least not as we have 
defined the term; rather they are either real objects or irreal objects 
interchangeably. Moreover, it seems that even if the reference of 
‘intentional object’ is unclear (i.e. if it is real or irreal objects that the 
mystics encounter in their necessarily object-containing experiences), the 
‘irreal’ objects may or may not correspond to some ‘real’ object – a 
position not very unusual or unreasonable to hold. We return to this 
issue in chapter three.     
Since Katz considers intentionality to be such that an intentional act 
contains an object in itself, we must conclude that in his account there 
cannot be an intentional experience that is not also containing an object. 
Moreover, the quotation above seems to suggest that this relation is 
reflexive – i.e., that there cannot be an experience containing objects that 
is not also intentional. From this it is likely not overreaching to identify 
the “thing in itself” in Katz’s formulation with a real object, and 
“mediated” with intentionality in the psychological sense (to ‘seek’, 
‘hope’, ‘desire’, etc). As a common epistemological consideration, 
denying the possibility of attaining “…a direct form of knowledge of ‘the 
thing in itself’ without any conceptual (or other) mediation” seems to be 
denying the possibility of ‘knowing’ a real object without involving 
conceptual or other forms of intentionality. This is insufficient for two 
reasons: 1) to our knowledge, no serious philosopher has affirmed the 
possibility of knowing the ‘thing in itself’ without some form of 
mediation.  Katz’s denial is thus not unique, but rather a general 
epistemological consideration that can generate various analyses of 
experience and is thus insufficient in terms of narrowing down the 
specific character of Katz’s point of view; and, 2) it is difficult to see 
what this formulation has to do with mysticism and mystical experience, 
or what effect it would have on the interpretation of mystical experience 
reports. In light of this, Katz’s claim seems to be merely contradicting 
                                                
123 Katz 1978a, p. 63. 
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the perennialist claim that it is possible for the mystics to attain a state of 
consciousness which does not involve a conceptual form of 
understanding, like for instance Robert Forman’s claim of a Pure 
Consciousness Event.124 Our intent is to understand what the denial of 
pure experience means in Katz’s theory, and how it can be said to 
explicate or otherwise advance our understanding of mysticism and 
mystical experience. Katz presents the denial of ‘pure experience’ as a 
central point of departure relative to understanding mystical experience 
and mystical experience reports. However, since this same proposition 
appears to undermine the possibility of doing just that, we examine 
different conceptualizations of ‘pure experience’ and compare them with 
Katz’s position. By this we hope to gain a firmer understanding of the 
implications of Katz’s denial. 
In section 1.3.4 we discussed how an experience of the ‘pure self’ can be 
assimilated with the notion of ‘mystical union’ (found in mysticism 
research). We call this notion of ‘pure experience’ notion (α): 
(α): The experience of the ‘pure self’ that in a perennial 
interpretation is a Universal Self, identical in all men (and that in an 
‘orthodox’ or ‘religious’ interpretation can be termed Buddha 
Nature, God, etc.), and for which ‘mystic union’ is an appropriate 
description. Experiences of this type are said to be achieved 
                                                
124 The PCE is not a claim of knowing the ‘thing in itself’, though what exact 
’knowledge’ that may result from such an event (if at all possible) remains to be 
evaluated. In his article “Mystical knowledge” Robert Forman argues that it is 
“knowledge by identity”, and the known ‘object’ is consciousness (the ‘pure self’). 
Unless Katz wishes to claim that consciousness is a “thing in itself”, all that remains to 
contradict here is the idea of non-conceptuality. Katz would not be alone in upholding 
the position that it is impossible to have non-conceptual experiences (resulting in some 
form of ‘tacit knowledge’ – see for instance Husserl in Cartesian Meditations 1977, §16), 
though this is a matter worthy of discussion in itself, which is impossible if there is no 
argument except the ‘fact’ that this is “the sorts of beings we are” (Katz 1978a, p. 26). 
Should we accept the argument that mystical experience is conditioned by beliefs as an 
argument supporting the claim that there are no pure experiences, we are still no better 
off than without this argument. Katz provides his ‘evidence’ that experience is 
conditioned by beliefs by making a case of the differences between religious traditions. 
However, the differences between religious traditions cannot support the claim that the 
experiences of mystics are not unmediated by these different interpretive patterns.   
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through a suspension, by whatever means, of the empirical 
qualities of the empirical self.  
In secular contexts this type of experience need not be described as a 
unification with a universal principle, and although we do not discuss 
Forman’s metaphysical position on the nature of this “consciousness 
devoid of intentional content”, his PCE would seem to belong to this 
class of experiences in that it is “a wakeful but content-less (non 
intentional) experience.”125  
We have moreover noted that mystical experiences that have been called 
‘genuine’ because of their acclaimed non-facilitated ‘givenness’ can at 
times also be termed ‘pure experience’. This criterion alone, however, is 
not sufficient to constitute a category of ‘pure experience’. This is partly 
because it is difficult to ascertain whether or not a given experience has 
been in some way facilitated or induced by a source other than the 
accepted divine one, and partly because even if this problem were 
overcome there is still no way of guaranteeing that the experience was 
‘pure’ in the sense of not being affected by the expectations and 
interpretive pattern of the experiencer. This is also the precise point of 
proponents of ‘pure experience’: if the conceptual and expectational 
features are not set aside, any component of the experience is tainted by 
the pre-experiential cognitive foundation through which experience is 
made meaningful. If this cognitive foundation (or interpretive pattern) of 
the experiencer cannot be ‘undone’ or temporarily ‘inactivated’, the 
experience can never be ‘pure’ in the sense that it is non-conceptual or 
non-intentional. So whether the experience is of God, Allah or Nirvana, 
as long as the pre-experiential cognitive foundation has not been erased, 
or at least diminished, neither God nor Allah nor Nirvana is experienced 
‘purely’.126 
                                                
125 Forman 1999a, p. 367.  
126 Katz considers this requirement to be complementary to the view that experience 
can be facilitated. In Katz’s view, “language creates, when used by the mystical adept … 
the operative processes through which the essential epistemic channels that permit 
mystical forms of knowing and being are made accessible” (Katz 1992a, p. 8). To this 
he adds in a note that facilitation “is to be understood as one way of coming to mystical 
knowledge or experience; that is, the knower actively seeks to alter his consciousness in 
order to facilitate the desired nonordinary experience. This approach is neither 
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Two points of controversy are involved in this. The first is the matter of 
how this affects the interpretation of mystical experience reports. One 
way of understanding Katz’s denial of pure experience is as a two-part 
argument: first, the experiences of mystics are not considered pure 
because they are mediated; second, whatever the ‘given’ may be in their 
experience, it is impossible to distinguish from the content that is what it 
is because of the interpretation imposed by the experiencer in his or her 
report. The first part of this argument includes the tacit presumption that 
mystics are not factually able to undo or set aside their interpretive 
pattern, an issue that Katz explicitly addresses when discussing the 
notion of ‘unconditioning’ (shortly to be examined). The second part of 
the argument constitutes the main challenge to the perennial claim that 
in a ‘mixed’ report it is possible to distinguish those elements that are 
part of the experiencer’s interpretive pattern from those that are ‘purely’ 
given. Specifically challenged by this argument are the claims that 
mystical experiences contain experiential similarities that transcend 
cultural and religious boundaries, and that the phenomenal 
characteristics listed by James, Stace and others represent the 
identificational criteria for mystical experience. This issue will be 
discussed more thoroughly in chapter three. 
The second point of controversy arising from the issue of pure 
experience and its relation to ‘givenness’ concerns the general question 
of how this enhances our understanding of the phenomenon of mystical 
experience. At times Katz seems to equate the ‘given’ with ‘pure 
                                                                                                              
universal nor is it to be taken as the only approach found in the mystical traditions of 
the world. It is complemented (not contradicted) by an alternative position that views 
mystical experience as an act of God or the transcendent that requires no prior or 
technical preparation, and that explains the specialness of such experience by reference 
to the specialness of the object of such experience – for example, Allah or Brahman” 
(Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12). At first, the position which “views mystical experience as an 
act of God” seems to be an affirmation of the position that there can be pure (or 
‘given’) experiences, but the rest of the sentence implies that the ‘specialness’ of the 
experience is that it came from a ‘special object’, which does not exclude the idea that 
these ‘special objects’ (Allah and Brahman) can only be experienced through the 
mediational processes of the knower. So these experiences cannot be said to be ‘pure’, 
even if their source is a ‘special object’ – which it necessarily is in Katz’s philosophy, as 
we soon will see. 
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experience’,127 but if we consider what has been said above, it seems that 
mystical experiences (in theoretical accounts) can be either ‘pure’ and 
‘given’ or ‘given’ but not pure, indicating that ‘givenness’ and ‘purity’ 
should be considered as separate possible attributes of an experience. 
When ‘givenness’ and ‘purity’ are equated, the possibility of ‘given’ 
experience vanishes along with the possibility of ‘pure’ experience, 
leading to the negation of the possibility of mystical experience 
altogether, even of the type “that views mystical experience as an act of 
God or the transcendent that requires no prior or technical 
preparation”128 – Katz’s own alternative to the view that mystical 
experience is facilitated. Katz clearly considers language and the religious 
pre-experiential conditioning of the mystic to be some form of 
“technical preparation” (i.e., facilitation); this leads one to question how 
much of an alternative Katz’s alternative really is. Should Katz then be 
understood as saying that experiences ‘given’ by an act of the divine also 
require conceptual preparation? This view appears to be confirmed in his 
statement that “[a]ll ‘givens’ are also the product of the process of 
‘choosing’, ‘shaping’, and ‘receiving’. That is, the ‘given’ is appropriated 
through acts which shape it into forms which we can make intelligible to 
ourselves given our conceptual constitution”.129 Or should he be 
understood as meaning that these particular types of experiences – i.e., 
the ones ‘given’ by an act of the divine – do not require a conceptual 
component? If this is indeed what he means, the statement appears to 
lead back to the understanding that such experiences are, in a sense, 
‘pure’? Unfortunately, without more information about Katz’s notion of 
pure experience and how it relates to other conceptions of pure 
experience, it is difficult to derive definitive answers to these questions. 
If we take Katz’s description of ‘pure experience’ as “…a direct form of 
knowledge of ‘the thing in itself’ without any conceptual (or other) 
                                                
127 See, for instance, Katz 1978a, p. 59: “Closely allied to the erroneous contention that 
we can achieve a state of pure consciousness is the oft used notion of the ‘given’ or the 
‘suchness’ or the ‘real’ to describe the pure state of mystical experience which 
transcends all contextual epistemological colourings.”   
128 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12. 
129 Katz 1978, p. 59. 
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mediation”130 and attempt to interpret this in terms that are familiar to 
us, “form of knowledge of ‘the thing in itself’” becomes ‘objective 
knowledge’ and “without any conceptual (or other) mediation” becomes 
‘non-intentional experience’. When viewed in the light of this 
interpretation, Katz appears to be negating the possibility of an objective yet 
non-intentional experience, in which the objects, more specifically, are real 
objects. In our understanding this amounts to a rejection of the position 
that experiential content is given to consciousness in a “direct” manner. 
In other words, Katz rejects the notion that the real objects that we 
interact with in ordinary experience are somehow ‘imprinted’ on a blank 
mind (a tabula rasa perhaps),131 and, as such, are objectively ‘known’ by a 
passive receiver. Although it is difficult to find examples of such 
experiences in the mystical literature (perhaps one is the epistemology in 
some interpretations of the concept of ‘revelation’) we will try to form a 
description of the notion of pure experience that Katz refers to. We call 
this notion (β): 
(β): A non-mediated (non-intentional) experience of a real object.  
This has more the character of an interpretation of experience, or an 
epistemological aspect of experience in general. Any experience can be 
interpreted as mediated or unmediated, and the interpretation depends 
more on the epistemological model being applied than on the type of 
objects being ‘given’. Although for Katz the possibility of having a 
mystical experience without an object is also nil, which is why he denies 
the possibility of Forman’s PCE: 
…the pure consciousness event is not without content. If it is without 
content … then we couldn’t deal with it. But the fact that we can call it 
“pure consciousness” and talk about it, and treat it in texts, and compare 
it to other things means that it has to have some content to it.132 
The idea that anything that can be talked about necessarily has a content 
(an object, in Katz’s account) is a very strong suggestion even for 
ordinary types of experience, especially if we have two types of objects to 
                                                
130 See A3 in chapter two.  
131 See Katz in Katz 1978a, p. 59. 
132 Katz quoted by Gregory from the annual meeting of the American Academy of 
Religion 2000, Mysticism Group. In Gregory 2006, p. 148. 
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deal with. On the one hand, we have experiences that lack real objects. 
In dreams, for example, we are acquainted with sincere intentional 
attitudes towards ‘objects’, irrespective of whether they ‘really’ exist or 
are adequate representations of a natural environment; the same can be 
said of hallucinations, mirages and other such experiences. On the other 
hand, we find experiences that have neither real nor irreal objects – what 
we can call non-directed attitudes. Feelings of ecstasy, anxiety, unity and 
holiness belong to this class, as would the feeling of a presence without 
someone being present, of a fear that has no object, etc.  
The identification of ‘pure experience’ with an intentional but object-less 
experience can be interpreted as the non-mediated (non-intentional) 
experience of a real object (β above), but it can also be interpreted as 
either:  
(γ): Experiences that do not have real objects, but only irreal 
objects that do not accurately represent reality. These would 
include dreams, mirages, hallucinations, deceptive perception, 
imaginary thinking, etc.; or, 
(δ): Experiences that have neither real nor irreal objects. These 
would include ‘purely’ intentional experiences such as anxiety and 
ecstasy, but also such feelings as ‘restlessness’ that do not appear to 
have ‘objects’, despite the fact that they are distinct ‘feelings’ or 
‘states’ of the self.  
These ways of viewing experiences are based on a naturalistic ontology 
(which is presupposed by the real object); accordingly, the experiences 
are generally classified as subjective, internal and non-cognitive. With 
reference to (γ), the importance of finding a viable means of 
differentiating between deceptive and cognitive experiences has been 
emphasised by many authors on mysticism and mystical experiences, and 
also by mystics who, of course, do not want their experiences classified 
according to naturalistic standards. With reference to (δ), one might 
assume that Katz means that even experiences of this type – of which 
Forman’s PCE could be one – have a ‘content’ in that they have a 
‘name’. If I am ‘restless’, then ‘restlessness’ is the object or content of my 
experience, and if I have a ‘pure experience’, then ‘pure experience’ (or 
‘purity’) is the object or content of my experience. The problem with this 
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is that ‘acts’ and ‘non-acts’ must also be ‘contents’ or ‘objects’, and it 
becomes impossible to distinguish the constitutional process from its 
result. Moreover, if experiences are to be classified systematically 
according to ‘object’, then the classification of a ‘pure experience’ as an 
‘objective’ experience (since we do seem to be talking about it) should be 
a natural consequence.  
Neither the notions (γ) nor (δ) are explicitly denied by Katz. Why, then, 
in Katz’s system of classification, should we not classify claimed ‘pure 
experiences’ according to what they are claimed to be; why should such 
experiences be considered either non-existent or misconceived by the 
experiencer?  
We could easily continue our analysis of the many different notions of 
‘pure experience’ that are commonly found in mystical writings. 
However, as interesting as this might be, we have basically reached the 
limits of what Katz’s theory and conceptual set permit. It is hoped that 
the above described clarifications will suffice for our forthcoming 
analysis. Before discussing the relation between mysticism and religion, 
which continues our discussion concerning Katz’s position on ‘pure’ 
experience, we briefly examine another set of concepts that play a central 
role in Katz’s philosophy of mysticism: ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. 
 
1.3.7. Sameness and difference 
A central point in Katz’s philosophy is that mystical experiences are 
different in character, and not the same or similar as perennial interpreters 
assume. Katz considers this an important point and insists that we 
should consider his article “Language, epistemology, and mysticism” as a 
plea for the recognition of such differences.133 We briefly mentioned the 
idea that the identity of real objects is determined by the foundational 
material that occupies a certain limited area of space and cannot 
simultaneously occupy the same area as another real object. Real objects 
that satisfy the above requirement are said to be identical to themselves. 
The reality of these objects is assured by their independence of other 
objects and their spatio-temporal restrictions. The same (identical) real 
                                                
133 Katz 1978a, p. 25. 
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object can be experienced by many persons at the same time and by one 
person at different times, and is independent of the phenomenal 
difference by which it is ‘known’ to different persons and/or to the same 
person at different times. Although we do not intend to develop a 
metaphysics of real objects, we do intend to understand what Katz 
means by his plea for the recognition of differences. And since Katz 
seems to mean that it is the ‘object’ (the real object, we may conclude) 
that determines the type of experience had, it may at times be inevitable 
to involve metaphysical considerations. We are still applying the epoché, 
however, so none of our assertions should be taken as affirming (or 
negating) the independent reality of objects; rather they should be taken 
as considerations on the logic of metaphysical thinking.  
Concerning the metaphysics of the pure self, we have said that a 
property-less entity (which the ‘pure self’ can be viewed as) with no 
particular spatio-temporal location is indistinguishable from other such 
‘entities’, and is to be viewed as one ‘object’ (essence, principle, substance, 
etc). Objects that lack spatio-temporal determination are difficult to 
individuate intersubjectively, as the Scolastics experienced in their debate 
on particulars and universals and as we have noted with regard to the 
noema of intentional acts. Without spatio-temporal relational properties, 
the objective reality (and individuality) of any claimed essence is 
questionable. Likewise, the reality of any phenomenal object (in cases 
where they are identified as irreal objects) can be questioned. As we will 
discuss in chapter five (and shall already see in chapter two), Katz claims 
some form of verificationism for the objectivity of experience, and also 
some form of possible realism for the ‘realities’ encountered in the 
experiences of mystics. This realism implies that the objects encountered 
in mystical experiences are possible real objects.134 The descriptions of 
the mystics, then, mirror the mystic’s (possible) encounter with a real 
object, which in its own terms has a metaphysical individuality and 
                                                
134 We also leave for later, the discussion of how Katz can claim possible realism for the 
experiences of mystics after initially asserting that the mystical experience is not 
verifiable. This point is of considerable weight, since it is the foundation for Katz’s 
assertion that mystical claims are irrelevant in establishing the “truth or falsity of 
religion in general” (Katz 1978a, p. 22). How this should be weighed (or measured) in 
relation to Katz’s realism is not clear at all.  
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independence; and this object, if the encounter is factual (a real relation 
between two independent entities), is what individuates and characterizes 
the specific experience that the mystic reports. This interpretation of 
Katz’s position – i.e., that the object of experience is characterizing the 
experience – is supported by Katz’s insistence that the object of 
experience makes the experience what it is, his major argument against 
the perennialist claim of similarities in experiential quality. For Katz, if 
the experiences of mystics have different objects, the experiences are 
different.  
In a natural spatio-temporal reality, if two individual objects are 
experienced as being similar, they share certain phenomenal properties. If 
they share all phenomenal properties (like two identical reproductions of 
the Mona Lisa) they are individuated by their relational properties.135 If 
the experiences are characterized by their objects, which is how Katz 
suggests that experiences should be characterized, then two experiences 
are the ‘same’ or ‘similar’136 if they share the common property of having 
had an encounter (sRo) with the ‘same’ or ‘identical’ real object.137 It is thus 
                                                
135 The relational properties can only be the ‘same’ in an empty space where nothing 
exists except the two objects, and, as Ivar Segelberg discusses in Begreppet egenskap, if 
they are not two perfect spheres, they must be mirror-faced in order to share all real 
(relational) properties. This, of course, is not the place for an extended discussion on 
this matter. Interested readers are referred to Segelberg’s Properties, in English 
translation by Herbert Hochberg, published at Thales, Library of Theoria No 25, 1999. 
We also recommend Hochberg’s Complexes and consciousness, in which Segelberg’s 
philosophy receives a thorough analysis (at Thales, Library of Theoria No 26, 1999).    
136 Unfortunately, as we shall see many examples of in chapter two, Katz never 
distinguishes between ‘sameness’ and ‘similarity’ when discussing the idea of common 
features in the experiences of mystics from different religious backgrounds. When 
pleading for the recognition of differences, Katz rejects both the idea that two cross-
traditional experiences can be the ‘same’ (which does not make sense, since no two 
experiences can be said to be numerically identical even if had by the same person and 
are of the same object), and the idea that there are similar characteristics in the 
experiences of mystics from different traditional backgrounds (which is the main point 
of controversy between Katz and common-core theorists).    
137 Katz writes: “…mystics and students of mysticism have to recognize that mystical 
experience is not (putatively) solely the product of the conditioned act of experience as 
constituted from the side of the experiencer, but is also constituted and conditioned by 
what the object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic (believes he) ‘encounters’ or 
experiences” (Katz 1978a, p. 64). This is a ‘softer’ formulation of Katz’s position on the 
features of mystical experience, in which there appears to be room for a ‘conditioning’ 
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not the relational property of an experience that is the criteria of its 
individuation, but the objects to which it relates. A relational property 
like ‘looking for’ (which Katz discusses in terms of ‘intentional act’) is 
otherwise a generally excellent way of characterizing an experience, since 
it is ‘real’ or ‘the same’ independently of the elements of the relation. 
Whether I am looking for my keys or you are looking for my keys, or 
whether I am looking for your keys and you are looking for your pet, the 
relational act of ‘looking for’ is the universally same act – i.e., we are 
doing the same thing independently of who we are or what we are 
looking for. We would not say that if you are looking for your keys and I 
am looking for my pet, then we have had different experiences. Katz 
does not say that one experience of Allah is the same as another 
experience of Allah, but neither does he say that they are different in the 
same way that one’s experience of Allah is different from another one’s 
experience of the Christian God. 
As will be discussed in chapter three, this is the major source of conflict 
between Katz and the perennialists. Katz’s criteria of ‘sameness’ are not 
in keeping with the criteria of the perennialists who claim, contrary to 
Katz, that there can be similar experiences across religious borders. 
According to Katz’s criteria of individuation, the Muslim experiences 
Allah, the Buddhist experiences Nirvana and the Christian experiences 
God. In his view, this fact makes Allah, Nirvana and God different 
(although not necessarily spatio-temporal) ‘objects’ that may or may not 
be encountered by the mystic; when encountered, however, such 
‘objects’ shape the mystic’s experience into what it is. 
Perennial interpreters also often seem to claim that there need not be an 
object in a given mystical experience (just as there need not be an object 
in a given feeling of restlessness, anxiety, despair, ecstasy, etc.). Because 
of this they believe that an experience is best classified according to its 
                                                                                                              
on the part of the experiencer. However, taken together with the “plea for the 
recognition of differences”, in which it is implied that if one mystic experiences Allah 
and the other experiences God they have different experiences (even if both experiences 
are transcendent, unitive, joyful, etc.), the object of experience gains primacy over the 
phenomenal characteristics as an individuator of the experience. Adding Katz’s 
(possible) realism to the equation results in a real object partly determining an 
experience to the extent that it determines what type of experience the experience is.  
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phenomenal characteristics. If the experiences have the same or similar 
qualitative (as opposed to relational) properties they are characterized as 
similar, and it is not considered necessary to make metaphysical 
assertions as to whether they are the ‘same’ in the sense that they 
constitute a single universal experience, or whether the qualities of the 
experience stem from a universal quality-source or from the particular 
instantiations of experienced quality. Part of Katz’s criticism against this 
is that the phenomenal characteristics listed by perennialists are too 
general to outline mystical experiences:          
That is to say, what appears to be similar-sounding descriptions are not 
similar descriptions and do not indicate the same experience. They do not 
because language is itself contextual, and words ‘mean’ only in context. 
The same words – beautiful, sublime, ultimate reality, ineffable, 
paradoxical, joyful, transcending all empirical content, etc – can apply and 
have been applied to more than one object. Their mere presence alone 
does not guarantee anything; neither the nature of the experience nor the 
nature of the referent nor the comparability of various claims is assured 
by this seemingly common verbal presence alone.138 
One problem here seems to be that Katz does not distinguish between 
properties ascribed to an object and properties ascribed to an experience, 
whether of an object or not. It is difficult to see how “transcending all 
empirical content” can be the property of an object, or even how 
someone could claim that it is so. If one person considers Mona Lisa to 
be aesthetically attractive, while another finds her to be repulsive, what 
does it add to say that both persons have had an experience of the same 
‘object’. Do both persons have the same experience when they 
experience DaVinci’s Mona Lisa? The two may completely agree on any 
given phenomenal description of the painting, the properties they ascribe 
their object may match to the last detail, yet the person considering the 
Mona Lisa to be attractive would never agree that he has had the same 
experience as the person considering her to be repulsive. In the process 
of categorizing experiences according to Katz’s criteria, one seems 
unable to account for many important qualitative features. Because 
repulsion and attraction are not natural qualities, their intersubjective 
demonstration can only be performed through the medium of language 
                                                
138 Katz 1978a, p 46 
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– a medium, it must be mentioned, that very much includes the reality of 
‘repulsion’ and ‘attraction’ as general attitudes that, while perhaps 
identical in all men, are not empirically observable in the objects to 
which they are ascribed.  
Even if one wants to classify experiences according to the objects they 
‘contain’, similarity of experiences must be based on some typology of 
phenomenal properties, since their identification (not identity) is 
dependent on their phenomenal properties. This is the second argument 
against Katz’s apparent view that experiences should be categorized 
according to the objects they contain. The first argument concerned the 
criticism that such a view is reductive of certain aspects (and forms) of 
experience; the second concerns the challenge that in order to compare 
and classify experiences according to the real objects they ‘contain’ we 
would have to become professional metaphysicians with the capacity to 
identify all sorts of real objects and their relational properties. This seems 
a strange detour from the study of the experiences of mystics.  
Chapter three will involve a more detailed discussion regarding the 
problems merely hinted at here, and how these problems affect Katz’s 
own interpretive pattern as he goes about the task of analysing and 
assessing mystical experience reports. This discussion, however, requires 
certain clarifications regarding Katz’s view on the relation between 
mysticism and religion. Katz’s primary reason for denying the ‘sameness’ 
of mystical experiences is that the mystic brings his religious 
‘conditioning’ to the experience, and those ‘conditions’ (here, also, 
‘objects’) are as different as the religions themselves. Thus we must ask: 
what is mysticism and what is religion according to Katz?  
      
1.4. Mysticism and religion 
The aim of this section is not to propose definitions for either “religion” 
or “mysticism”; rather, it is to examine the implicit assumption in Katz’s 
use of these two terms. This is important for several reasons. First there 
is the conflict between Katz and the perennialists concerning the 
characteristics of mystical experience, with Katz characterizing mystical 
experience by way of religion and the perennialists characterizing it by 
way of experience. Second, to understand what type of interpretation 
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Katz insists upon respecting reports of mystical experiences, one must 
look to religion, since religion is represented as the ‘source’ or ‘origin’ of 
such experiences in Katz’s understanding. Thirdly, if, as Katz claims, 
mystical experience is largely informed by religion, one might ask what 
difference Katz sees between a mystical and a religious experience. 
Finally, Katz claims that although mystics have been generally portrayed 
as heretics and antinomians,139 this picture ignores the fact that, for the 
most part, mystical experience preserves rather than contradicts religious 
doctrine, and is thus more a conservative than a ‘revolutionary’ 
phenomenon. Because of these considerations, it would seem necessary 
to examine what similarities and distinctions Katz draws between 
mysticism and religion. This will be done primarily by contrasting Katz’s 
views on the relationship between religion and mysticism with those of 
the perennialists.  
We begin by making a preliminary distinction between Religious Systems 
(e.g., Christianity, Hinduism) on the one hand, and Religious Persons 
(e.g., a Christian, a Hindu) on the other. In preceding sections the notion 
of a personal belief system, or interpretive pattern, has been discussed, 
and although we have not yet clarified the precise nature of a religious 
interpretive pattern, it would seem fair to say that a religious person is 
one with a religious interpretive pattern. The principle question in the 
point of conflict between Katz and the perennialists involves the 
relationship between ‘religious persons’ and the ‘religious systems’ to 
which they adhere. Religious systems contain doctrines and 
recommendations of practice for adherents (e.g., praying, reading sacred 
texts, participating in rituals, etc). If we were to identify a religious 
person as one who follows the rituals, strictures and practices of a 
specific religious system, this manner of identification would exclude the 
possibility of there being a religious person outside of any specific 
religious system. It appears that this is precisely what Katz does in the 
following description of mysticism:  
                                                
139 Katz 1983a, pp. 3-4. 
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… readers should treat the terms “mysticism” as a shorthand for a list of 
independent mystical traditions, Buddhist, Hindu, Sufi, Christian, Jewish, 
etc.140 
Mysticism thus appears to be not one thing – i.e., there is no common 
core – but many, and each mystical tradition is inseparably tied to a 
religious tradition, and notably “independent” of the other mystical 
traditions. It also seems that mysticism (or, at least, mystical experience) 
is a product of religion, and not the other way around: 
Mystical experience(s) are the result of traversing the mystical way(s), 
whatever specific way one happens to follow, e.g. the Jewish, Sufi, or 
Buddhist. What one reads, learns, knows, intends, and experiences along 
the path creates to some degree (let us leave this somewhat vaguely stated 
as yet) the anticipated experience made manifest.141 
Mystical experience is embedded within the religious context of the 
experiencer, and mystics experience the doctrines they have inherited 
from their traditions: 
All these mystical personalities intended and experienced, they had 
knowledge by acquaintance, what their communities taught as knowledge by 
description. They had existential knowledge of what their co-religionists 
knew only through propositions.142 
‘Mystics’, then, are those who have religious experiences within a religious 
system. Islam, for example, is a religious system containing a particular 
‘body of knowledge’ in the form of religious propositions; this body of 
knowledge to some degree informs Sufism, an Islamic mystical tradition, 
and thus helps to ‘create’ the “anticipated experience made manifest” in 
a given Sufi mystic. This type of understanding is the principal reason 
that Katz believes that a Muslim cannot experience the same thing as a 
Buddhist, a Christian or a Jew: since the religious traditions are different in 
character and each presents propositions with different content, the 
Muslim mystic experiences Allah, the Buddhist mystic experiences 
Nirvana, the Christian mystic experiences Jesus and the Jewish mystic 
experiences the Divine Throne. Thus it appears that, for Katz, a 
common characteristic of mystical experiences is that they are existential 
                                                
140 Katz 1983a, p. 51, n1 
141 Katz 1983a, p. 6.  
142 Katz 1983a, p. 21. 
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instantiations of the particular truths presented by the religious systems 
of which they are a part. 
Katz’s identification of mystics appears to be solely in terms of the 
religious tradition of which they are a part, seeming to exclude the 
possibility of mystics and mystical experiences that are unconnected to a 
particular religion. This is clearly a critical point, since several prominent 
authors on mysticism and mystical experience have included so-called 
‘nature experiences’ – experiences that involve a sense of oneness or 
unity with nature – within the class of experiences they consider to be 
mystical. Apart from nature experiences, certain other experiences, 
known generally as ‘altered states of consciousness’, have been regularly 
referred to as ‘mystical’ by various interpreters of mysticism, mostly of 
the perennialist school.  
The fact that Katz’s notion of ‘mystical’ makes no room for experiences 
that lack traditional religious content may not be a strict problem. 
However, for those who believe that the study of such experiences 
contributes positively to our overall understanding of mystical 
experience, the removal of these data constitutes a loss, and thus 
represents a serious weakness in Katz’s understanding.143 This difference 
of opinion regarding what should and should not be included within the 
class of experiences known as mystical arises as a consequence of the 
fact that while perennialists identify a mystical experience in terms of the 
phenomenal characteristics of experience, Katz identifies a mystical 
experience in terms of the religious object – i.e., the ‘object’ that mystics refer 
to when describing their experience. Although Katz provides no detailed 
discussion on this issue in any of his essays on mysticism, he gives some 
vague indications that the ‘object’ that the mystic experiences is the deity 
as described by respective religions. In a note concerning the facilitative 
aspects of mystical experience, Katz claims that a different “approach” 
can complement the picture: 
…an alternative position that views mystical experience as an act of God 
or the transcendent that requires no prior or technical preparation, and 
                                                
143 Without such data it becomes exceedingly difficult to differentiate between those 
elements in a mystical experience report that are independent of a religious foundation 
and those that depend on the religious background of the experiencer. 
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that explains the specialness of such experience by reference to the 
specialness of the object of such experience – for example, Allah or 
Brahman.144 
The ‘specialness’ of these ‘objects’ may delimit mystical experience and 
help in distinguishing it from ordinary experience, but it does not help 
with respect to differentiating between mystical experience and religious 
experience. Katz initiates his investigation in “Language, epistemology, 
and mysticism” by stating that: 
…in the final analysis, mystical or more generally religious experience is 
irrelevant in establishing the truth or falsity of religion in general or any 
specific religion in particular.145  
This statement implies that the class known as mystical experiences is 
subsumed within and/or distinct from the more general class known as 
religious experiences, and also indicates that ‘religion in general’ is in some 
way distinct from ‘religion in particular’. Katz seems to believe that the 
phrase ‘mystical tradition’ signifies those individuals who are merely 
experiencing and teaching others to experience the ‘Truth’ of their greater 
religious heritage. Given this, it is difficult to see how such an 
understanding can help in distinguishing between a mystical and a 
religious experience. The story is completely different in accounts where 
experience delimits mysticism, rather than religious doctrine. Ralph Hood, for 
example, identifies the common factor in mystical experiences as the 
‘unitive’ experience, which, in his view, may be given either a religious or 
a non-religious interpretation:  
…it seems reasonable to conclude that the M-scale identifies the report of 
a single core experience of mysticism … with a joyful, religious 
interpretation possible … This, of course, means that some religious 
experiences may in fact not be mystical and some mystical experiences 
may not be religious.146    
                                                
144 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12 
145 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
146 Hood 2001, p. 27. The M-scale (or Mysticism-scale) is based on Stace’s criteria of 
the phenomenal characteristics of mystical experience and measures the mysticism-
factor in mystical and religious experience reports. Hood also recognizes that 
experience can be distinguished from interpretation: “…interpretation of experience 
can be separated from experience itself, even though, paradoxically, no experience is 
uninterpreted.” (in Hood 2001, p. 150.)  
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As can be seen from this quotation, Hood’s view holds out the 
possibility for mystical experiences outside the traditional context of a 
religion, whereas Katz’s account apparently does not. Katz’s view 
appears to be that mysticism is some kind of a by-product of religious 
doctrine.  
An implication of this point of view is that a heretic mystic would be an 
almost impossible phenomenon, since, for the most part, mystics 
experience – and report experiencing – according to the inherited truths 
of their religious tradition. Such an understanding, however, flies in the 
face of historical fact, since heresy among mystics is a genuine recorded 
occurrence. This would indicate that Katz’s theory of interpretation can 
neither account for nor explain certain historical events. Katz, of course, 
does not deny that throughout history there have been contradictory 
views on religious issues, and that these have led to the persecution of 
several individuals, some of whom Katz would classify as ‘mystics’. 
Nonetheless, the unmistakable emphasis of his approach has been on the 
‘conservative character of mystical experience’. In addition, and as a 
consequence of the strong connection he draws between mystical 
experiences and the religious traditions that have apparently shaped 
them, Katz would seem to consider heresy a type of illusion or 
misunderstanding. Otherwise, how could a mystical experience that is 
largely conditioned by the religious tradition to which a given mystic is 
connected, contradict or in other ways undermine the truths presented 
by that tradition?      
From an historical perspective, it would seem that the relations between 
religious systems and religious experience have been rather turbulent and 
confrontational over time, and that, in the process, religious persons 
have often been victimized for their beliefs. The cross-cultural history of 
religion indicates that a religious system tends to classify adherents as 
either genuinely religious or heretical according to their degree of loyalty 
to that system’s precepts and commandments. A genuinely religious 
person that has a profound experience which contradicts the basic 
‘truths’ of her religious system is often faced with the difficult choice of 
either rejecting her experience and remaining a faithful follower of that 
system, or rejecting the standardized understandings of her tradition and 
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following the potentially heretical calling of her own experiences, 
especially as they relate to issues of ultimate concern. If that person 
decides upon the latter course, and begins to think, speak and act in ways 
that fundamentally conflict with the traditional understandings, 
behaviour and practices of her religion, then naturally she will appear as a 
threat to other adherents and be dealt with accordingly. In such a case, 
both she and her religious experience are in danger of being rejected 
because her experience has turned her against the fundamentals of the 
religious system.  
In any religious system (as well as in any system, political or theoretical), 
then, there can be no acceptance of individual experiences that make 
people apt to question or criticise the basic laws of that system. If, for 
instance, a particular religious experience fosters the view that the 
experiencer’s religious system insists upon certain precepts only to 
maintain worldly control over its adherents, this would certainly be 
viewed within the system as a heretical religious experience. An example 
of one such ‘heresy’ can be found in the realization of Bhuddahasa 
Bhikku, quoted below: 
...one who has attained to the ultimate truth sees that there's no such thing 
as "religion." There is only a certain nature, which can be called whatever 
we like. We can call it "Dhamma," we can call it "Truth," we can call it 
"God," "Tao," or whatever, but we shouldn't particularize that Dhamma 
or that Truth as Buddhism, Christianity, Taoism, Judaism, Sikhism, 
Zoroastrianism, or Islam, for we can neither capture nor confine it with 
labels and concepts. Still, such divisions occur because people haven't yet 
realized this nameless truth for themselves.147  
In 1885, Pope Leo XIII declared that “the equal toleration of all religions 
... is the same thing as atheism”.148 What would he have made of 
Bhikku’s statement? Probably that it was a heresy not only with respect 
to Catholicism, but with respect to religion in general. Indeed the 
realization of the “nameless truth” that Bhikku expresses is offensive to 
all religious systems that insist on the uniqueness of their own linguistic 
expressions of truth.  
                                                
147 Buddhadasa Bhikku (translated by Bhikku Punno); Speech given on 01/27/1964 at 
Suan Usom Foundation, Bangkok 
148 Pope Leo XIII; Immortale Dei, 1885 
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This type of ‘universalist’ thinking – i.e., thinking beyond the cultural, 
linguistic and religious determinants that comprise the contextual 
conditions of the thinker – is exactly what Katz’s “perennialists” have 
identified as the common core of religious experience, or rather as 
mysticism. And if the experience of this ‘nameless truth’ can cause the 
rejection of a religious system’s laws and beliefs, clearly it would be in the 
interest of preservationists to ban such experiences from the start, in the 
name of sustaining the social order. The conflict between religious 
systems and religious experiences is thus a struggle over religious 
persons. Or rather, the relation that a religious person chooses to have 
relative to religious systems and religious experiences respectively, is a 
means of identifying ‘genuine’ religiousness, and a means of 
differentiating between ‘spiritual religiousness’ and ‘ritual religious 
behaviour’. Whether or not a religious experience is in and of itself 
heretical is not the question. The term heresy derives its meaning not 
from the so-called ‘heretical’ experience, but from the degree and type of 
threat that the experience poses to an established system of law and 
order. In other words, the nature and degree of a particular heresy may 
depend more on the structure of the system than on the particular 
experience had. As such, it seems just as inaccurate to claim that 
‘mystical experience is a conservative phenomenon’149 as it is to claim 
that it is inherently heretical.  
This notwithstanding, Katz does characterize mystical experience as 
‘conservative’, as is suggested by the title, “The conservative character of 
mystical experience” (1983), the follow-up article to his 1978 ‘plea for 
the recognition of differences’. But there is something in this plea that 
appears to betray a serious weakness in his contextual approach: there is 
no ‘bottom limit’ concerning how fine-pointed we can become in terms 
of distinguishing these differences. If, for instance, one were to assume a 
‘bottom limit’ to be at the conceptual borders of each religious system, it 
seems we must also assume this ‘border’ to be static and uniform, leaving 
no room for the possibility of schism or changes within the system itself. 
However, internal religious schisms are a well-established feature of all 
                                                
149 See: “The conservative character of mystical experience” in Katz, 1983. This is also 
discussed in chapter five.  
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religious traditions, and require no introduction for anyone even slightly 
acquainted with the differences in belief and practice, even among the 
varieties of Christian adherents who seem no better at praying to one 
and the same God than the Hindus. And if one continues down this 
road of identifying contextual differences that affect the beliefs and 
practices of the adherents of religious systems, one might end up with as 
many different systems of belief and practice as there are adherents.  
It would be hasty to conclude that Katz is not aware that such schisms 
exist in each major religious tradition. Yet it is safe to say that there is no 
way that Katz’s contextual explanation of the differences among mystical 
experiences, when taken to its logical end, can continue to make sense in 
the face of all these internal divides. It is one thing to argue that there are 
differences between mystical experiences across the borders of religious 
traditions that have wholly different systems of beliefs, practices and 
understandings of the absolute. However, what about differences in 
beliefs, practices and ultimate understandings that arise within the 
borders of a religious tradition? How could one be certain, for example, 
that the ‘Allah’ experienced by one Muslim mystic is the same as the 
‘Allah’ experienced by another Muslim mystic?  
Katz’s theory appears to include the theoretical assumption that all 
Muslims would experience the same Allah, having been taught by the 
tradition of Islam to experience Allah in a certain way. However, if that 
is what they all experience – and all they experience – then mystical 
experience is a mere construct of the expectations, beliefs, and so forth 
of the mystics of respective religious tradition. As will be discussed, Katz 
makes an attempt to avoid constructivist reduction by introducing the 
element of realism into his notion of mystical experience. It remains to 
be seen how successfully Katz manages to combine an alleged realism 
with the “over-determination” of experience by pre-experiential 
interpretive patterns.  
  
1.5. The problems recapitulated 
According to Katz, the experience of a mystic is tightly aligned to the 
religious tradition in which she has been raised, educated and trained. 
Thus she tends to experience the “solutions” proposed by her specific 
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tradition. And since these solutions are different across religious 
traditions, so are the mystical experiences. The first question we must ask 
of this understanding is what precise difference there is between 
knowing something “existentially” and knowing it “through 
propositions”? If the difference is a phenomenal one, why should we be 
unable to talk about it in terms of ‘pure experience’, i.e. that dimension 
of an experience that exceeds conceptual understanding? One might 
term that difference non-conceptual knowledge, so why not ‘pure’, i.e. 
“without any conceptual (or other) mediation”? And how can this be 
combined with a realism concerning mystical experience?  
Katz insists that the Christian mystics experience a Christian Jesus, the 
Muslim mystics a Muslim Allah and the Buddhist mystics a Buddhist 
Nothingness; at the same time he appears to insist that we must leave 
room for the possibility that mystical experiences are ‘real’ encounters. 
When the insistence that mystical experience is determined by pre-
experiential conditioning is juxtaposed with the insistence that mystical 
experience somehow involves contact with ‘the real’, this creates a major 
conflict or inconsistency in Katz’s theory, making  it difficult to interpret 
without an indication as to which of these conflicting views should be 
given primacy.  
Why is this so? Because if there is a natural object that corresponds to 
the description of the mystic’s encounter, and that encounter is coloured 
by the interpretational pattern that the mystic brings to his experience,150 
this clearly allows both for the possibility of pure experience and for the 
possibility that mystics in general are encountering the same natural 
object although their descriptions – and experiences – differ as a result 
of their ‘conditioning’. The perennial claim, however, is not that all 
mystics experience the same object; this is a metaphysical conclusion that 
one may draw if one is inclined towards metaphysics. The perennial 
claim is that the same phenomenal characteristics, independent of object or 
conditioning, occur in the descriptions of mystics from different religious 
traditions. Walter T. Stace, among others, has formulated a set of 
                                                
150 Katz 1978a, p. 26. Katz writes: “The experience itself as well as the form in which it 
is reported is shaped by concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his 
experience.” 
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phenomenal characteristics that Katz has rejected. Why does Katz find it 
necessary to reject Stace’s list?  
Katz argues that the set of characteristics of mystical experience 
proposed by various perennial interpreters (primarily Stace) are 
insufficient because of their generality. In other words, Katz argues not 
only that mystics experience different Realities or ‘objects’, but also that 
these realities or ‘objects’ make their mystical experiences what they are. 
The fact that mystical experiences are reported to be ‘joyful’, ‘ineffable’, 
‘frightening’, ‘realistic’, ‘unitive’ or ‘cognitive’ is not enough. In Katz’s 
view, the qualitative aspect of the experience, independent of whatever 
‘object’ it ‘contains’, fails to describe or delineate what a “mystical 
experience is”.151 The common-core characteristics identified by 
perennial interpreters as typical of mystical experience are based on 
general epistemological and experience-based considerations, not on the 
‘objects’ that the mystical experiences ‘contain’. This is why Katz 
believes them to be not only “to general” to outline mystical experience, 
but also distortive of our understanding of what mystical experience is. 
For Katz mystical experiences are defined by their ‘contents’ and not by 
the epistemological or experiential characteristics that are displayed in 
mystical reports.  
If this is indeed the case, one could legitimately ask: what is the specific 
value of mystical or any other experience? If mystical experience claims 
basically reflect the religious claims of a given mystic’s tradition, and if 
there is nothing more to such experiences than this, it makes no sense to 
study, examine and try to understand mystical experience claims; one 
would likely become more informed about mystical experience by 
studying a given tradition’s religious texts than by studying the experiential 
reports of its mystics. What, then, is the sense of a project aimed at 
interpreting mystical experience reports? And why does Katz develop a 
theory of mystical experience based on the interpretation of mystical 
reports? Why not base it instead on the interpretation of sacred scripture 
or on the interpretation of contextual facilitative methods? 
                                                
151 Katz 1978a, p. 51. 
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From “Language, epistemology and mysticism” (1978) to “Mystical 
speech and mystical meaning” (1992) to “Mysticism and the 
interpretation of sacred scripture” (2000) it becomes clearer and clearer 
that, in Katz’s view, the salient features of mystical experience (i.e. the 
‘objects’ that mystics experience) are pre-experientially shaped, and that 
these experiences are facilitated by the propositions presented by the 
given religious tradition. Pre-experiential facilitation is not a new 
discovery. It has also been noted by common-core theorists, although 
their methods are far more diverse than merely reading and 
incorporating texts. Looking at the various religious practices that have 
played either a broad integrative role within the fabric of a whole 
religious community or a more narrow formative role in changing the 
consciousness of a given experiencer, perennialists have sought to 
discover the means whereby consciousness can be transformed so as to 
become more receptive of transcendent Reality; and the common factor 
thus discovered among these diverse systems of facilitation is thought to 
be the ‘purification’ of consciousness.  
Non-conceptuality – whether achieved through intense prayer, isolation 
and long-term solitude, self-mortification, meditative practices or the 
ingestion of substances thought to produce ‘altered states’ – has been 
identified by perennialists as a common aim.152 The level-theory of 
interpretative acts is addressed and explicitly described in Arthur 
Deikman’s “Deautomatization and the mystic experience” (1973). In 
terms of this thesis, ‘deautomatization’ can be understood as the gradual 
setting aside of the automatic onset of the interpretive pattern that is 
normally actualized in similar situations. The achievement of a ‘pure 
consciousness experience’ is described as a long process by most 
perennialists, a process involving various ‘stages’ of development, 
regardless of whether the actual goal is achieved or not. When conceived 
                                                
152 See, for instance, Deikman’s account in which he quotes a passage from The Cloud of 
Unknowing to exemplify “a procedure to be followed in order to attain intuitive 
knowledge of God. Such an experience is called mystical because it is considered 
beyond the scope of language to convey” [Deikman 1973 (1966), p. 240] Deikman is 
interested in the psychological mechanisms that lie behind this phenomenon and 
transcend the theological context they are presented within. In The Observing Self (1982), 
Deikman also argues that this methodology of attaining alternate states could be useful 
as a methodological model in psychiatric treatment.  
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in this way, ‘gradual deautomatization’ implies gradual non-conceptuality, 
or non-conceptuality in certain respects or with respect to certain 
domains. The possibility of ‘stages’ of deautomatization seems to be 
rejected by Katz. Instead he offers the contextualist view that it is not an 
“unconditioning” or “deconditioning” of consciousness that occurs, but 
only a “reconditioning”. Addressing a practice generally associated with 
the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, Katz explains what the practitioners 
really do:   
For it is in appearance only that such activities as yoga produce the 
desired state of ‘pure’ consciousness. Properly understood, yoga, for 
example, is not an unconditioning or deconditioning of consciousness, but 
rather a reconditioning of consciousness, i.e. a substituting of one form of 
conditioned and/or contextual consciousness for another …153 
This view also applies as a response to critics that have noted Katz’s 
inability to account for ‘spontaneous’ and ‘non-religiously’ contextualized 
experiences. If Forman, for instance, would understand his experience 
“properly”, Katz might argue, he would realize that his context is TM 
(transcendental meditation), and that he has ‘learned’ what to experience 
from the ‘tradition’ that promotes this sort of  activity. William P 
Gregory confirms this by citing a statement made by Katz at a 
conference speech in 2000: 
… Katz points out that Forman’s PCE is “very much part of a specific 
tradition… ‘Transcendental Meditation.’ The experience of “pure 
consciousness” is “colored by the assumptions of ‘Transcendental 
Meditation,’ and is actually a part of the teaching of ‘Transcendental 
Meditation.’ It is not independent of all mediation.”154 
And regarding other non-religiously contextualized experiences identified 
as ‘mystical’ by perennialists, Katz considers these to be conditioned by 
context as well: the context of modernity, and all that this implies. 
We now turn to a detailed presentation of the paper that started all the 
controversy: Katz’s 1978 article, “Language, Epistemology and 
Mysticism.”
                                                
153 Katz 1978a, p 57 
154 This quote comes from “Comments made at a presentation of a paper on the theme 
‘Mysticism and its contexts’ at the annual meeting of the American Academy of 
Religion 2000, Mysticism group, November 19, 2000” (Gregory, 2006, p. 289) 
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Part II: Material 
 
Chapter 2 
“Language, epistemology, and mysticism” and its 
place in Katz’s philosophy of  mysticism 
 
 
Introduc t ion  to  chapter two  
 
For six decades prior to the publication of Katz’s “Language, 
epistemology, and mysticism” (1978), research on mystical experience 
had been dominated by phenomenologically inclined interpretations that 
more or less followed the philosophy of William James. Thus Arthur 
Deikman’s theory of deautomatization, Roland Fischer’s cartography of 
meditative and ecstatic states of consciousness, Rudolf Otto’s 
description of numinous experience, R. C. Zaehner’s typology of 
mystical experiences and Walter T. Stace’s explicit common-core 
philosophy depended upon the idea that all mystical experiences contain 
an ‘essence’ conceptualized as their ‘common-core’. As can be seen in 
the following quote from Katz’s ‘letter of invitation to the symposium’, 
the aim and intent of his 1978 article was strongly motivated by his 
dissatisfaction with this ‘perennialist’ notion and his desire to supplant it:  
The aim of the collection is to investigate various aspects of the subject 
[of mysticism] from a sensitive yet rigorous philosophical perspective. The 
object is to try to advance the discussion and analysis of the subject 
beyond James and Otto, Stace and Zaehner. We would like to have essays 
which investigate and clarify basic aspects of the subject so that we can 
move beyond the position which is philosophically unsophisticated and 
fails to distinguish between various types of mystical experience on the 
one hand and the logic and language of different types of mystical claims 
on the other. Alternatively, we want to avoid the extremes of positivist-
like rejections of such experience as ‘nonsense’ as well as the position 
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which rejects logic, criteria, and analyses on the dubious ground that they 
are out of place in the discussion of mysticism.155   
In his article, Katz presented a detailed description of the problems 
entailed in the common core approach, along with a new method of 
interpretation that was said to bring logic and reason to bear on the 
subject of mystical experience without dismissing mystical claims as 
nonsense. Katz’s aim was to replace the old ‘unsophisticated’ approaches 
of common-core interpreters by allowing one central epistemological 
assumption to inform and guide his investigation: i.e., “there are NO 
pure (unmediated) experiences”.156 
In the years following the publication of “Language, epistemology, and 
mysticism”, the contextual approach presented therein has been neither 
departed from nor abandoned in Katz’s subsequent works on mysticism. 
On the contrary, he has sought to bolster his idea with sharper contours 
and various theoretical reinforcements. In “The conservative character 
of mystical experience” (1983), for example, Katz’s original 1978 thesis 
appears largely intact,157 the conclusion being that mystical experience is 
at least partially constructed out of the contextual features of a given 
mystic’s socio-religious environment:158 
In sum, our deconstruction and re-conceptualization suggests that models 
play an important role in providing our map of reality and what is real, 
and, thus, contribute to the creation of experience – I repeat to the creation 
of experience. This is a fact to be pondered, and pondered again.159 
                                                
155 Katz 1978, p. 3. 
156 Katz 1978a, p. 26.      
157 Katz 1983a. On page 4, for example, he restates his 1978 article’s central 
assumption: “There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.”   
158 The question of whether Katz’s theory indicates that it is ‘partially’ or ‘totally’ 
constructed this way is a matter of ongoing discussion. Nelson Pike and Richard 
Swinburne – among others – have accepted Katz’s characterization. (See Pike 1993, and 
Swinburne, 1979.) For his part, Katz claims that he does not want mysticism to be 
viewed as “only a conservative phenomenon” (in Katz 1982a, p 3, italics his), but instead 
wishes to promote a “dialectic” view of the relationship between “the innovative and 
traditional poles of the religious life” (p 3f). This desire, however, appears to be 
contradicted by the conclusions with which he sums up his inquiry. In these there 
seems to be little or nothing left of the ‘innovative’ part of mystical experience.  
159 Katz 1983a, p 51 (original italics) 
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Additionally, Katz’s position regarding the issues of cognitivity (as an 
outcome of mystical experience) and the facilitation of mystical 
experience remain fundamentally unchanged.  
The next publication in the collection of Katz’s investigations on 
mystical experience is the article “Mystical speech and mystical meaning” 
(1992). Here Katz focuses on the language of mystics, employing his 
findings in an effort to support the idea of differences in the experiences 
of mystics. Explicitly addressing the various critics of the contextual 
approach presented in ‘Language, epistemology and mysticism”, he 
asserts that he has “not yet been dissuaded of its correctness”.160 During 
that same year, Katz published two further articles on the subject: 
“Ethics and mysticism in eastern mystical traditions”161 and “Mysticism 
and ethics in western mystical traditions”162 (1992). These articles were 
initially presented at a 1984 conference163 in response to claims that 
mystics are non-moral and centre upon the presence of ethical 
consciousness in mysticism. Their basic point is closely connected to that 
which is presented in “The conservative character of mystical 
experience” (1983) – i.e., that views concerning the non-morality of 
mystics arise from the ‘misapprehension’ of mystics as religious 
revolutionaries: 
It is yet another distorted and distorting manifestation of the still more 
universal misapprehension that mystics are essentially arch-individualists, 
‘Lone Rangers’ of the spirit, whose sole intention is to escape the religious 
environment that spawned them in order to find personal liberation or 
salvation.164 
Rather than as heretics or ‘arch-individualists’, mystics are seen by Katz’s 
as individuals that, for the most part, conserve the religious doctrines of 
their tradition and experience the ‘solutions’ proposed by that same 
traditions: 
                                                
160 Katz 1992a, p. 5. 
161 Katz 1992b. 
162 Katz 1992c. 
163 They were delivered as David Baumgart Memorial Lectures at Harvard University, 10 
November 1984. 
164 Katz 1992b, p. 253. 
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All these mystical personalities intended and experienced, they had 
knowledge by acquaintance, what their communities taught as knowledge by 
description.165  
Again the message is the same: mystics have different experiences that are 
shaped by the communities and traditions from which those mystics 
arise. Already in his 1984 articles, Katz had pointed to the important role 
played by sacred scriptures (and their languages) in forming the 
experiences of mystics, a view that received further development in 
“Mystical speech and mystical meaning” (1992), which analysed the 
different uses of language displayed by mystics. “Mysticism and the 
interpretation of sacred scripture” (2000) presents yet another 
confirmation of this understanding, this time with an emphasis on sacred 
scripture and its impact on the experiences of mystics. The conclusion 
presented in this last article can be seen as a consequence of the original 
contextual thesis articulated in “Language, epistemology and mysticism” 
as well as a reinforcement of its central thesis – all with the apparent aim 
of increasing our understanding of mystical experience reports: 
If one seeks to understand how mystical fellowships work and how 
individual mystics pursue their ambitious metaphysical goals, then one not 
only has to concentrate attention on the rarefied, and rare, moments of 
ecstasy, adhesion, supernatural marriage, mindlessness, satori, nirvana and 
unity, but one also has to pay close attention to the sorts of exegetical 
techniques, and the ways of studying scripture, that are described in this 
essay. For the actual interpretation of sacred texts in these ways comprises 
a substantial part of what mystics actually do and plays a significant role in 
achieving those ultimate states of experience (or metaexperience) that 
mystics seek.166 
Indeed all of the articles that have appeared in the wake of “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism” can be viewed as providing extensions and 
further examples of Katz’s central epistemological assumption that there 
is no such thing as a pure (unmediated) experience; on the other hand, 
not one of them seems to have properly addressed the various questions 
and criticisms that have arisen as a result of his original presentation. In 
other words, no new idea or theoretical adjustment has emerged in 
                                                
165 Katz 1983a, p. 21. 
166 Katz 2000a, p. 56. 
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Katz’s later writings that would distinguish them in any substantial way 
from his original views presented in “Language, epistemology and 
mysticism”. Thus the primary focus of this chapter will be on the 
content of this article, next presented in a manner aimed at preserving 
Katz’s original line of argumentation as faithfully as possible.167 
 
2.1. The structure of the article 
Katz’s most concise characterization of “Language, epistemology and 
mysticism” is as a “plea for the recognition of differences”.168 The 
‘differences’ referred to are, of course, those that he perceives to exist 
between various mystical experiences across a variety of social and 
religious boundaries, a finding that he believes to contradict the view that 
all mystical experiences have identifiably similar features. Katz’s article 
consists of four sections, with the ‘plea for the recognition of 
differences’ being emphasised at the outset. In the first section he 
introduces the problem and discusses the insufficiency of past 
(‘perennial’ or ‘common-core’) interpretational methods, a discussion 
that he continues in the second section together with a presentation of 
the main features of his alternative interpretational approach. Here Katz 
introduces the central epistemological assumption upon which most 
elements in his contextual theory of interpretation rest: the assumption 
that there are no pure (unmediated) experiences. In section three, Katz 
provides further evidence that his contextual model has advantages that 
exceed the advantages of perennial interpretative models, concluding 
that the differences in the experiences of mystics are obvious and must 
be taken into account. In section four, Katz summarizes his conclusions 
and the major points of his contextual approach. 
                                                
167 Another reason for the focus on “Language, epistemology and mysticism” concerns 
the many and diverse reactions it has received. As already mentioned in subsection 1.2., 
a major objective of this thesis is to clear up some of the ‘misunderstandings’ that have 
arisen relative to the original presentation of Katz’s contextual approach. In the 
following chapters, Katz’s position will be presented largely, but not exclusively, on the 
basis of “Language, epistemology and mysticism”. Further complementary sources will 
include: 1) the articles referred to above; 2) Katz’s replies to my questionnaire; and, 3) 
William P. Gregory’s collection of material from Katz’s writings on Judaism and the 
Holocaust. 
168 Katz 1978a, p. 25. 
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Section I 
In order to clear the way for a focus on “main epistemological 
concerns”,169 Katz introduces the problems associated with mystical 
states by referring to the terms ‘verification’ and ‘interpretation’. 
Beginning with the issue of ‘verification’, Katz’s notes that mystical 
experience cannot be verified, if by ‘verification’ one means “the strong 
thesis that independent grounds for the claimed event/experience can be 
publicly demonstrated”.170 Considering this, Katz concludes that 
…no veridical propositions can be generated on the basis of mystical 
experience. As a consequence it appears certain that mystical experience is 
not and logically cannot be the grounds for any final assertions about the 
nature or truth of any religious or philosophical position nor, more 
particularly, for any specific dogmatic or theological belief. Whatever 
validity mystical experience has, it does not translate itself into ‘reasons’ 
which can be taken as evidence for a given religious proposition. Thus, in 
the final analysis, mystical or more generally religious experience is 
irrelevant in establishing the truth or falsity of religion in general or any 
specific religion in particular.171 
By this, Katz does not mean to say that mystical experiences do not 
happen or that the claims of mystics are not true, only that “there can be 
no grounds for deciding this question, i.e. of showing that they are true 
even if they are, in fact, true”.172 Katz states that it does not “seem 
reasonable to reduce these multiple and variegated claims to mere 
projected ‘psychological states’ which are solely the product of interior 
states of consciousness”.173 With these words Katz closes the issue of 
‘verification’, and moves on briefly to mention the issue of 
‘interpretation’. 
Katz initiates the discussion on interpretational issues with the general 
concern that “the work done [in this regard] seems to me, despite the 
beginnings of some valuable investigations on this area, to be still 
                                                
169 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
170 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
171 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
172 Katz 1978a, p. 22. Italics are original. 
173 Katz 1978a, p. 23. 
  
 114  
preliminary in terms of its methodology as well as its results”.174 By 
‘interpretation’ Katz means “the standard accounts of the subject which 
attempt to investigate what the mystic had to say about his experience”.175 
These accounts are classified according to different perspectives: “(a) the 
first-person report of the mystic; (b) the mystic’s ‘interpretation’ of his 
own experience, at a later, more reflective, and mediated, stage; (c) the 
‘interpretation’ of a third person within the same tradition (Christians on 
Christian Mysticism); (d) the process of interpretation by third persons in 
other traditions (Buddhists on Christianity); and so on”.176 Katz ascribes 
importance to these accounts, but wants to direct our attention to the 
more basic concerns: the “preinterpretive” issues.177 
These ‘preinterpretive’ issues are the focus of Katz’s ‘epistemological’ 
concerns. To explain his position, Katz addresses the problematic 
content in the “almost universally accepted schema of the relation which 
is claimed to exist between one mystic’s experience (and his report of the 
experience) and the experience of other mystics”.178 In order of degree of 
sophistication, Katz divides the accounts of the “almost universally 
accepted schema” into three major classes, all of which share the claim 
that mystical experience has the ‘same’ or ‘similar’ content across cultural 
and religious boundaries.179 Katz rejects the accounts of these 
‘perennialist’ proponents one by one, mentioning such figures as Huxley, 
Zaehner, Stace, and Smart. In this connection he notes that 
…the phenomenological typologies of Stace and Zaehner are too 
reductive and inflexible, forcing multifarious and extremely variegated 
forms of mystical experience into improper interpretative categories 
which lose sight of the fundamentally important differences between the 
data studied.180  
                                                
174 Katz 1978a, p. 23. 
175 Katz 1978a, p. 23. Italics are original. 
176 Katz 1978a, p. 23. 
177 Katz 1978a, p. 23. 
178 Katz 1978a, p. 23.  
179 Katz 1978a, pp. 23-4.  
180 Katz 1978a, p. 25. 
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As previously indicated, Katz concludes this first section of “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism” by describing his attempt as a “plea for the 
recognition of differences”.181 
 
Section II 
Since the most basic features of Katz’s contextual theory are outlined in 
this section, it will be treated in greater detail. 
The primary concern of Katz’s investigation is not the typologies of 
mystical experience that have been the focus of researchers such as 
James, Underhill, Inge, Jones, Otto, Zaehner and Stace. For Katz the 
more fundamental question is “why the various mystical experiences are 
the experiences they are”.182 To clarify the meaning of this question, Katz 
explains that 
…the single epistemological assumption that has exercised my thinking 
and which has forced me to undertake the present investigation [is that]: 
There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical experience, 
nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, or any 
grounds for believing that they are unmediated. This is to say, all 
experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available 
to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of 
unmediated experience, seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty. 
This epistemological fact seems to me to be true, because of the sorts of 
beings we are, even with regard to the experiences of those ultimate 
objects of concern with which mystics have intercourse, e.g. God, Being, 
nirvana, etc.183 
Katz notes that this ‘mediated’ feature of all experience has been 
“overlooked or underplayed by every major investigator of mystical 
experience”.184 According to Katz, had the perennialists recognized the 
significance of this fundamental epistemological point, it would have led 
them to conclude that 
…in order to understand mysticism it is not just a question of studying 
the reports of the mystic after the experiential event but of acknowledging 
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183 Katz 1978a, p. 26. Italics are original. 
184 Katz 1978a, p. 26. 
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that the experience itself as well as the form in which it is reported is 
shaped by concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his 
experience.185   
In Katz’s view this means that “the Hindu mystic does not have an 
experience of x which he then describes in the, to him, familiar language 
and symbols of Hinduism, but rather he has a Hindu experience, i.e. his 
experience is not an unmediated experience of x but is itself the, at least 
partially, pre-formed anticipated Hindu experience of Brahman.”.186 
Contrasting this with the example of a Christian mystic, Katz concludes 
that “the Hindu experience of Brahman and the Christian experience of 
God are not the same”.187 This is because 
…the forms of consciousness which the mystic brings to experience set 
structured and limiting parameters on what the experience will be, i.e. on 
what will be experienced, and rule out in advance what is 
‘inexperienceable’ in the particular given, concrete, context.188  
Herein lays the main point of contention between Katz and the 
‘perennial’ interpreters of mystical experience. Since the perennialists do 
not acknowledge the epistemological point that there are no pure 
(unmediated) experiences, they underplay the effect of pre-experiential 
patterns on experience itself. In the remaining sections of “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism”, Katz intends to supply “full supporting 
evidence and argumentation” for his claim that  
…this process of differentiation of mystical experience into the patterns 
and symbols of established religious communities is experiential and does 
not only take place in the post-experiential process of reporting and 
interpreting the experience itself: it is at work before, during and after the 
experience.189    
Katz’s arguments and supporting evidence consist of two basic elements: 
1) extensive reasoning directed at establishing that the perennialist 
approach is fundamentally flawed; and, 2) a wide variety of examples 
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from ‘mystical literature’ that are said to confirm Katz’s point of view 
and suggest that his interpretation is the superior of the two.  
 
The argumentation 
Katz’s discussion regarding the perennialists’ failure to recognize the 
force of pre-experiential conditioning begins with the work of Stace. 
Citing a number of statements from Stace’s writings, Katz concludes 
that, despite his awareness of the difficulties involved in distinguishing 
between experience and interpretation, Stace “fails to grasp clearly the 
force of this concern about the impossibility of ‘pure’ experience and 
what this entails”:190 
For Stace turns the discussion into a discussion of the post-experience 
interpretation placed on the experience rather than pursuing in any sense at 
all the primary epistemological issues which the original recognition 
requires.191  
By ‘primary epistemological issues’, Katz here means those related to the 
central assumption that there is no such thing as a pure experience. Katz 
continues to critique Stace’s “naively conceived distinction between 
experience and interpretation” as follows:192 
The focus of Stace’s remarks is on the relation between the mystics’ 
experience and ‘the beliefs which the mystics based on their experiences’. 
Here the symmetry is always one-directional: from experience to beliefs. 
There is no recognition that this relationship contains a two-directional 
symmetry: beliefs shape experience, just as experience shapes belief.193  
Katz next notes that, unlike Stace, Zaehner realized “that it is not easy to 
draw all mystical experience together in one basically undifferentiated 
category”.194 However, Katz does not consider this to be enough; that is 
why Zaehner is still seen to attempt a cross-cultural typology with an 
inadequate phenomenology at its base: “Zaehner’s well-known 
investigations flounder because his methodological, hermeneutical, and 
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193 Katz 1978a, p. 30. 
194 Katz 1978a, pp. 30-31.  
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especially epistemological resources are weak”.195 Again, it is the claimed 
‘sameness’ of mystical experiences that Katz finds problematic. Zaehner 
divides mystical experience into three types: theistic, monistic and 
panenhenic. Katz argues that this results in a ‘reductionistic’ and ‘overly 
simplistic’ theory of interpretation. This is because 
…both Jewish and Christian mysticism are for the most part theistic in 
the broad sense, yet the experience of the Jewish mystics is radically 
different from that met in Christian circles. And again, the ‘theism’ of 
Bhagavad Gita or of Ramanuja is markedly different from the theism of 
Theresa of Avila, Isac Luria or Al Hallaj. Alternatively the monism of 
Shankara is not the monism of Spinoza or Eckhart. And again Buddhism, 
for example, though classified according to Zaehners phenomenology as 
monistic, is really not to be so pigeon-holed.196   
The ‘plea for the recognition of differences’ echoes throughout Katz’s 
analysis of both Stace’s and Zaehner’s phenomenological approaches. 
They fail “to investigate or to consider in [their] own investigation of 
mystical experience the conditions of experience in general and the specific 
conditions of religious/mystical experience in particular”.197 The 
‘conditions of experience’ referred to in the above quotation are, once 
again, those mediating factors that prevent the apprehension of a pure 
experience.  
As a way of helping his readers better comprehend the meaning of 
mediated experience, Katz offers the phrase, ‘the child is father to the 
man’, applying it to the belief-system of a Jewish mystic. In Katz’s 
example, the Jewish mystic, since childhood, has been conditioned to 
have certain beliefs about ultimate reality, beliefs that, in turn, determine 
the experiences of the mystic: 
That is to say, the entire life of the Jewish mystic is permeated from 
childhood up by images, concepts, symbols, ideological values, and ritual 
behaviour which there is no reason to believe he leaves behind in his 
experience. Rather, these images, beliefs, symbols and rituals define, in 
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advance, what the experience he wants to have, and which he then does have, 
will be like.198  
How this “complex pre-experiential pattern affects the actual experience 
of the Jewish mystic”199 is indicated by Katz’s description of “the 
performance of mitzvot (commandments) for reaching the mystic goal 
and how this interpenetration of ritual and mystical actions (mitzvot) with 
the goal of relation to God affects the kind of experience one anticipates 
having and then, in fact, does have”.200 From some central details in 
Kabbalistic doctrine Katz concludes that 
…the Jewish conditioning pattern so strongly impresses that tradition’s 
mystics (as all Jews) with the fact that one does not have mystical 
experiences of God in which one loses one’s identity in ecstatic moments 
of unity, that the Jewish mystic rarely, if ever, has such experiences. What 
the Jewish mystic experiences is, perhaps, the Divine Throne, or the angel 
Metatron, or aspects of the Sefiroth, or the heavenly court and palaces, or 
the Hidden Torah, or God’s secret Names, but not loss of self and unity 
with God.201   
As evidence Katz cites: 
The absence of the kinds of experience of unity one often, but mistakenly, 
associates with mysticism, even as the ‘essence of mysticism’, in the 
Jewish mystical context, is very strong evidence that pre-experiential 
conditioning affects the nature of the experience one actually has.202 
Katz’s next example concerns the state of devekuth in Jewish mystical 
contexts. Here Katz attempts to demonstrate that the experiences 
themselves – and not merely the post-experiential reports – are shaped 
by patterns provided by Jewish mystical literature. As evidence of this he 
notes the close conformity between all Jewish mystical testimonies and 
the pattern given in Jewish mystical literature.203 
Katz finds the same type of connection between mystical testimony and 
mystical literature in Buddhist mysticism as well. After making a 
                                                
198 Katz 1978a, p. 33.  
199 Katz 1978a, p. 34. 
200 Katz 1978a, pp. 33-4.  
201 Katz 1978a, p. 34. 
202 Katz 1978a, pp. 34-5.  
203 Katz 1978a, p 36 
  
 120  
thorough presentation of the elements that he believes construct the 
Buddhist mystical experience, he concludes:  
Whatever nirvana is, and indeed whatever devekuth is, in so far as words 
mean anything and philosophical enquiry has any significance, there is no 
way one can describe, let alone equate, the experience of nirvana and 
devekuth on the basis of the evidence. There is no intelligible way anyone 
can argue that a no-self experience of ‘empty’ calm is the same experience 
as the experience of intense, loving, intimate relationship between two 
substantial selves, one of whom is conceived of as the personal God of 
western religion and all that this entails.204  
The experiences are not “the same” Katz argues, and any typology 
attempting a cross-religious account of ‘mysticism’ would be wrongly 
directed. The remainder of section two provides further evidence of the 
‘differences’ between the mystical experiences of mystics coming from 
different traditions. In this regard Katz considers Ruysbroeck’s unio 
mystica to be nothing like “(a) the dualistic experience of devekuth; (b) the 
no-self, no-God, no-relation experience of nirvana; (c) the naturalistic 
mysticism of those like Richard Jefferies; (d) the non-absorptive 
mysticism of non-Jewish mystics whose experiences differ from that of 
devekuth; or even (e) the absorptive mystics who superficially seem 
closest, such as the Advaitans”.205  
To further reinforce the thesis that “mystical experience is ‘over-
determined’ by its socio-religious milieu”,206 Katz also notes that 
discipleship within mystical traditions is another way through which 
mystics learn what to experience: just as the mystic’s experiences are 
informed and shaped by the holy scriptures of their respective traditions, 
so they are also informed and shaped by the instructions of their gurus. 
And if the traditions are different, the experiences of the mystics must 
also differ.207 
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207 Because there are no ‘pure’ experiences, the mystics cannot escape the impact of 
socio-religious context. Thus the socio-religious context shapes the experiences of 
mystics.  
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Section III 
In this section, Katz seeks support for his “contextual thesis”208 by 
pointing out the “curious logical-philosophical problems inherent in the 
study of mysticism”.209 The initial problem concerns the meaning of the 
terms used by mystics to describe their experience. It is an inadequate 
evaluation of these meanings that is thought to be the 
… factor that misleads those like Underhill, Otto, Stace, Bucke, Arberry, 
and Zaehner, among others, into thinking that all mystics are referring to 
the same experience or to a small number of similar experiences.210  
Katz first notes that Stace is in error when he argues for a common core 
in mystical experience based on the fact that mystics of different 
religious traditions use similar language to describe their experiences. He 
concludes that Stace, and others who “follow a similar procedure” have 
been “misled by the surface grammar of the mystical reports they 
study”.211  
That is to say, what appear to be similar sounding descriptions are not 
similar descriptions and do not indicate the same experience. They do not 
because language is itself contextual and words ‘mean’ only in contexts. 
The same words – beautiful, sublime, ultimate reality, ineffable, 
paradoxical, joyful, transcending all empirical content, etc. – can apply and 
have been applied to more than one object.212 
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212 Katz 1978a, pp. 46-7. Unfortunately, Katz never distinguishes between same 
(numerically identical) and similar (qualitatively identical) experiences, a distinction 
which would allow for other types of discussions about the experiences of mystics. 
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no similarities whatsoever between the experiences of mystics coming from different 
traditions. As I understand the ‘perennialist’ claim, the Muslim unitive experience is 
claimed to have some similarity with the unitive experience of a Christian one, in spite 
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In Katz’s view, the descriptions are not similar (or the same) because 
they are predicated of different objects in mystical experience. Thus, 
Katz argues: 
Again, ‘ineffable’ nirvana is not the ‘ineffable’ Allah of the Sufi, nor the 
‘ineffable’ Allah of the Sufi the ‘ineffable’ Tao of Taoism.213   
Likewise, the Absolute Thou of Buber is not the Absolute Thou of 
Kafka, just as the ‘truths’ displayed to Castaneda are claimed not to be 
the same ‘truths’ the Zen master claims.214 Mystics have different 
experiences for the very reason that they encounter different Realities in 
their experiences: 
It seems clear that these respective mystics do not experience the same 
Reality or objectivity, and therefore it is not reasonable to posit that their 
respective experiences of Reality or objectivity are similar.215 
According to Katz, this is at least partially explained by the way language 
is used: “different metaphysical entities can be ‘described’ by the same 
phrases if these phrases are indefinite enough”.216 Apparently similar 
descriptive phrases are not being used univocally, and this is something 
the common-core interpreters have not taken into account.  
                                                                                                              
of the theological differences between the two traditions. Katz’s criticism is directed 
towards perennialist claims of sameness or similarity. In this limited context, I cannot 
examine in detail whether perennialists in general (or any specific perennialist for that 
matter) consider(s) the experiences of mystics to be the same or to be similar, though I 
believe it to be an absurd interpretation that Stace, Huxley or any other perennialist 
would claim that the experiences are the same – even if had by the same mystic. 
Nevertheless, as we soon shall see, this is exactly how Katz discusses the perennial 
position.   
213 Katz 1978a, p. 48. 
214 Katz 1978a, p. 49. 
215 Katz 1978a, p. 50. 
216 Katz 1978a, p. 51. As true as it is that different objects have been described with 
various ‘indefinite phrases’, it is also true that different objects have been described 
with ‘definite’ phrases, like ‘brown shoes’ or ‘square tables’. Whether the phrases are 
definite or indefinite has thus nothing to do with how many different objects (or 
‘metaphysical entities’) they can describe. Katz makes a case of this, and warns that 
“Analysis of these terms indicates their relativity; they are applied to a variety of 
alternative and even mutually exclusive ‘states of affairs’ and ‘states of no-affairs’. This 
variety itself should alert us to the real danger and arbitrariness involved in this gambit.” 
(Katz 1978a, pp. 58-9).    
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Taking the term ‘nothingness’, which is often used in descriptions of 
Buddhist experiences, Katz argues that we must ask whether the 
description of the mystic is “being used as a subjective description of an 
experience or a putative objective description of an object or ontological 
state of being”.217 What additionally must be asked is whether  
…the various experiences of ‘nothingness’ are similar or dissimilar 
experiences of the same phenomenon, i.e. ‘nothingness’, or different 
experiences of different phenomena, i.e. ‘nothingness’ is a term which is 
used to cover alternative ontic realities.218  
Further addressing the issue of phenomenal characteristics, Katz notes 
that in addition to the “linguistic-cum-ontological” problems involved in 
the classification of experience through its phenomenological 
characteristics, this sort of approach entails logical problems as well. 
Taking the standard ascriptions ‘ineffability’ and ‘paradoxicality’ as 
examples, Katz asks: “Do these elements logically allow for the inquiry 
into the possible identity of mystical experiences and their attempted 
comparability, especially their claimed equivalence or similarity?”219 For 
Katz the answer is no because “[w]hat ontological or logical reason 
demands that there be only one experience that is ineffable and 
paradoxical?”220As an illustration of this Katz asks us to consider the 
following example: 
(1) mystic A claims experience x is paradoxical and ineffable, while (2) 
mystic B claims experience y is paradoxical and ineffable. The only 
logically permissible conclusion one can draw in this situation is that both 
mystic A and mystic B claim their experience is paradoxical, nothing can 
be said about the content of their respective experiences x and y for there 
is no way to give content to experience x or y in such a manner as to learn 
anything about them, apart, as we have said, from their both being 
paradoxical, which could then serve as a basis of a reasonable 
comparison.221 
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These standard elements are also logically in the way of a 
phenomenology or typology of mysticism, since they logically “cancel 
out all other descriptive terms”. As a consequence 
… it would appear that to take the mystics claim seriously, i.e. that his 
proposition that ‘x is PI’ [Paradoxical and Ineffable] is a true description, 
turns out to have the damaging implication that one cannot make any 
reasonable or even intelligible claim for any mystical proposition. The 
proposition ‘x is PI’ has the curious logical result that a serious 
interpretation of the proposition neither makes the experience x 
intelligible nor informs us in any way about x, but rather cancels x out of 
our language – which, of course, is what most mystics claim they want.222  
Apart from his point that writers on mysticism fail to consider that terms 
like ‘nirvana’ or ‘God’ or ‘Being’ are not names, but rather “disguised 
descriptions”,223 Katz continues his argument for the contextual nature 
of mystical experience by turning to the practices of mystics aimed at 
“lead[ing] the ‘self’ from states of ‘conditioned’ to ‘unconditioned’ 
consciousness, from ‘contextual’ to ‘non-contextual awareness’.224 In this 
regard, Katz criticises the perennialists for using the fact of these 
mystical efforts as support for their claim that mystical experiences share 
common features upon which a common characterization can be built:  
For it is in appearance only that such activities as yoga produce the 
desired state of ‘pure’ consciousness. Properly understood, yoga, for 
example, is not an unconditioning or deconditioning of consciousness, 
but rather it is a reconditioning of consciousness, i.e. a substituting of one 
form of conditioned and/or contextual consciousness for another …225  
Katz concludes that “there is no substantive evidence to suggest that 
there is any pure consciousness per se achieved by these various, common 
mystical practices”,226 and thus rejects this as a common characteristic of 
mystical experience. All other notions related to the notion of ‘pure 
experience’ are also rejected on the same basis: 
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Closely allied to the erroneous contention that we can achieve a state of 
pure consciousness is the oft used notion of the ‘given’ or the ‘suchness’ 
or the ‘real’ to describe the pure states of mystical experience which 
transcends all contextual epistemological colouring. But what sense do 
these terms have? What is the ‘given’ or the ‘suchness’ or the ‘real’? 
Analysis of these terms indicates their relativity; they are applied to a 
variety of alternative and even mutually exclusive ‘states of affairs’ and 
‘states of no-affairs’. This variety itself should alert us to the real danger 
and arbitrariness involved in this gambit. Phenomenologists seem 
especially prone to this fruitless naivety – all intuit the ‘given’ but their 
intuitions differ significantly. It can fairly be said that no attempt to state 
clearly or individuate the ‘given’ has succeeded. Indeed, talk of the ‘given’ 
seems to be a move made to short-circuit the very sort of epistemological 
inquiry here being engaged in, but such a move fails because there is no 
evidence that there is any ‘given’ which can be disclosed without the 
imposition of the mediating conditions of the knower. All ‘givens’ are also 
the product of the process of ‘choosing’, ‘shaping’, and ‘receiving’. That is, 
the ‘given’ is appropriated through acts which shape it into forms which 
we can make intelligible to ourselves given our conceptual constitution, 
and which structure it in order to respond to the specific contextual needs 
and mechanisms of consciousness of the receiver.227 
Katz claims that this sort of ‘epistemic activity’ requires “what in Kantian 
idiom, though not in Kant’s own manner, would be called a 
‘transcendental deduction’, i.e. an argument which reveals both conditions 
of knowing in general as well as the grounds of its own operation and 
which is thematized according to specific possibilities”.228 Katz argues 
that the nature of consciousness is not a ‘tabula rasa’; experience, 
including mystical experience, is contextual and mediated by “the kind of 
beings we are”.229 “And the kind of beings we are require that experience 
be not only instantaneous and discontinuous, but that it also involve 
memory, apprehension, expectation, language, accumulation of prior 
experience, concepts, and expectations”:230 
Thus experience of x – be x God or nirvana – is conditioned both 
linguistically and cognitively by a variety of factors including the expectation of 
what will be experienced. Related to these expectations are also future 
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directed activities such as meditation, fasting, ritual abolitions, self-
mortification, and so on, which create further expectations about what the 
future and future states of consciousness will be like. There is obviously a 
self-fulfilling prophetic aspect to this sort of activity.231   
The point is made once again: there is no escaping the contextual factors 
that shape experience. After two lengthy quotations from Ruysbroeck, in 
which Ruysbroeck describes a sequence of unio mystica, Katz’s analysis of 
the quotation suggests the same conclusion: 
Though [Ruysbroeck’s] description may appear, on first reading, 
epistemologically, theologically, or metaphysically neutral, closer 
inspection will reveal a myriad of epistemological, theological and 
metaphysical assumptions which colour the account both before and after it 
occurs.232  
Additionally, Katz argues that mystical traditions are ‘intentional’ in the 
sense that they “intend some final state of being”.233 For Katz this tells 
us more about the experiences of mystics than can a list of phenomenal 
characteristics: 
Indeed, it appears that the different states of experience which go by the 
names nirvana, devekuth, fana, etc., are not the ground but the outcome of the 
complex epistemological activity which is set in motion by the integrating 
character of self-consciousness employed in the specifically mystical 
modality.234 
Thus, intentionality – another fundamental epistemological aspect of 
consciousness – plays a constructive role. It is not only the experiences 
of mystics but also their language that is ‘intentional’, and the meaning 
Katz ascribes to ‘intentionality’ is described as follows: 
This entire area of the ‘intentionality’ of experience and language of 
experience as it relates to mysticism is a rich area for further study. By way 
of only introducing the significance of this topic for our concerns, I will 
merely suggest that, if one looks closely at the language of mystics, as well 
as at mystical devotion, practices, and literature, one will find that much 
of it is ‘intentional’ in the sense suggested by Husserl and Brentano. 
Though I am no great admirer of either with regard to their more general 
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metaphysical positions, their discussion of ‘intentional language’ per se is 
instructive, for it calls to our attention that certain terms such as ‘expects’, 
‘believes’, ‘hopes’, ‘seeks’, ‘searches’, ‘desires’, ‘wants’, ‘finds’, ‘looks for’, 
involve, as Brentano said, ‘an object in themselves’. We must heed the 
warning that the linguistic intentionality does not generate or guarantee 
the existence of the ‘intentional object’, but we must also recognise the 
epistemologically formative character of intentional language mirroring as 
it does intentional acts of consciousness. Using the language modern 
phenomenologists favour we might say that ‘intentionality’ means to 
describe a ‘datum as meant’, i. e. to be aware that an action includes a 
reach for some specific meaning or meaningful content.235   
For instance, when asked, “Why are you doing such and such?”,236 a yogi 
will generally answer by citing a variety of theologically-loaded beliefs 
that have shaped his experience. Katz explains why this is so important: 
the object ‘contained’ in experience must be taken into consideration 
when the mystic’s experiences are interpreted, because the object itself 
gives character to the experience. For example: 
When Smith says ‘I experience x’ he is not only involved in the sort of 
epistemological procedures that we have just discussed, i.e. that the mind 
is active in constructing x as experienced, but he is also asserting that 
there is an x to be experienced. In other words, mystics and students of 
mysticism have to recognize that mystical experience is not (putatively) 
solely the act of the conditioned experience as constituted from the side 
of the experiencer, but is also constituted and conditioned by what the 
object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences.237 
Katz presents this as a “known aspect of mystical experience”, an aspect 
that displays the “full content of the concept of experience”.238 From an 
ordinary realistic position, mystical experience is not only shaped by the 
conditions of the experiencer, but also by the ‘object’ the mystic 
“believes he” encounters in his experience. “To say that ‘Smith 
experiences x’ is also to recognize that this experience is in part 
dependent on what x is”.239 But there is a ‘rub’: 
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…the recognition also requires the additional awareness of the complexity 
of the situation in that what ‘x is’ is itself, at least partly, determined by a 
contextual consciousness.240 
The epistemological concerns that point to differences between mystical 
experiences have been proffered by Katz. As he sees it, experience is 
largely shaped by contextual factors such as pre-experiential socio-
religious conceptual structures, and partly by the object of experience, 
which is also partly ‘determined by a contextual consciousness’.  
Katz concludes section three of “Language, epistemology and 
mysticism” by confirming and reiterating his original ‘plea for the 
recognition of differences’. 
Moreover, to take account of the differing objects of experience is to 
recognize of necessity the difference of the experiences themselves – even 
if these differences are themselves at least partly contributed to ‘reality’ at 
an earlier or parallel stage.241   
 
Section IV 
Three major points are made in this final section that reflect the 
fundamental aims of “Language, epistemology and mysticism”: 
1. According to Katz, his primary aim as been to outline an alternate 
interpretive approach to the “data”, with a specific focus on freeing 
common core researchers in the field from preconceptions regarding the 
sameness or similarity of all mystical experiences: 
If mystical experience is always the same or similar in essence, as is so 
often claimed, then this has to be demonstrated by recourse to, and 
accurate handling of, the evidence, convincing logical argument, and 
coherent epistemological procedures. It cannot be shown to be the case 
merely by supported and/or unsupportable assertions to this effect… nor 
again can it be demonstrated by prior assumptions on the matter which 
‘prove’ their case in what is essentially circular fashion.242 
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In other words, it is up to the common-core interpreters to prove their 
point. 
2. Katz hopes he has made it clear throughout that he does not hold any 
given mystical tradition as “superior” or “normative” relative to any 
other and that he does not have any given dogmatic position to defend. 
As he explains it, his “sole concern” has been to determine, “recognizing 
the contextuality of [his] own understanding, what the mystical evidence will 
allow in the way of legitimate philosophical reflection”.243 In this regard 
he views his investigation as suggesting that “a wide variety of mystical 
experiences … are, at least in respect of some determinative aspects, 
culturally and ideologically grounded”.244 Having said this, however, he 
frankly admits his awareness that two lines of research need to be 
continued:  
(1) further careful, expert, study of specific mystical traditions has to be 
undertaken to uncover what their characteristics are and especially how 
they relate to the larger theological milieu out of which they emerge; and 
(2) further fundamental epistemological research into the conditions of 
mystical experience has to be undertaken in order to lay bare the skeleton 
of such experience in so far as this is possible.245 
It is the latter of these enterprises that Katz considers “especially 
important, yet all the more neglected”.246 
3. Katz believes that strong supporting evidence for his pluralistic 
understanding of mystical experience is found in the fact that 
…our position is able to accommodate all the evidence which is 
accounted for by non-pluralistic accounts without being reductionistic, i. 
e. it is able to do more justice to the specificity of the evidence and its 
                                                                                                              
(numerically identical) and not merely similar with respect to certain qualitative aspects. 
I believe this to be a totally mistaken interpretation of the perennial position, though I 
will not provide arguments for this in the present context.   
243 Katz 1978a, p. 65-66. 
244 Katz 1978a, p. 66. 
245 Katz 1978a, p. 66. The project of ‘laying bare the skeleton’ of such experience 
sounds strikingly similar to what perennialists do when they point to structural 
similarities (the common core) between experiences. How ‘laying bare the skeleton’ of 
‘such experience’ differs from the perennialist project is not clear at all, though this is 
not a question that will be addressed here.   
246 Katz 1978a, p. 66. 
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inherent distinctions and disjuctions than can the alternative approaches. 
That is to say, our account neither (a) overlooks any evidence, nor (b) has 
any need to simplify the available evidence to make it fit into comparative 
or comparable categories, nor (c) does it begin with a priori assumptions 
about the nature of ultimate reality.247 
With these concluding remarks on the ‘hermeneutical advantages’ of the 
pluralistic way, Katz has presented his solution to the problem of 
common-core interpretations of mystical experience. 
The following section of this thesis looks at Katz’s argument in abstract 
and provides a preliminary glimpse of those aspects that appear to be 
problematic. With regard to these apparent problem areas, we posted a 
series of email questions to Katz, seeking clarification. Those questions 
along with his answers are presented in what follows since they will be 
used together with Katz’s published writings as source material in the 
coming analysis.   
 
2.2. Some problems involved in Katz’s position 
Although the ideas presented in “Language, epistemology and 
mysticism” are interconnected – in the sense that they presuppose or 
imply one another – each will receive individual treatment. What follows 
is a listing of some of the problematic claims made in Katz’s article (in 
order of appearance): 
a. Whatever validity mystical experience has, it does not translate itself into 
reasons which can be taken as evidence for a given religious proposition. 
b. One must recognize the differences in mystical experiences across 
traditional boundaries, as opposed to recognizing the similarities. 
c. There are no pure (unmediated) experiences.  
d. It is not possible to distinguish between experience and interpretation.  
e. Experience is shaped/constructed/determined by beliefs, expectations, 
language, religious doctrine, etc… 
                                                
247 Katz 1978a, p. 66. 
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f. The phenomenal characteristics of common-core interpreters are inadequate in 
delineating mystical experience, and they also display logical incompatibility 
and inconclusiveness. 
g. The object of experience (partly) determines what kind of experience the experience 
is. 
As noted in chapter one, conflicting understandings in Katz’s 
formulation seem to arise when certain of the above claims are 
juxtaposed. For example, if one posits that a mystical experience is partly 
determined by the ‘object’ of that experience (a. above), one appears to 
be making some sort of ‘realist’ claim. Such a claim, however, appears to 
conflict with the contextualist claim that mystical experiences are more 
or less completely determined by the beliefs, expectations, language, etc. 
of the given mystic (e. above). This sort of theoretical inconsistency 
makes it difficult to see how Katz’s contextual approach could effectively 
ascertain whether or not mystical experiences are similar or different (b. 
above). Katz’s claim for the partial involvement of the object of 
experience is itself complicated because this gives the impression that 
reality impacts on the mystic in such ways that the experience is 
individuated by this – i.e., that it makes the mystic’s experience what it is; 
at the same time, Katz posits that the ‘object’ of the mystic’s experience 
is determined by contextual factors, a view that appears to negate the 
realism declared in the previous sentence (g. above). Moreover, Katz’s 
conviction that it is not possible to distinguish between experience and 
interpretation implies that there is no way of knowing the degree to 
which reality actually influence a mystical experience in terms of 
determining its character (d. above).  
Another apparent flaw in Katz’s presentation involves the fact that while 
he claims that perennialists do not provide adequate criteria for the 
discernment of mystical from other types of experience, the only 
alternative he manages to offer is the statement that there are Buddhist, 
Muslim, Christian, etc. types of mystical experiences. Apart from this, 
Katz’s contextual approach remains confused regarding the degree to 
which mystical experience is shaped by beliefs, expectations, language, 
religious doctrine, etc. (e. above) and the degree to which it is shaped by 
the involvement of the ‘object’ (g. above). 
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2.3. Starting the discussion 
For the purpose of resolving some of these problems, four sets of 
questions were sent to Katz via email in October, 2006. The questions 
were meant to clarify some of these issues, especially considering the 
types of criticisms Katz’s thesis has attracted and the apparent 
‘misunderstandings’ these have involved.  
The first set of questions, concerned Katz’s single epistemological 
assumption that there are no pure (unmediated) experiences; the second 
set, addressed the problem of differentiating between various types of 
mystical experiences, between mystical and religious experiences, and 
between mystical and non-mystical experience as well; the third set, 
concerned the matter of where Katz’s stands on the question of the 
cognitivity of mystical experiences, especially given the importance he 
places on context as a determinant of those experiences; and, the fourth 
set concerned the propositional content of the notions that mystical 
experience does not translate into reasons (a. above) and is largely 
determined by context (e. above), both of which we preliminarily 
regarded as claims of non-cognitivity. 
 
2.3.1. Questions Sent to Katz 
To make it easier for the reader, the initial email questions along with 
Katz’s answers will be artificially presented as an interview by inserting 
Katz’s answers after each question – without, of course, changing the 
content. (The original email format can be found in an Appendix.):  
 
This first set of questions attempts to clarifying the role played by the denial of ‘pure 
experience’ in Katz’s theory of mysticism: 
Q: The first set of questions that arose from my reading concerns the 
denial of pure experience. My first concern with the proposition “There 
are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.” was its general character. I 
have not been able to figure to what extent it determines the content of 
your theory of interpretation. You state for example, that mystical 
experience is ‘over-determined’ by contextual factors. Is this based on 
the epistemology following from the denial of ‘pure experience’? [Q1] 
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A: Yes. [A1] 
Q: If yes, should we treat experience-reports in general as we treat 
reports of ‘mystical experience’? [Q2] 
A: No, as we need to recognize that mystical experience is not exactly 
like "experience in general."  But it is not altogether different either. [A2] 
Q: If we can conclude that mystical experience is for instance ‘non-
cognitive’ (or not cognition-generating) based on the denial of ‘pure 
experience’, can we draw the same conclusion about experience in 
general? [Q3] 
A: I do not hold that mystical experience is non-cognitive. [A3] 
Q: What exactly is intended by the expression ‘pure/unmediated 
experience’? In the article from 1978 there are several expressions used 
for this ‘phenomenon’, among which ‘the given’ is one. Is the notion of 
‘unmediated/pure experience’ to be understood as ‘the given’ of 
phenomenology as well as the ‘intuited’ knowledge of Lao Tsu? And is 
the Erfarung without Erlebnis of Kant, as well as ‘the original flux’ of 
James also included in the denial? [Q4] 
A: In answer to your question about "pure/unmediated experience" I 
mean to refer to a direct form of knowledge of "the thing in itself" 
without any conceptual (or other) mediation. [A4] 
Q: In ‘Language, epistemology, and mysticism’ the denial of ‘pure 
experience’ is first labelled an ‘assumption’, then an ‘epistemological fact’ 
and in ‘The conservative character of mystical experience’ it is labelled a 
‘working hypothesis’ – what label is most accurate? [Q5] 
A: I would think that calling the denial of pure experience "a working 
hypothesis" is best. I do so because I do not want to be dogmatic about 
the possibility I am wrong. (Though to date I do not think anyone has 
shown that I am wrong.) [A5] 
Q: What part of the argument is it – is it a conclusion or a premise? 
What role does the assumption play in the contextual theory as a whole? 
Is this assumption/working hypothesis/epistemological fact necessary 
and does the contextual approach depend on the assumption? [Q6] 
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A: Whether the contextual approach in all forms depends on this 
"working hypothesis" I am not sure - For myself, however, the answer is 
yes. This dependency does exist. [A6] 
 
This second set of questions primarily concerns the delimitation of mystical experience 
and religious experience. Section 1.4 discussed different ways of defining religion and 
what they imply for the identification of mystical experience, and also for the 
distinction between religious experience and mystical experience.  
Q: The second set of questions concern the delimitation of ‘mystical’ in 
experience. Concerning the questions of a common core in mystical 
experience, you direct a serious amount of criticism towards the ability of 
‘perennial’ interpreters of mystical experience to delineate mystical from 
other forms of experience. If I understand you correctly, you do not 
believe there is a common core in mystical experience, and prefer a list 
of mystical-experience reports as a means of picking out the reports for 
interpretation. This leaves me wondering: Without the phenomenal 
characteristics of experience, how is it possible within the contextual 
model to discern mystical experience from other kinds of experience? 
There are indications in your article that it is the object of the mystic’s 
experience that makes the experience ‘mystical’, is that correct? [Q8] 
A: Yes. I reject the "Common core" position. This, however, does not 
preclude distinguishing mystical experience from general experience. 
Mystical experience has, in each discrete instance, specific 
phenomenological conditions that mark it as mystical. [A8] 
Q: Is there any way to discern between a mystical experience and a 
religious experience in the contextualist approach of interpretation of 
mystical reports? [Q9] 
A: Yes one can distinguish mystical from religious experience. There will 
be areas that seem to overlap and about which one can argue but this 
distinction is not hard to posit. [A9] 
Q: I have also wondered what role, if any, the denial of pure experience 
plays for the conclusion that there is no common core to mystical 
experience. [Q10] 
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A: … the denial of pure experience is for me, separate from, but related 
to, the denial of the common core claims insofar as these claims are 
usually of the pure experience variety. [A10] 
 
The third set of questions concerns the epistemological foundation for a contextual-
realist theory of mystical experience of the type Katz is proposing. 
Q: A third important issue that has also been reflected in the critical 
reviews of your article concerns the over-determination of experience. 
Keeping in mind that you consider experience ‘over-determined’ by 
contextual/historical/psychological/linguistic factors, I was surprised to 
find that you also think that “beliefs shape experience, just as experience 
shapes beliefs”. To me this seems contradictory, on account of the 
following: How can experience shape beliefs when experience is ‘over-
determined’ by belief and other contextual factors? It seems that on the 
contextual approach the ‘over-determination’ of experience stretches to 
encapsulate all aspects of it, including the autonomy that experience 
would require to ‘shape’ anything. What does the autonomy of 
experience consist in when it ‘shapes beliefs’? [Q11] 
A: As to my view that "experience shapes belief" as well as the contrary - 
to deny this would be to deny reality, i.e., novelty, and the possibility - at 
least - of radical novelty.  I think, that one must at least allow for these 
possibilities in religious (as well as other) forms of life and experience. 
[A11] 
Q: Taking the ‘over-determination’ of experience as a dominant 
characteristic, I have also wondered what it is that the mystics interpret 
when they have ‘mystical’ experiences. What is the object of their 
interpretation? [Q12] 
A: I do not want to deny the reality of mystical experience - this I grant, 
as a given from which one proceeds.  I begin by allowing the claim for 
the Ultimate Object - whatever that is - as claimed by the mystic.  I then 
ask: "Why does He or She know Reality (whatever it is) the way that they 
do?" Thus I never deny the object of the claims for mystical experience 
whatever the Object claimed is. [A12] 
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This final question concerns the claimed cognitivity of mystical experience, a claim that 
appears unsupported by Katz’s contextual theory of mystical experience. 
Q: A final question that has puzzled me is whether you consider that 
mystical experiences are cognitive or not. That the mystical experience 
can not be “translated into reasons” I have interpreted as “mystical 
experiences are non-cognitive”. Some of your interpreters claim this is 
not so. Do you consider the mystical experiences cognitive or cognition-
generating? [Q13] 
A: No - you have misinterpreted my view that mystical experience 
cannot be "translated into reasons" as meaning they are non-cognitive.  
The cognitive nature of these claims is not the issue - one can have 
cognitive claims that are not verifiable and thus cannot serve as decisive 
proof of an argument.  Cognitivity and verifiability, etc., are concepts 
that must be distinguished. You conflate them incorrectly. [A13] 
 
2.3.2. Concluding remarks 
The above series of questions and answers shall be viewed as part of the 
source material since it will be used in later chapters as the basis for 
certain conclusions. Unfortunately, several issues remain unclarified since 
they are not covered in Katz’s replies. It would be interesting, for 
instance, to learn more about how Katz differentiates between mystical 
and religious experience, and how the religious/mystical is distinguished 
from the ‘secular’ in his contextual model. Moreover, his attempt to 
combine a contextualist model with realist intentions also bears closer 
scrutiny, since the two notions seem mutually exclusive and thus 
contradictory. We would also be interested to know what those 
‘phenomenological conditions’ are that mark a mystical experience as 
specifically mystical. Most of these issues will be discussed in the coming 
chapters, which will aim at a deeper understanding of Katz’s theory and 
an analysis of how the interpretation mysticism can be advanced.  
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Part III: Analysis 
 
Chapter 3 
The nature of mystical experience 
 
 
Introduction to chapter three 
 
… there's a war in the mind, over territory  
For the dominion  
Who will dominate the opinion  
Schisms and isms, keepin' us in forms of religion  
Conformin' our vision  
To the world churches decision  
Trapped in a section  
Submitted to committing election 
Moral infection  
Lauren Hill 
 
This chapter focuses on an analysis of Katz’s rejection of the 
phenomenal characteristics as a valid means of delimiting mysticism. 
From the outset, however, it is important to keep in mind the gap that 
exists between the first-hand interpretations of mystics (who are at some 
point or another interpreting their own experiences) and various types of 
second-hand interpretations (the interpretations of these experiential 
reports). Katz’s own awareness of this gap is indicated in both 
“Language, epistemology, and mysticism” and “Mystical speech and 
mystical meaning”.248 Much of the argumentation concerning which 
                                                
248 Katz distinguishes between “(a) the first person report of the mystic; (b) the mystic’s 
‘interpretation’ of his own experience at some later, more reflective, and mediated, 
stage; (c) the ‘interpretation of third persons within the same tradition (Christians on 
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theoretical framework is best for interpreting mystical experience 
concentrates on how the details of the mystic’s first-hand interpretation 
of her own experience is to be understood. This is exemplified by the 
following two quotes from Katz regarding a central point of his 
contextual approach: 
…this process of differentiation of mystical experience into the patterns 
and symbols of established religious communities is experiential and does 
not only take place in the post-experiential process of reporting and 
interpreting the experience itself: it is at work before, during and after the 
experience.249 
Thus,  
…in order to understand mysticism it is not just a question of studying the 
reports of the mystic after the experiential event but of acknowledging 
that the experience itself as well as the form in which it is reported is 
shaped by concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his experience.250 
This highlights a major distinction between Katz’s approach and that of 
the perennialists. In Katz’s epistemology of mysticism, the mystic’s 
experiential interpretation occurs at all times – before, during and after 
the mystical experience; in the perennial account, however, there is 
recognition of the presence of ambiguous experiential phenomena which 
are interpreted by the experiencer through either religiously or secularly 
acquired interpretive models. This is what Paul Elmer More means when 
he insists that: 
There is thus a ground of psychological experience, potential in all men, 
actually realized in a few, common to all mystics of all lands and times and 
accountable for the similarity of their reports. But upon that common 
basis, we need not be surprised to see them also erecting various 
superstructures in accordance with their particular tenets of philosophy or 
religion. At bottom their actual experiences, at the highest point at least, 
will be amazingly alike, but their theories in regard to what has happened 
to them may be radically different.251 
                                                                                                              
Christian mysticism); (d) the process of interpretation by third persons in other 
traditions (Buddhists on Christianity); and so on.” (Katz 1978a, p. 23) 
249 Katz 1978a, p. 27. 
250 Katz 1978a, p. 26. 
251 Paul Elmer More quoted in Pike 1993, p. 87. 
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This sharp contrast between the contextualist and the perennialist 
models is expressed by Katz in his central thesis that there are no pure 
experiences, that the interpretative functions are never inactivated, that it 
is impossible to distinguish between experience and interpretation and 
that there are differences rather than similarities among mystical experiences. 
Katz pleads for “the recognition of differences” in the experiences of 
mystics and offers a contextual alternative to the common core 
interpretations of the perennialists. This chapter comprises an 
examination of Katz’s theoretical justification for interpreting various 
mystical experiences as being fundamentally different from, rather than 
similar to, one another.  
Katz’s arguments against the perennial interpretation of ‘sameness’ 
involve several interrelated problems, each of which will be examined in 
due course. In this regard, a principal point of concern revolves around 
the question of whether or not Katz’s theory is genuinely able to 
distinguish mystical experience from other types of experience – i.e., 
whether or not his theory includes precise demarcation standards. For 
his part, Katz seems to propose that it is the ‘object’ of experience that 
one should look to in order to establish appropriate demarcation 
standards. In attempting to address the problem of the ‘object’ in Katz’s 
understanding one is invariably led to a detailed examination of his 
realism in terms of the following questions:  
1) When Katz speaks of the ‘object’ that the mystic supposedly 
encounters and that makes the mystic’s experience what it is, is he talking 
about an existing real object, what we have called an ‘irreal’ object (a 
non-existing, merely imagined real object) or an intentional object in the 
phenomenological sense? 
2) Does Katz’s realism contradict his contextualism, thus jeopardising 
the theoretical consistency of his overall approach?   
3) Can Katz’s realism function as a valid basis for making claims of 
difference or similarity in the experiences of mystics?  
The following analysis also includes a discussion regarding Katz’s 
grounds for rejecting the perennial criteria of identification as well as the 
claim of similarity across mystical experiences. This discussion relates to 
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the further question of whether or not Katzian contextualism is actually 
capable of extending the understanding of the field. 
 
3.1. Sameness and difference in experience 
Because Katz’s ‘plea for the recognition of differences’ plays such an 
important role in his theory, the issue of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ will 
be at the centre of discussion throughout the analysis of his contextual 
approach. In section 1.4 we discussed the possible sense Katz gives to 
the notion of mystical experience, and in chapter two we examined 
Katz’s view that the ‘object’ of experience is at least partially involved in 
determining what the experience is:  
When Smith says ‘I experience x’ he is not only involved in the sort of 
epistemological procedures that we have just discussed, i.e. that the mind 
is active in constructing x as experienced, but he is also asserting that 
there is an x to be experienced. In other words, mystics and students of 
mysticism have to recognize that mystical experience is not (putatively) 
solely the act of the conditioned experience as constituted from the side 
of the experiencer, but is also constituted and conditioned by what the 
object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences.252 
At the same time, he believes that the object of experience is at least 
partially determined by “contextual consciousness”: 
…the recognition also requires the additional awareness of the complexity 
of the situation in that what ‘x is’ is itself, at least partly, determined by a 
contextual consciousness.253 
Since in Katz’s philosophy, it appears to be the object which determines 
that mystical experiences are not the same but different, it is both 
interesting and highly relevant to ascertain what possible ‘objects’ would 
make different experiences typically mystical (different from ordinary 
experience) and yet so instrumentally fine that they could help 
distinguish different types of mystical experience.254 In attempting to 
                                                
252 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
253 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
254 This is also a distinction that Katz wishes to maintain, although, as we have seen, he 
is not very specific about which “phenomenological conditions” demarcate mystical 
experience: “we need to recognize that mystical experience is not exactly like 
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ascertain Katz’s understanding of what type of object the mystic 
encounters that makes her experience specifically mystical (as opposed to 
both ‘ordinary’ and ‘religious’), yet distinctively non-similar to the other 
members of its class, we will examine the compatibility of Katz’s theory 
with the three notions of ‘object’ constructed in chapter one: i.e., 
intentional objects, irreal objects and real objects.   
Since the realism and contextualism in Katz’s theory seem incompatible 
(a matter to be discussed in the next section), it is necessary to separate 
the implications of assuming that the mystic encounters a real object 
from those involved in assuming that the objects in mystical experience 
are irreal (or subjective constructions). A third possibility is that Katz is 
referring to ‘phenomenal’, or as we have termed them, ‘intentional’ 
objects. This third possibility implies that Katz would actually be able to 
construct demarcation standards and make judgements concerning 
similarity and difference in experience. Thus our first point of 
consideration will be the question of whether or not the ‘objects’ that, in 
Katz’s view, demarcate mystical experiences are intentional objects as 
defined in chapter 1.  
Before considering this, however, a fourth possibility must be examined 
first: William P. Gregory’s suggestion that Katz does not necessarily 
imply that an object is involved in the experiences of mystics. Here 
Gregory’s line of reasoning belongs to the discussion concerning the 
possibility of ‘pure experience’. Pure experience has often been 
conceptualized as an ‘object-less’ or ‘non-intentional’ experience. If Katz 
is denying the possibility of ‘object-less’ experiences, he seems to be 
                                                                                                              
‘experience in general.’ But it is not altogether different either.” (See A2 in section 2.2.) 
and “This, however, does not preclude distinguishing mystical experience from general 
experience. Mystical experience has, in each discrete instance, specific 
phenomenological conditions that mark it as mystical.” Additionally, Katz claims that 
mystical experiences can be distinguished from religious experiences: “Yes one can 
distinguish mystical from religious experience.  There will be areas that seem to overlap 
and about which one can argue, but this distinction is not hard to posit.” (A9) The 
major problem here is that if the experiences of mystics are conditioned (or 
determined) by the ‘religious context’ and mystics experience ‘religious objects’, and if 
this is viewed as the basis of pleading for the recognition of differences, it seems 
impossible to say whether an experience is ‘mystical’ or ‘religious’ (as we have discussed 
in section 1.4).  
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contradicting many of the reports which, at least in the perennial 
accounts, qualify as reports of mystical experience. When interpreted as a 
rejection of the possibility of ‘object-less’ experience, Katz’s rejection of 
the possibility of pure experience has also been regarded as a theory that 
rejects the possibility of the fundamental Buddhist experience of nirvana. 
This, of course, could be seen as a failure to show regard for the validity of 
Buddhistic self-understanding.  
This is Gregory’s interpretation: 
His manner of describing mystical experiences as having ‘objects,’ for 
example, is not meant to suggest that mystical consciousness is in all 
circumstances precisely an intentional mode of awareness involving a 
subject perceiving an object – a claim that is problematic in any number 
of mystical traditions. Rather, it is to suggest that mystics have experiences 
of ‘something’ that, on the one hand, transcends their limited 
subjectivities and, on the other hand, possesses a specific character or set 
of qualities which individuate the experience from other experiences. His 
reference to nirvana as the ‘object’ of the Buddhist mystic’s experience, 
for example, is not meant to contradict the fundamental assertion of 
Buddhism that nirvana is a state of awareness that transcends all subject-
object duality. In referencing nirvana Katz actually tries very hard not to 
transgress the acceptable theological parameters of Buddhist descriptions 
of it. Nevertheless, he has a point to get across which certainly is itself not 
contrary to Buddhism, and he uses the language available to him to make 
it: whatever the right way of characterizing whether ‘nirvana’ or the 
‘nirvanization’ of the Buddhist mystic’s consciousness may be, the fact is 
that the enlightened Buddhist mystic has an experience or undergoes a 
transformation, and whatever that transformation is, it is not nothing and 
it does not go unnoticed. Something really happens, and in not being 
nothing and in something really happening, nirvana is in this sense – 
however one best wants to qualify this – is the ‘object’ of the Buddhist 
mystic’s experience.255 
If the term ‘object’ is as ‘loosely’ used in Katz’s terminology as Gregory 
suggests, we will not be able to make any use of it whatsoever.  
Gregory goes even further by suggesting that Katz uses the terms 
‘object’ and ‘content’ to designate the character of mystical experience: 
                                                
255 Gregory 2006, p. 269. 
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The same could be said about the form of other claims Katz makes. His 
reference to the ‘content’ of mystical experience, for example, often raises 
objections from proponents of pure consciousness and other similar 
events who insist that it is possible to achieve a state of experience in 
which there are no ‘objects’ or ‘contents’ of any sort. But Katz, in this 
specific use of language of his, is once again simply asserting that every 
mystical experience has a specific character and this is its ‘content,’ even if 
such ‘content’ is best characterized as an ‘empty’ or ‘contentless’ mode of 
consciousness.256  
Clearly there is a problem with interpreting Katz in this way: if a 
contentless experience has a ‘content’, namely ‘contentlessness’, not only 
is the word ‘content’ deprived of all meaning, but there appears to be 
nothing left of the controversy between Katz and the perennialists. The 
notion that there are no content-less experiences is the primary basis of 
Katz’s position on mysticism, from which he draws conclusions about 
the experiences of mystics that contradict the conclusions and results of 
perennial investigators. In Gregory’s interpretation nothing remains of 
this, and even though we cannot tell whether it is an interpretation that 
Katz would accept, we must either reject it or conclude that Katz’s 
theory is, itself, without a content.  
In Katz’s theory, it is the different ‘objects’ that are responsible for 
mystical experiences’ not being the same but different. We first examine 
whether or not the ‘objects’ that Katz insists are involved in mystical 
experiences should be viewed as intentional objects. To begin with it should 
be made clear that the mere fact that Katz ‘heeds the warning’ that 
“linguistic intentionality does not generate or guarantee the existence of 
the ‘intentional object’”257 is not enough to confirm that the objects he 
refers to are ‘intentional objects’ as defined in this thesis. There are, in 
fact, many reasons not to apply a phenomenological understanding to 
Katz’s use of the term ‘object’: 1) Katz’s rejection of the 
phenomenological method, which implies that his usage of the term 
‘object’ very likely refers to some sort of metaphysical system; 2) his 
rejection of phenomenological results because of their apparently 
‘subjective’ character, and (3) his rejection of the phenomenal 
                                                
256 Gregory 2006, p 270 
257 Katz 1978a, p. 63. 
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characteristics of mystical experience on the grounds that they are too 
general and thus unable to delineate what that experience is. These 
points will be dealt with in the following subsection, while Section 3.2 
returns to the problem of Katz’s inclusion of both realism and 
contextualism in his approach.  
 
3.1.1. Katz’s notion of intentionality and intentional objects 
Katz’s rejection of the phenomenological method includes a direct 
reference to his realist position. His point is that phenomenological 
results are ‘subjective’ because phenomenologists think that through 
their methods they can arrive at ‘objective truth’. Gregory also makes 
mention of this aspect of Katz’s thought:  
In addition to acknowledging that his own theological judgements in 
relation to history are not decisively proven, he criticises 
phenomenologists, for example, for believing that they could arrive at 
objective metaphysical truths in their reflections on the structure of 
existence and the world. To them he replies that the metaphysical 
structure of the real is neither “given” nor “self-evident” and their claims 
about it in turn are not judgements of an objective philosophical sort, but 
more subjective “intuitions.” The procedure that holds to the “direct 
apprehension of certain metaphysical, ontological, cognitive, and moral 
truths,” he writes, “… is deficient.”258 
Clearly there is a misunderstanding here, although its origin is not clear. 
Perhaps it would help to know who these phenomenologists are that 
think they can arrive at “objective metaphysical truths in their reflections 
on the structure and existence of the world”. The more likely 
explanation is, however, that Katz has seriously misinterpreted the 
phenomenological project. Since the primary aim of phenomenology is 
to analyse experience and not to arrive at metaphysical truths (which, by 
the way, are bracketed), Katz seems to be arguing against a straw man. 
Indeed Katz’s criticism of the phenomenologists is strikingly similar to 
Husserl’s criticism of the naïve scientific realism. All experience is 
‘subjective’, and questions concerning the correlation between subjective 
experience and objective reality have been pondered since the dawn of 
man; yet still they remain at the centre of most philosophical and 
                                                
258 Gregory 2006, p. 70. 
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scientific debates. Husserl’s point is that natural science cannot escape 
the subjective character of experience. Even in the sacrosanct realm of 
‘observation’ and ‘measurement’ the subjectivity of the scientist is 
involved, and this is a primary reason that phenomenologists go about 
examining ‘subjectivity’ – i.e., the functional elements and characteristics 
of experience. From this it appears that Katz is philosophically inclined 
towards the actual phenomenological approach, but rejects it because of a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its aim and intent. 
This is confirmed in Katz’s description of the processes involved in 
experience. This description is a central part of Katz’s epistemology, in 
which Katz associates the notion of ‘the given’ with the notion of ‘pure 
experience’: 
Closely allied to the erroneous contention that we can achieve a state of 
pure consciousness is the oft used notion of the ‘given’ or the ‘suchness’ 
or the ‘real’ to describe the pure state of mystical experience which 
transcends all contextual epistemological colourings. But what sense do 
these terms have? What is the ‘given’ or the ‘suchness’ or even the ‘real’? 
Analysis of these terms indicate their relativity; they are applied to a 
variety of alternative and even mutually exclusive ‘states of affairs’ and 
‘states of no affairs’. This variety itself should alert us to the real danger 
and arbitrariness involved in this gambit. Phenomenologists seem 
especially prone to this fruitless naivety - all intuit the ‘given’ but their 
intuitions differ significantly. It can fairly be said that no attempt to state 
clearly or individuate the ‘given’ has succeeded. Indeed, talk of the ‘given’ 
seems to be a move made to short circuit the very sort of epistemological 
inquiry here being engaged in, but such a move fails because there is no 
evidence that there is any ‘given’ which can be disclosed without the 
imposition of the mediating conditions of the knower. All ‘givens’ are also 
the product of the process of ‘choosing’, ‘shaping’, and ‘receiving’. That is, 
the ‘given’ is appropriated through acts which shape it into forms which 
we can make intelligible to ourselves given our conceptual constitution, 
and which structure it in order to respond to the specific contextual needs 
and mechanisms of consciousness of the receiver.259  
Here, arguing on the basis of his own misunderstanding, Katz criticises 
phenomenologists for ‘mistakenly’ thinking that they can “individuate 
the ‘given’” and then offers a description of the experiential process that 
                                                
259 Katz 1978, p. 59. 
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could have been just as easily given by a phenomenologist. The 
statement that the ‘given’ (the ineffable hyle in phenomenological terms) 
is “appropriated through acts which shape it into forms which we can 
make intelligible to ourselves” sounds very much like a 
phenomenological description of ordinary experience.  
Setting labels aside and focusing on the content of Katz’s claims, why 
not then interpret his account of ‘intentional object’ as a 
phenomenological account? The answer is that there is a problem with 
Katz’s formulation that goes beyond what he thinks phenomenologists 
do: in Katz’s account, the ‘given’ is the “the product of the process of 
‘choosing’, ‘shaping’, and ‘receiving’” and not a constitutive part of 
experience. This understanding of the ‘given’ causes difficulty for Katz’s 
realist claim; interestingly enough, it is also the understanding he uses in 
his argument against the phenomenological method. If Katz claims that 
the ‘given’ is a product of our processes of thought, then this 
understanding is obviously incompatible with any realist claim. Katz 
describes his position as a realist one, and although a phenomenological 
approach is compatible with a realist position (which could be yet 
another reason to assume that Katz’s position is similar to the 
phenomenologists), Katz rejects this approach because he considers the 
results following from the phenomenological method to be ‘subjective 
impressions’ that are different in content. In addition to his claim that 
“no attempt to state clearly or individuate the ‘given’ has succeeded”, 
Katz calls critical attention to the inability of phenomenologists to intuit 
the same thing, viewing this as a fundamental flaw in their method: 
…every phenomenologist seems to intuit as the ‘essence’ of things 
something quite different from his phenomenological colleagues.  The 
result of the intuiting is only a coterie of unverifiable subjective 
impressions which seem to owe as much to what the particular 
phenomenologist wants to ‘intuit’ (i.e. he seems to find what he was 
looking for) as to any truly independent route-finding procedure into the 
nature of things. … We have no trust in the phenomenological method.260 
Katz thus seems to equate ‘different’ with ‘subjective’ and ‘irreal’. We 
return to the question of how Katz manages to resolve the conflict 
between his contextualist and his realist ideas, but for now it seems that 
                                                
260 Katz quoted from Gregory 2006, p. 70.  
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we must interpret Katz as rejecting phenomenology because of the 
alleged ‘subjective’ or ‘non-realistic’ character of the conclusions that 
result from its methods. Here Katz seems to wrongly assume that all 
phenomenologists intuit essences and make claims about metaphysical 
truths, features that dissuade him from using the phenomenological 
method as a tool.261 Ironically, it is phenomenology minus Katz’s 
misconceptions that would actually be compatible with his realist 
inclinations. To use the term ‘intentional object’ as it is defined in 
chapter one, would leave room not only for a realist approach, but also 
for the possibility of demarcating mystical experience from other types 
of experience. This is because the individuation of phenomena of 
experience in terms of similarity and difference is ultimately based on the 
phenomenal qualities that an experience has.   
The argument that the objectivity of phenomenologists should be 
rejected because their ‘intuitions’ differ in content is closely related to the 
argument Katz gives for rejecting the phenomenal characteristics 
compiled by perennialists to categorize types of experience:  
Careful inspection thus shows that while lists of supposed 
phenomenological characteristics seem to help in delineating what 
mystical experience is, and also in establishing what ties seemingly 
different experiences together as a class of like experience, such lists, in 
fact, are so general that even though they serve to exclude certain types of 
experience as, for a bizarre example, contemplating one’s navel, as a 
                                                
261 “Intuiting of essences” can certainly be a part of the phenomenologist’s efforts, 
though it is difficult to say whether Katz fully understands the meaning of this 
expression in the phenomenological context. In Husserl’s use, Anschauung reflects the 
particular understanding of terms that cannot be found in sensual perception, and their 
meaning is thus necessarily ‘intuited’ as opposed to ‘experienced’. Terms like ‘unity’, 
‘number’ and ‘similarity’ cannot possibly correspond to a particular sense datum, so 
their meaning is therefore ‘intuited’. (See Spiegelberg’s discussion in Spiegelberg 1976, 
p. 118) Concerning ‘essences’, they are described by Spiegelberg as “the whatness of 
things as opposed to their thatness, i.e., their existence” (Spiegelberg 1976, p. 716). 
Wesensschau is further defined as: “intuiting of essences and essential relations” 
(Spiegelberg 1976, p 728). What point there is in claiming that “…every 
phenomenologist seems to intuit as the ‘essence’ of things something quite different 
from his phenomenological colleagues” is hardly clear in light of the definitions given 
above. It would be absurd to assume that all things have the same ‘essence’ so that all 
phenomenologists would intuit the “essence of things” as the same essence.   
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mystical experience, they remain so general as not to suffice to delineate 
what mystical experience actually is, nor again are they sophisticated in 
their recognition of the contextual basis of language and thus are 
incapable of sorting out the actual meaning of mystical reports.262 
The fact that the characteristics are too general in the sense that they can 
and have been applied to more than one object is the standard argument 
employed by Katz in his refutation of the phenomenal characteristics of 
experience. However, if it is not the phenomenal characteristics that 
individuate the experience, but rather the ‘object’ of experience, this 
‘object’ cannot be the ‘intentional object’ that we have described.  
In summary, the intentional object is constituted by way of morphe (pure 
forms) and hyle (ineffable material), and if we consider morphe too general 
to ‘delineate’ an experience, we do no better with hyle: in itself hyle is 
nothing but unconstituted matter (and thus non-demarcational, or 
impossible to differentiate in terms of similarity and difference). As Katz 
also notes, ‘the given’ is made accessible through the ‘forms’ of 
understanding. The single tool we have for distinguishing between 
elements of experience in terms of similarity and difference are the 
forms – the forms that Katz rejects as too general.  
When asked about the possibility of distinguishing mystical experience 
from ordinary experience, Katz replies: 
Mystical experience has, in each discrete instance, specific 
phenomenological conditions that mark it as mystical.263 
This seems to indicate the possibility of differentiating mystical 
experience from other types of experience by way of phenomenal 
conditions, but Katz never bothers to make plain what those “specific 
phenomenological conditions” might be. One thing at least is certain: 
they cannot be the characteristics outlined by Stace since these have 
already been rejected by Katz. Let us take a brief look at these rejected 
characteristics before moving on to the problem of the ‘object’ that is 
said to demarcate mystical from ordinary experience, and Katz’s inability 
to combine both realist and contextualist understandings in his 
approach. 
                                                
262 Katz 1978a, p. 51. 
263 See A8 in section 2.2. 
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3.1.2. The phenomenal characteristics rejected 
One the one hand, Katz appears to reject the phenomenal characteristics 
listed by Stace and other ‘perennial’ interpreters of mysticism; on the 
other hand, he appears to hold out the possibility that there are “specific 
phenomenological conditions that mark [an experience] as mystical”. 
Since Katz never seems to indicate what these ‘conditions’ are, let us 
look at what he clearly indicates they are not. 
In “Language, epistemology and mysticism” Katz rejects as inadequate 
the following phenomenal characteristics – all taken from Stace:264 
 The quality of ‘unity’  
 The quality of ‘objectivity’ or ‘reality’ 
 The quality of ‘peace’  
 The quality of ‘nonspatiality’ and ‘nontemporality’ 
 The quality of ‘holiness’ 
 The quality of ‘paradoxicality’ 
 The quality of ‘ineffability’265 
Throughout his discussion on these various characteristics, Katz appears 
to be considering them as necessarily intentional – or necessarily 
‘containing an object’. Let us look in greater detail at two of these 
characteristics as well as Katz’s grounds for rejecting them. 
In section 1.4 we briefly discussed ‘mystic union’ and the theological 
elements that make it potentially heretical to particular religious systems. 
                                                
264 The points are listed in Katz 1978a, p 50, and are, in fact, collected from two 
overlapping lists that respect Stace’s distinction between ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ 
mystical experience. For purposes of this discussion we do not find it relevant to make 
such a distinction, and it does not seem to have been relevant to Katz either, since he 
rejects both lists on the same basis regardless of this distinction.  
265 Stace does not consider all the characteristics to be necessary for every mystical 
experience, but prefers to describe them in terms of ‘family resemblance’: “It has been 
too readily taken for granted by writers on mysticism that all ‘mystical’ states must 
necessarily have common characteristics to justify the application of the one word to 
them. But as the Wittgensteinians have recently been insisting, the multifarious objects 
or phenomena which are all called by one name may be thus grouped together, not 
because of an identity of common qualities, but only because they bear to one another a 
relation of ‘family resemblance’” (Stace 1960, p. 46.). 
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The ontological considerations connected to this are not relevant from a 
phenomenological perspective: an experience may very well be thought 
of as ‘unitive’ without implying anything about the properties of a 
transcendental reality or ‘entity’. In his essay on the phenomenology of 
mystic union, Nelson Pike categorizes this unitive experience as an 
experience that lacks the “subject-object structure” that experiences 
generally have. The lack of subject-object structure not only implies that 
the ‘object’ is missing from the structure, but that the ‘subject’ disappears 
as well. Pike describes how he draws this conclusion as follows:  
In chapter XI of the Book of Supreme Truth, Ruysbroeck relates an 
experience in which the mystic is totally occupied with a single object 
(God), which he then distinguishes from himself. Using the repertoire of 
concepts just introduced: God is here experienced as a not-me that stands 
in contrast to the experiencing subject. The experience has what I shall 
call ‘subject-object structure.’ In chapter XII of the same text however, 
Ruysbroeck goes on to describe the succeeding experiential interval as a 
state of (what he calls) ‘solitude.’ This is to say, I think, that in this interval 
of experience, the mystic does not pick out an object that is distinguished 
from self. Experientially, the mystic is not in the company of another. 
Framed in the language of the theory we are using, this is to say that in 
this moment of experience, nothing is discerned as a not-me, and thus the 
experience as a whole is also bereft of a sense of self. And so it is in 
Ruysbroeck’s account as well. Ruysbroeck says that in the union without 
distinction ‘uplifted spirits are melted and naughted.’ As I read this 
sentence, Ruysbroeck is saying that an awareness of self is not a part of 
this moment of experience.266  
Experiences in which there is neither an awareness of the self nor of the 
‘object’ as being separated from the self are strikingly similar to 
descriptions of the states acquired in different religious traditions. In 
Gregory’s defence of Katz’s theory, he suggests that Katz does not claim 
that experience cannot be of nothing – i.e., that it must necessarily 
contain an object – but rather that the whole of ‘experience’ is the 
‘object’ of the mystic’s description. This interpretation of Katz, however, 
does not appear correct. Here is an example of the principal reason why.  
For Katz, it is one thing to say, as Pike does, that Ruysbroeck’s 
experience is a ‘totally unitive’ experience in which dichotomies between 
                                                
266 Pike 1993, p 32 
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self and object disappear, but it is quite another to equate this ‘type’ of 
experiencing with, for instance, the Buddhist notion of ‘nothingness’. 
According to Katz, this latter alternative is out of the question because 
the term ‘nothingness’, according to Katz, covers different ontic realities: 
Even agreeing that in two or more cases the term ‘nothingness’ is being 
used in the sense of an objective ontological reference, there is still no 
surety that the term is being used in synonymous ways. One has to ask 
whether the various experiences of ‘nothingness’ are similar or dissimilar 
experiences of the same phenomenon, i.e. ‘nothingness’, or different 
experiences of different phenomena, i.e. ‘nothingness’ is a term which is 
used to cover alternative ontic realities. In this latter instance which seems 
to fit at least a substantial segment of the data of mystical experience more 
adequately, the difference between the cases is a difference between what 
is experienced not just how something is experienced. The appropriateness 
of this schema, i.e. that the term is used to cover differing ontic ‘states of 
affairs’, recommends itself because to hold that it is just a case of how one 
experiences a common reality, one would have to have a sufficiently 
delimiting list of corresponding and agreed predicates that the 
experienced object possessed in both (or more) cases which are being 
compared.267   
We wonder then, not only how the (object-less but not self-less) anxiety 
of one man can be deemed either different or similar in comparison to 
the anxiety of another, but also, what exact predicates can be ascribed to 
‘nothingness’ if, as Katz apparently argues, we should view ‘nothingness’ 
as an object (the what) in the mystic’s experience. Katz recognizes the 
distinction between the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ in experience, but rejects 
the ‘how’ because the “substantial segment of the data of mystical 
experience”268 more adequately ‘fits’ the ‘what’. He thus seems to say that 
mystical experience is necessarily connected to a metaphysical system of 
beliefs. However, this same “substantial segment of the data of mystical 
experience” (i.e., the mystical reports) is used by Pike, Forman and many 
others to confirm that it is the ‘how’ that can differentiate experiences, 
and not the ‘what’, especially since the reports contain explicit references 
to the fact that the experience does not involve a ‘what’ at all.  
                                                
267 Katz 1978a, p. 52. 
268 Katz 1978a, p. 52. 
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All the above points and how they relate to mysticism and mystical 
experience could readily be discussed at length. However, since this has 
already been done by Stace,269 our focus will be on Katz’s attempted 
refutation of two of these phenomenal characteristics (considered as 
typical of his attempts to refute other characteristics as well): the “sense 
of objectivity or reality” and “ineffability”.  
The first of these two characteristics, the “sense of objectivity or reality”, 
is connected to our ongoing discussion concerning Katz’s realism. In the 
perennial lists discussed at the beginning of section 3.2. it frequently 
appears among the common characteristic of mystical experience. This is 
rejected by Katz on the following grounds: 
While it is the case that all mystics claim that theirs is an experience of 
reality – actually a reality with a capital R – this seemingly common claim 
provides no basis for Stace’s extreme conclusion about the ‘universal 
common characteristics of mysticism’. It does not because the terms 
‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’ are notoriously elusive as they are seductive. 
Every system and every mystic had made claims to ultimate objectivity 
and to discovered Reality, but their claims are more often than not 
mutually incompatible. For example, while objectivity or reality (Reality) 
                                                
269 Stace does so in ”Mysticism and language” (1960). Stace sums up the characteristics 
on p. 79. William James identifies four (phenomenological) characteristics for the 
delimitation of mystical experience: ‘ineffability’, ‘noetic quality’, ‘transciency’ and 
‘passivity of the experiencing subject’. Lists of similar phenomenological features are 
also presented: Stace quotes R. M. Bucke’s seven features: “(1) the subjective light, or 
photism, (2) moral elevation, (3) intellectual illumination, (4) sense of immortality, (5) 
loss of fear of death, (6) loss of sense of sin, (7) suddenness”; he then quotes D. T. 
Suzuki’s eight: “(1) irrationality, inexplicability, incommunicability; (2) intuitive insight; 
(3) authoritativeness; (4) affirmation (positive character); (5) sense of the beyond; (6) 
impersonal tone; (7) feeling of exaltation; (8) momentariness (roughly equivalent to 
Bucke's ‘suddenness’)”; and finally he presents his own seven: “1. The unifying vision, 
expressed abstractly by the formula ‘All is One.’ The One is, in extrovertive mysticism, 
perceived through the physical senses, in or through the multiplicity of objects. 2. The 
more concrete apprehension of the One as being an inner subjectivity in all things, 
described variously as life, or consciousness, or a living Presence. The discovery that 
nothing is ‘really’ dead. 3. Sense of objectivity or reality. 4. Feeling of blessedness, joy, 
happiness, satisfaction, etc. 5. Feeling that what is apprehended is holy, or sacred, or 
divine. This is the quality which gives rise to the interpretation of the experience as 
being an experience of ‘God.’ It is the specifically religious element in the experience. It 
is closely intertwined with, but not identical with, the previously listed characteristic of 
blessedness and joy. 6. Paradoxicality. […] 7. Alleged by mystics to be ineffable, 
incapable of being described in words, etc.” 
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in Plato and Neoplatonism is found in the ‘world of Ideas’, these 
characteristics are found in God in Jewish mysticism and again in the Tao, 
nirvana, and Nature, in Taoism, Buddism, and Richard Jefferies 
respectively. It seems clear that these respective mystics do not experience 
the same Reality or objectivity, and therefore, it is not reasonable to posit 
that their respective experiences of Reality or objectivity are similar. As 
presumably few of my readers have had a mystical experience, perhaps 
this point can be reinforced by comparing the terms ‘Reality’ in, say 
Marxism, where Reality is equated with the economic and the material, as 
against Freudianism where Reality is defined in terms of the psychological 
or alternatively in empiricism where Reality is equivalent to the sensible or 
that which is derived from the sensible as compared to the Idealist 
‘Reality’ which is ideational and non-sensible.270 
Clearly Katz conceives of this ‘quality of realness’ not as a ‘how’, but as a 
‘what’, a likely cause of the confusion displayed here. Should one regard 
Plato’s theory that Ideas are ultimately Real as an experience-based 
predication or a theoretical construct of Ultimate Reality? Or the 
Buddhist mystic’s state of nirvana as an ontological setting of Ultimate 
Reality? And when did Marx report experiencing that the primarily Real is 
‘economy and matter’, or Freud that the Ultimate is a ‘psychological’ 
entity such as the ‘libido’? Katz refers to theoretical structures or models 
of reality, not the experiences of mystics (or common men), some of 
which have been religious in character. What these systems of belief may 
contribute to the understanding of particular instances of experienced 
‘reality’ is thoroughly outlined by Katz. And if Katz is right that nobody 
can undo the automatic inset of a Marxist interpretive pattern or a 
Freudian interpretive pattern, then the Marxist experiences his world as 
an economic and material world in which there is no room for the 
primacy of ideal entities that the Platonist would experience in his world 
(compare to the discussion in section 1.4). And the Freudian, whether he 
is aware of it or not, must interpret the Reality of ‘God as Father’ into all 
individuals that display ‘signs’ of religiousness. But these are ‘existential 
judgements’, and experience does not need ‘existential judgements’ to 
exist. Katz, of course, would disagree since, in his view, there is no way 
to overcome the ontic commitments of the experiencer. In reaction, the 
perennial philosopher Robert Forman remarks that no one disagrees that 
                                                
270 Katz 1978a, p. 50. 
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experiences are ‘mediated’ through the background mind-set of the 
experiencer; but can Katz, or for that matter, anyone deny that there are 
“counter-expectational experiences”?271  
“Reality” or “objectivity” as a qualitative aspect of experience (a how) 
needs to be described in terms other than making existential judgements. 
In order to make possible a distinction between mystical experiences and 
dream-states, for instance, mystics could explain that the experience 
contains an aspect of ‘reality’ or ‘objectivity’ in the sense that it is a 
‘wakeful’ experience. As an aspect of experience, the ‘reality-feeling’ may, 
as Katz claims, be too general to exclude most of our every-day 
experiences. But if the experience contains other phenomenal aspects 
that suggest to an interpreter that it is more dream-like than wakeful or 
real, there may be a point to the mystic’s emphasising that the experience 
had a quality of ‘realness’ without implying any metaphysical reality-
claims or making reference to the nature and properties of Ultimate 
Realities.  
Apart from his standard ‘no pure experience’ objection to the notion of 
‘non-conceptuality’ in mystical experience, Katz has two primary 
objections to the inclusion of ‘ineffability’ as a common characteristic of 
mystical experience. The first, as already mentioned several times, 
concerns the general nature of the terms: 
Though two or more experiences are said to be ‘ineffable’, the term 
‘ineffable’ can logically fit many disjunctive and incomparable experiences. 
That is to say, an atheist can feel a sense of dread at the absurdity of the 
cosmos which he labels ineffable, while the theist can experience God in a 
way that he also insists is ineffable. […] ‘[I]neffable’ nirvana is not the 
‘ineffable’ Allah of the Sufi, nor the ‘ineffable Allah of the Sufi the 
‘ineffable’ Tao of Taoism. The ontology or reality of the Brahman/Atman 
that lies ‘beyond all expression’ in the Mandukya Upanishads is not the 
‘ineffability’ encountered in Eckhart’s Christian experience.272 
Here Katz takes descriptions of personal experiences and mixes these 
with the ideological and ontological statements of particular religious 
traditions. As an inevitable consequence of this admixture there could be 
                                                
271 Forman 1990, in the “Introduction”  
272 Katz 1978a, p. 48. 
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no difference between the Sufi’s and the orthodox Muslim’s experience 
of Allah, no difference between the Jewish mystic’s and the orthodox 
Jew’s experience of Yahweh, and no difference between the Christian 
mystic’s account of God and those that are found in the various 
Christian traditions. Katz’s suggestion that the experience of the 
Buddhist is different from the experience of the Christian does not 
necessarily imply that he considers the experience of Buddhist A to be 
similar to the experience of Buddhist B. However, there are two basic 
reasons to assume that he does: 1) The Buddhists are unable to undo 
their Buddhist interpretive pattern and thus remain pre-experientially 
conditioned to experience the same mystical phenomenon, commonly 
known as nirvana; and, 2) The idea that no experiences can be the ‘same’ 
or ‘similar’ is far too broad a notion to function as the basis of Katz’s 
conclusion that the experience of mystic A in tradition X is different 
from the experience of mystic B in tradition Y.  
Katz’s second objection to ‘ineffability’ as a common feature of mystical 
experience concerns the logical consequences of such a claim: 
…to take the mystic’s claim seriously, i.e. that his proposition ‘x is PI’ 
[P=paradoxical, I=ineffable] is a true description, turns out to have the 
damaging implication that one cannot make any reasonable or even 
intelligible claim for any mystical proposition. The proposition ‘x is PI’ 
has the curious logical result that a serious interpretation of the 
proposition neither makes the experience x intelligible nor informs us in 
any way about x, but rather cancels x out of our language – which, of 
course, is what most mystics claim they want. This, however, is no 
foundation for a phenomenology of mysticism or a typology of 
comparative mystical experience, for there are a wide variety of mutually 
exclusive ontological ‘states of affairs’ which can thus be ruled out.273 
Here it is obvious that Katz has difficulties in distinguishing the 
experience from its assumed object. At first it seems that Katz is 
attempting to say that an experience cannot be characterized by the 
qualities of ‘paradoxicality’ and ‘ineffability’ because ‘x’ (the ‘object’ of 
experience) cannot logically be ascribed properties like ‘P’ and ‘I’. This 
would “cancel x out of our language”, that is, the ‘object’ of the 
experience cannot be talked about because it becomes logically 
                                                
273 Katz 1978a, p. 56. 
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contradictory. But then Katz indicates that ‘x’ is not the ‘object’ of 
experience, but the experience itself (“neither makes the experience x 
intelligible…”). Interpreted in this way, the ‘x’ that the mystics want to 
cancel out of our language is ‘experience’, and ‘P’ and ‘I’ are qualitative 
aspects of experience, not objects or properties of objects. This 
interpretation, however, also appears inconclusive as we see Katz 
introducing “mutually exclusive ontological ‘states of affairs’” which 
directs our attention back to the object-realism that Katz appears to 
propose. Perhaps ‘x’ designates the ‘object’ of experience, and both ‘P’ 
and ‘I’ are properties of the object ‘x’. Katz continues his discussion by 
referring to another mistake that ‘writers on mysticism’ appear to make: 
namely, treating terms like ‘God’, ‘nirvana’, and so on, as names rather 
than descriptions. In his view, terms like ‘Being’ and Urgrund are not 
names but descriptions which “carry a meaning relative to some 
ontological structure”.274 
In the end, however we chose to interpret them, Katz’s arguments 
appear too ambiguous to provide a foundation for the rejection of the 
phenomenal characteristics suggested by Stace. Moreover, Katz’s analysis 
of mystical experience is not inclusive of the important qualitative 
aspects of the experience: ‘holyness’, ‘love’, ‘unity’, ‘realness’, ‘peace’ and 
so forth. And his primary reason for neglecting this feature appears to be 
his preoccupation with criticising the perennialists. Finally, Katz’s 
approach appears to make the ‘object’ (the what) the prime differentiator 
of mystical experiences as opposed to the phenomenal characteristics 
(the how), and, as noted before, what difference there is between this 
object in his theory and the phenomenal characteristics is not very clear.  
From what has been said thus far, Katz appears to imply that the 
experiences of mystics must contain an object (i.e., be intentional); 
however, this ‘object’ cannot be interpreted as an ‘intentional object’ in 
the way it has been defined in chapter one. Katz could have used the 
notion of ‘intentional object’ to make claims about differences and 
similarities in various experiences, although he has eliminated this 
possibility by rejecting the validity of the phenomenal characteristics to 
demarcate experience. What this implies can be explored by looking at 
                                                
274 Katz 1978a, p. 56. 
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the alternative ways of viewing the ‘object’ of experience. This will help 
to ascertain the validity of Katz’s assertion that there are differences 
rather than similarities among the experiences of mystics.  
 
3.2. A note on Katz’s realism 
We will return several times to the issue of Katz’s realism in the coming 
chapters. In this section, the discussion is limited to an examination of 
Katz’s claim that there are ‘objects’ in all mystical experiences and that 
these ‘objects’ are different rather than similar. We look again at the 
quotation that initiated our discussion on differences and similarities at 
the beginning of this chapter: 
When Smith says ‘I experience x’ he is not only involved in the sort of 
epistemological procedures that we have just discussed, i.e. that the mind 
is active in constructing x as experienced, but he is also asserting that 
there is an x to be experienced. In other words, mystics and students of 
mysticism have to recognize that mystical experience is not (putatively) 
solely the act of the conditioned experience as constituted from the side 
of the experiencer, but is also constituted and conditioned by what the 
object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences.275 
What is it, then, that “mystics and students of mysticism have to 
recognize” in consideration of Smith’s experience of x? Katz seems to 
draw a distinction between “…the conditioned experience as constituted 
from the side of the experiencer”276 on the one hand, and “…the object or 
‘state of affairs’ … that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences”277 on the other. The notion of a conditioned experience as 
constituted from the side of an experiencer sounds very similar to the 
notion that “the mind is active in constructing x as experienced”,278 
                                                
275 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
276 Katz 1978a, p. 64. The use of the term ‘constituted’ can be seen as yet another 
indication that Katz is phenomenologically inclined. However, the fact that it is the 
encountered ‘object’ (or ‘state of affairs) that constitutes the experience (in contrast to 
the phenomenological thesis that it is the ‘object’ that is constituted in experience) 
seems to require a metaphysical system of objects. This is very non-phenomenological 
since it implies a shift of focus from experience to the experience-independent Reality – 
whether ideal or material.   
277 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
278 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
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identified in chapter two as Katz’s constructivist (or contextualist) thesis. 
The idea of the mystic’s encountering (or believing he has encountered) 
an ‘object’, on the other hand, appears to assimilate mystical experience 
to ordinary acts of perception where it is usually the case that there is an 
independent ‘object’ percieved so that the experience is “constituted and 
conditioned by what the object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic … 
experiences”. What, then, in Katz’s opinion, is the connection between a 
“conditioned experience as constituted from the side of the experiencer” 
and “the object or ‘state of affairs’ … that the mystic (believes he) 
encounters or experiences”? What does Katz mean to imply by asserting 
that “what ‘x is’ is, itself, at least partly determined by a contextual 
consciousness”?279 Here we seem to be caught up in a form of circular 
reasoning in which the object that determines the experience is itself 
determined (at least in part) by a contextual consciousness. Let us go 
over this one more time: On the one hand, it appears as if Katz is 
referring to a real object, described as the x that the mystic claims to have 
encountered; this is made plain by his denial that the object is merely a 
result of “the conditioned experience as constituted from the side of the 
experiencer” as well as his reference to an objective experience in which 
a mind-independent reality plays a role. On the other hand, this 
apparently mind-independent real reality is also described as if it were a 
mind-dependent irreal reality, “constituted and conditioned by what the 
object or ‘state of affairs’ is that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences”.280 At this point, we leave it to our readers to draw their 
own conclusions about the inherent contradictions of such a 
formulation.  
In terms of being the criterion for the identification and/or demarcation 
of mystical experiences, it appears that neither the conditioned experience 
nor the encountered object will do. If interpreted as a realist claim, the ‘object’ 
encountered by the mystic must be a real object, and the fact that it is 
also viewed as the object that the mystic believes he has encountered can 
be seen as a confirmation of Katz’s warning that “linguistic intentionality 
                                                
279 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
280 Katz 1978a, p. 64. 
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does not generate or guarantee the existence of the ‘intentional 
object’”.281  
Katz has identified the objects that mystics experience as “special 
objects”,282 and as examples of these he mentions Allah and Brahman.283 
We now focus on these ‘objects’ of mystical experience in terms of our 
previous definitions of real and irreal objects. With these various ‘objects’ 
in mind we again ask: what is the ‘x itself’ that is (at least partly) 
“determined by a contextual consciousness”? In terms of the above 
analysis, since Katz’s thesis of the encountered object is complementary to 
his thesis of the conditioned experience, and appears to cover for the realistic 
element in experience, we are led to believe that the ‘x itself’ – i.e., “the 
object or ‘state of affairs’ that the mystic (believes he) encounters or 
experiences” – is a real object. But, being also partly “determined by a 
contextual consciousness”, it appears that Katz’s ‘x itself’ does not 
precisely qualify as a real object either, at least not in any reasonable sense 
of the term. Generally, we do not think that the objects we posit as 
mind-independent are capable of being qualitatively transformed as a 
result of our merely attending to them. Perhaps that is what makes 
Katz’s mystical ‘objects’ so ‘special’: they are transformed (or shaped) by 
encountering the active experiencer. In that case, Katz would be saying 
that if the mystic Mary has an experience of God, God’s nature is 
determined by Mary’s experiencing God, and that would mean that God 
in Mary’s experience is not real, if by ‘real’ we mean that something has 
an existence independent of our experience of it. 
Since we cannot imagine that this is what Katz intends, we instead read 
him as saying that it is Mary’s representation of God that is (partly) 
                                                
281 Katz 1978a, p. 63. Compare to discussion in section 1.3.3. 
282 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12   
283 This was brought up in the context of Katz’s discussion regarding the two 
‘positions’ that can be held with respect to the facilitative aspects of experience. One 
position, according to Katz, holds that mystical experiences are facilitated, and the 
other (complementary, not contradictory) position is an “alternative position that views 
mystical experience as an act of God or the transcendent that requires no prior or 
technical preparation, and that explains the specialness of such experience by reference 
to the specialness of the object of such experience – for example, Allah or Brahman.” 
[Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12] (Compare to note 118, in section 1.3.5.)  
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determined by Mary’s “contextual consciousness”.284 However, to bring 
the realistic element into the equation, the experience must be more or 
less determined by God, so that “beliefs shape experience just as 
experience shapes belief”,285 or so that reality (whatever that reality may 
be) can have a determined impact on the mystic’s experience and make it 
what it is.286 But then it must also be possible that Mary experiences an 
‘x’ which she then interprets as God. How much of the experience is 
determined by God Katz cannot say, and apparently no one can know, 
since according to Katz there is to be no way of verifying mystical 
experience claims (this will be further discussed in chapter five). 
Apparently, even the mystic cannot know, since there is no way for him 
to distinguish between the experience and his interpretation of the 
experience. This is because:  
…the Hindu mystic does not have an experience of x which he then 
describes in the, to him, familiar language and symbols of Hinduism, but 
rather he has a Hindu experience, i.e. his experience is not an unmediated 
experience of x but is itself the, at least partially, pre-formed anticipated 
Hindu experience of Brahman. Again, the Christian mystic does not 
experience some unidentified reality, which he then conveniently labels 
God, but rather has the at least partially pre-figured Christian experience 
of God, or Jesus, or the like. Moreover, as one might have anticipated, it 
is my view based on what evidence there is, that the Hindu experience of 
Brahman and the Christian experience of God are not the same. We shall 
support this contention below. The significance of these considerations is 
that the forms of consciousness which the mystic brings to experience 
sets structured and limiting parameters on what the experience will be, i.e. 
                                                
284 This would be a reasonable position if Katz were saying that Mary’s experience is 
shaped partly by the object or the reality encountered and partly by Mary’s contextual 
consciousness. But Katz is not talking about the experience; he is talking about the object 
of the experience. The objects are, according to Katz, formative of experiences and set 
the criteria for their identification.  
285 Katz 1978a, p. 30. 
286 In chapter four we look at Katz’s arguments against the view that mystical 
experience is “merely subjective” as well as his conviction that the experiences are Real. 
When Katz says that regardless of the reality encountered by the mystic it is mediated 
by a contextual consciousness, he seems to imply that there are multiple and mutually 
exclusive realities to encounter. This interpretation is rejected by Gregory, a discussion 
we resume later in this text.  
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what will be experienced, and rule out in advance what is 
‘inexperienceable’ in the particular given, concrete, context.287 
This attempt to patch things up between realism/cognitivity and 
contextualism/constructivism is laudable, in that it is inclusive of the 
self-understanding of mystics. We must note, however, that Katz is not 
merely saying that the Hindu and the Christian do not have the same 
experience because the Hindu experiences Brahman and the Christian 
experiences God. He is also saying that the Christian does not 
experience ‘an unknown x’ which he then interprets as God, the 
Christian experiences God. The view that the mystic experiences an 
‘unknown’ x which he then interprets as God is one that Katz ascribes to 
the perennialists – a view that Katz argues against. But what would this 
difference of opinion really amount to in a concrete case of experience?  
Take the example of Christian Mary, who has had a mystical experience 
that is not of an ‘x’ that she has interpreted in terms of her conditioning 
(her Christian background and her study of Christian texts); rather she 
has experienced God, or at least she believes she has. In any case, the ‘object’ 
that Mary believes she has encountered has conditioned Mary’s 
experience into being what it has been – i.e., an experience of God. At 
any rate, this is what Mary experienced and this is what she reported. 
According to Katz, this is sufficient evidence to support the notion that 
the mystical experiences Christian Mary can have cannot be similar to 
                                                
287 Katz 1978a, p. 26. It is not very controversial to say that the notion of Brahman is 
different from the Christian notion of God, but the notions are not what make the 
experiences different – at least not from a realist point of view. Interestingly, this point 
of view equally upholds the perennial claim that mystics experience the same reality 
which they then interpret through the different notions provided by their religious 
contexts. If it is Katz’s intention to contest with the perennialists on metaphysical 
grounds, he then involves himself in a theological debate on the nature of ultimate 
reality. Perennialists do not argue on the basis of metaphysics, but rather assert that 
mystical experiences are similar or different as a result of their qualitative features and not 
their objects – i.e., whether  they are ‘unitive’, ‘frightening’, ‘unsettling’, ‘ecstatic’, 
‘overwhelming’, etc. For his part, Katz insists that this is a reductionistic approach since 
the ‘objects’ are not taken into account and the qualitative characteristics are ‘too 
general’ to outline mystical experiences. In this way, Katz’s realist claim and his 
insistence that the object determines the experience have brought metaphysics into the 
discourse on sameness and difference in mystical experience. This is why we insist on 
interpreting the ‘objects’ in Katz’s presentation as real objects.   
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those of Muslim Aisha. This provides both too much and too little 
information regarding how to interpret mystical experience and mystical 
experience reports. We attempt to clarify this point below. 
To begin with, nothing in the above account informs us as to whether or 
not Christian Jane’s experience of God would be similar to or the same 
as Christian Mary’s. If Katz means to imply that the two Christian 
experiences would be different, then perhaps he considers no two 
experiences to be the ‘same’. But if no two experiences are the same 
(which is obviously true if we consider sameness as numerical identity), it 
seems unnecessary (over-informative and distortive) to point out that the 
Hindu mystic’s experience differs from that of the Muslim mystic, because 
the Hindu and the Muslim experience different ‘objects’. If no two 
experiences are the same, then obviously one Hindu mystic’s experience 
would be different from every other mystic’s experience – be it the 
mystical experience of a Muslim, a Christian, a Jew, or even another 
Hindu. There are different religious traditions throughout the world, and 
if we take a moment to consider those traditions, we will recognize that 
Katz’s perspective does not inform us as to the difference between the 
experiences of a Christian who ‘sees’ God as the cause of all things and 
experiences spiritual beauty and joy on a daily basis, and the experiences 
of a Christian mystic who has rare but intense encounters, even feelings 
of ‘unity’, with what appears to be the same God. 
Where will it lead, then, if we regard Katz as considering Christian 
Mary’s and Christian Jane’s experiences to be similar in the sense that 
they ‘contain’ the ‘same’ object? The answer is that it leads to another 
sort of problem: what does it mean to say that the content of Mary’s and 
Jane’s experiences is the same? How could anyone know that Christian 
Mary and Christian Jane experience the same object, although one that is 
different from the object that Muslim Aisha experiences? How could 
anyone be privy to such information? 
If Katz’s position is that the mystic encounters a real object, he would 
need special knowledge about reality in order to ascertain whether the 
experiences of Christian Mary and Christian Jane are similar or different 
in character. He would have to know, for instance, that there are a 
variety of entities that more or less correspond to descriptions of 
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Ultimate Reality found in the different religious traditions; he would also 
have to know that Allah does not appear as an ‘object’ in the experience 
of a Buddhist, that the Christian God does not appear as an ‘object’ in 
the experience of a Muslim and so forth. 
We seem to repeatedly come up against the problem of Katz’s realism 
and how it can be understood in light of his contextual thesis. What does 
it mean that the object of the mystic’s experience is a real object? The 
statement “Krishna is real” must mean that the concept ‘Krishna’ refers 
to a certain specific reality (autonomous of experience) and possesses 
certain characteristic properties that may or may not be translatable to 
qualitative (experienceable) characteristics. For a sentence like “Krishna 
is happy” to be true (from a correspondence theory of truth), Krishna 
must really be happy, meaning “happy” for real, not only ‘seemingly,’ 
‘apparently,’ or ‘experienced as’ happy.288 But if Krishna is real and God is 
real and Allah is real – i.e., if they are individual entities with properties 
independent of human cognition – then why is Christian Mary unable to 
have an experience of Krishna? Even if she lacks the conceptual 
frameworks or interpretive patterns to identify Krishna as Krishna, she 
ought to be able to intentionally experience Krishna through her more 
abstract conceptual framework: as ‘a personality’ (though not that person 
– Krishna, that is), ‘a face’ (though not Krishna’s face), ‘a smile’ (though 
not Krishna’s smile). Or if the experience was of a ‘guiding presence’, 
and really that presence was Krishna instead of Jesus (as Mary believes), 
Mary should be able to experience a ‘guiding presence’ even if she is 
mistaken about the identity of the one who was present and guiding her.  
In our example, Mary has two possible ways of proceeding from this 
experience. She can either claim to have seen a happy face or claim to 
have had a vision of Jesus and that in her vision Jesus was happy. Since 
Katz recognizes the distinction between different levels of interpretation 
– what we have referred to as first-hand and second-hand reports – 
                                                
288 There are good reasons to bring in some reservations before interpreting Katz as 
having a correspondence theory of truth. In “Mystical speech, mystical meaning” he 
asserts that “…language is multiform … it is more than a series of nouns, more then a 
series of ostensive definitions, more than a correspondence theory of truth (á la Carl 
Hempel’s ‘snow is white’.)” Katz 1992a p. 8. It is difficult to know exactly what Katz 
means when he claims that language is “more than a correspondence theory of truth”.  
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Mary’s first-hand interpretation (either during or after her experience) 
may be that Krishna is Jesus. Conditioned as she is, and especially if she 
is conditioned to the extent that Katz claims, it is very likely that she did 
experience Jesus. Yet if she is less conditioned or cannot fit her 
experience into her Christian categories of conceptualization, what 
would Katz say ‘happened’? How do we best characterize Mary’s 
experience? 
Perhaps this is an unfair question. Gregory, for example, argues that 
Katz’s theory does not at all imply that there must be an “entire 
pantheon of metaphysical entities” affirmed by Katz:  
One of the most intriguing if not perplexing characteristics of Katz’s 
contextualist thesis is his claim that the mystics of different religious 
traditions each experience the respective ontological referents of their 
particular faith traditions. The Buddhist experiences nirvana, the Jewish 
devekuth, the Christian Jesus, and so on. When not understood 
accurately, his claim creates an interesting impression: it seems to some 
that he affirms the existence of an entire pantheon of metaphysical 
entities, each of which may be seen to inhabit its own distinct realm of 
ultimate truth – a larger conception of ultimate truth as something of a 
carnival of transcendent plurality. This, however, is not what Katz claims. 
His insistence that the Buddhist mystic experiences nirvana and the Hindu 
mystic Brahman, etc. is not, as we have seen, an insistence about the 
nature of the real object lying behind the mystics experiences, or the nature 
of what ultimate reality is. Rather, it is merely an affirmation about the 
nature of the phenomenological object a mystic experiences. His talk of ‘Jesus,’ 
‘nirvana,’ ‘devekuth,’ etc. is talk of judged interpreted sensations that may 
or may not be accurately judged.289 
In this quotation one can see that Gregory also interprets Katz’s ‘objects’ 
as “phenomenological object”, in which case it all seems to make sense. 
In relation to the discussion at hand, however, it is important to focus on 
Gregory’s warning not to interpret the ‘objects’ that Katz believes 
mystics to experience as “real objects”. From Gregory’s explanation it 
seems that in some way or another there is a ‘given’, or at least a 
distinction between experience and interpretation, and that Katz only 
means to suggest that this may be incorrectly interpreted. This 
interpretation also happens to match the idea that the mystic experiences 
                                                
289 Gregory 2006, p. 271. 
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an ‘x’ (a ‘judged interpreted sensation’) which she may judge (or 
interpret) inaccurately – the model of experience which has been rejected 
by Katz. In this interpretation, it would according to Katz be reasonable 
to interpret the events involving Mary and Krishna as follows; “Jesus” is 
the ‘judged interpreted sensation’ that Mary may have judged 
inaccurately. So where are the realism and the experienced object? An 
interpreted sensation could be of anything – i.e., any natural or 
supernatural entity that may interact with an experiencing self – and if 
there are no rules for how to interpret these sensations (givens), anything 
could be interpreted or judged as anything. 
If we stay with the ‘objects’ a little longer and look at Katz’s description 
of his own experience of the transcendent, we find support for our initial 
supposition that Krishna, Jesus, Allah, Brahman, etc., are, in Katz’s view, 
‘entities’ (even personalities):    
In the performance of t’fillah, not all the time because that would be the 
ideal, but occasionally, one feels that one is in the presence – a 
transcendental presence – of one’s maker, of one’s keeper. There is a 
profound feeling of reciprocity, a sense of intimacy that comes in the 
performance of certain mitzvot, sometimes on Shabbat, sometimes Tom 
Kippur [sic!], but especially in t’fillah, on different occasions. It means 
something. … It’s interactive, and the person with whom one is 
interacting is, kivyachol [as it were], the divine person. The ultimate 
presence is interested and engaged. It’s not just listening like some 
psychoanalyst who just listens but has, in effect, no personal involvement. 
It’s someone who is deeply, genuinely interested and reciprocates that 
interest.290 
Interpreted according to the contextual model, Katz’s experience would 
be merely the result of the expectations and conditioning of a man who 
reads the Torah. As we shall see, this is not what Katz means, since it 
would certainly take the edge off his experience. The ‘transcendental 
presence’ must be real, have an existence independent of the religious 
conditions that it is interpreted through. This leaves us with a question: if 
Katz’s experience of the transcendent is not the experience of an ‘x’ that 
is then interpreted according to Jewish patterns of pre-conditioning, 
                                                
290 Katz in interview with Haberman 1994, quoted from Gregory 2006, p. 208. (“Tom” 
Kippur is very likely a misprint and I have no way of telling how far back it goes.) 
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what is the best way of understanding what it is? Katz claims the 
experience should be interpreted as a “distinctive ontological condition”: 
Whether it has an objective ontological corollary, or if it’s only a 
psychological condition, that is the open question. But even if it has, in 
large part a psychological aspect, I would argue for analyzing it as a 
distinctive ontological condition that is not reducible to a mere 
psychological state.291 
What Katz seems to be saying is that neither he nor anyone else can tell 
whether (a) there exists a metaphysical entity that has interacted with his 
experiential ‘reality’ or (b) whether the properties he ascribes to this 
existentially set entity are correctly or incorrectly apprehended? But if it 
has not been an anonymous reality (an ‘x’) that Katz has experienced and 
then interpreted as he has been conditioned to, he must have had a “pre-
formed anticipated” Jewish experience of Yahweh. If Yahweh in this 
account is possibly real (because, as Katz emphasises, no one can tell), 
and no one but the Jews can experience Yahweh (and Katz cannot be 
experiencing God since he is not a Christian), then it also must be 
possible that God, Allah, Krishna, Nirvana, Brahman, etc. are just as real 
(i.e., real in the same sense) for their respective mystical adherents. In 
that case, whatever Gregory’s analysis shows, Katz must be understood 
as opening the possibility for “an entire pantheon of metaphysical 
entities, each of which may be seen to inhabit its own distinct realm of 
ultimate truth”, since that is how he would analyse his own experience.  
From a phenomenological perspective there is no need for a 
metaphysical system in order to interpret the experiences of mystics. 
Katz’s focus on the ‘objects’ of the experience and his insistence that it is 
the ‘objects’ (not the phenomenal characteristics) that demarcate mystical 
experience seem to require a metaphysical system of ‘objects’ for the 
interpretation of mystics. It is not even very clear where interpretation 
fits into the picture, since Katz rejects the perennial distinction between 
experience and interpretation. So the question remains: how does Katz 
know that the experiences of mystics are different in different mystical 
traditions and not similar across religious borders? 
                                                
291 Katz in interview with Haberman 1994, quoted from Gregory 2006, p. 208. 
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If Katz knows this by knowing that the reports of the mystics are in a 
one-to-one relation to the experience of the mystic and also to the 
religious tradition that the mystic belongs to, then Katz must think that 
there is no interpretation of experience required from either the mystic 
or the second-hand interpreter (i.e., Katz, the perennialists, etc.). The 
interpretation of the experience is already ‘given’ to the experiencer. If 
this interpretation of Katz’s position is reasonable, then it would also be 
reasonable to think that the Reality encountered by the mystic is ‘given’ 
and then described accurately to a second-hand interpreter who receives 
the ‘given’ in a textual form that does not require interpretation. 
Obviously, this is very far from what Katz aims to say since he explicitly 
denies the possibility of unmediated experience, and since he constructs a 
theory of interpretation of mystical reports. But how then does 
interpretation fit in? And how does the conditioning that the mystic 
brings to his experience come into play in relation to the ‘real’ object of 
experience? As we have seen, Katz denies the possibility of 
distinguishing between experience and interpretation. This means that it 
is not an ‘unknown x’ that is experienced and then interpreted by the 
experiencer; it is rather that the experiencer has the pre-conditioned, pre-
shaped, and pre-conceptualised experience of ‘whatever object he thinks 
he encounters’.  
According to Katz, there is no reason to equate two experiences of 
union if one of them is reported by a Christian mystic and the other by a 
Sufi. In his view, since perennialists believe that one can distinguish 
between an experience and its interpretation (which is merely another 
way of saying that mystics experience an ‘x’ that they then interpret as 
something),292 they mistakenly conclude that they are able to examine a 
mystical experience report and separate that which the mystic experienced 
from that which is the product of her interpretational background. This is 
why Katz believes the perennial account to be reductive. 
                                                
292 Or even more simple; they claim that experience is ambiguous, and that rather than 
making an existential claim when describing an experience one has to view it as an 
interpretational claim. If a certain ‘object’ can be experienced in various ways and be 
ascribed various meanings, this must mean that a main point which needs to be 
investigated further is the precise mechanisms of interpretation. Not the nature of the 
‘given’ or the like. 
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From Katz’s point of view perennialists believe that when a Christian 
and a Muslim both report having had a unitive experience, this is an 
indication that they have had similar experiences, and the fact that the 
Christian mentions God as an objective relational point to his 
experience, while the Muslim mentions Allah, is an effect of the 
contextual and linguistic circumstances that surround the mystics 
respectively. Katz reads this as the perennialists affirming that mystic’s 
‘misrepresent’ their experiences: the Christian who has encountered 
Ultimate Reality calls it ‘God’ in accordance with his conditioned 
background, while the Muslim, in accordance with his conditioned 
background, calls that same Ultimate Reality ‘Allah’. Thus Katz concludes 
that the perennialists think that mystics misdescribe their experiences: 
To think that the ‘unitive’ mystic merely describes his experience in this 
way is to distort the situation which gave rise to the experience, the 
experience itself, and the report of the experience. Thus, for example, 
seriously to credit that Augustine did not have the unitive experience 
described in his Confessions (Bk. 9) but only used this language is 
unwarranted for two strong reasons at least; (1) surely an Augustine would 
not consciously misdescribe his experience; (2) the theory of 
misdescription due to orthodox pressures is untenable in Augustine’s case 
because, in fact, the unitive account he gives is more in conflict, though 
little did he seem to know it, with Christian orthodoxy than a relational 
description would have been.293 
As interesting as Katz’s views on Augustine might be, it is unlikely that 
perennial interpreters would subscribe to the idea that Augustine had 
misdescribed his experience, especially since his experience of ‘unity’ 
provides another important bit of confirming evidence for one of the 
central characteristics in their general typology of mystical experience.294  
Katz’s argument is that because perennialists draw metaphysical 
conclusions regarding the object that the mystic experiences, they are led 
to equate the ontological reality of Allah with the ontological reality of 
God. But it is Katz, and not the perennialists, who believes that mystical 
experiences necessarily contain ‘objects’, and that a “distinctive 
ontological condition” is at hand during a mystical experience. While 
some perennialists are also metaphysicians, it is unfair to say that all 
                                                
293 Katz 1978a, p. 42. 
294 See for instance Hood (2001), Pike (1992), Huxley (1945), etc.  
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perennialists equate the phenomenal similarities in experience with the 
similarities or sameness of distinctive ontological conditions. The fact 
that Katz stands against the idea of the unity of “ontological conditions” 
appears to indicate that he considers those conditions to be distinct – 
“… an entire pantheon of metaphysical entities, each of which may be 
seen to inhabit its own distinct realm of ultimate truth”. Katz’s realist 
leaning would imply that it is these specific ‘ontological conditions’ that 
contact the experiencer; theoretically, then, it would be possible for Mary 
to have an experience of the angel Metatron. But Katz’s contextualist 
argument would deny this possibility.  
The “conditioning pattern” of the mystic affects the experience to the 
extent that the mystic cannot experience anything that is not 
conceptually covered by these patterns – i.e., anything new. The Jewish 
mystic, for instance, “rarely, if ever” has an experience of ‘unity’, at least 
according to Katz: 
…the Jewish conditioning pattern so strongly impresses the tradition’s 
mystics (as all Jews) with the fact that one does not have mystical 
experiences of God in which one loses one’s identity in ecstatic moments 
of unity, that the Jewish mystic rarely, if ever, has such experiences. What 
the Jewish mystic experiences is, perhaps, the Divine Throne, or the angel 
Metatron, or aspects of the Sefiroth, or the heavenly court and palaces, or 
the Hidden Torah, or God’s secret Names, but not loss of self in unity 
with God.295 
The realist side results in the conclusion that it should be theoretically 
possible for Mary to experience Metatron, or, for that matter, Krishna; 
this, however, is not supported by the contextualist side which results in 
the conclusion that the ‘conditioning pattern’ so strongly impresses the 
mystic that he has an experience of what he is taught to experience – 
quite apart, it would seem, from whatever “ontological conditions” 
might be present.  
One way of solving this problem would be to view the ‘specific 
ontological conditions’ as an ‘x’ that is then interpreted in accordance 
with the interpretive pattern of the experiencer. However, as we have 
seen, Katz rejects this possibility as well. Moreover, Katz provides no 
                                                
295 Katz 1978a, p 34 
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information as to what it is that Mary experiences should she experience 
Metatron. The fact that she may not report an experience of Metatron, 
for example, may have nothing to do with the distinct ontological 
conditions she has encountered.  
Nonetheless, Katz positions the ‘object’ of experience at the centre in 
the process of differentiating between experiences that are different, and 
rejects the assumption that they can be similar if they have certain 
common phenomenal qualities. But if it is so very unclear what this 
‘object’ is and how it is supposed to help us differentiate between 
different experiences, would it not be of some help to grant the 
phenomenal qualities of experience a role in this project of 
differentiation, and this without necessarily implying that all mystical 
experiences are characterized by the quality of ‘unity’ are the same 
experiences? 
 
3.3. Conclusions and summary 
Katz repeatedly refers us to the ‘object’ of the experience as a 
demarcational criterion for mystical experience. However, it is difficult to 
pin this ‘object’ down when it comes to type, since in Katz’s various 
explanations it appears to vacillate between the real and the irreal. The 
problem of the interchangeable object in Katz’s perspective indicates 
that his theory suffers from theoretical inconsistency. By speaking of the 
‘objects’ in the mystic’s experience at times as if they are ‘real’ and at 
other times as if they are ‘irreal’, it becomes possible to draw any number 
of conclusions about the phenomenon of mystical experience. Moreover, 
although Katz claims to include phenomenal characteristics in his 
account of mystical experience, he makes a considerable effort to show 
that the phenomenal characteristics outlined by the perennialists are 
inadequate as demarcational criteria for mystical experience. After this, 
however, he does not bother to replace the phenomenal characteristics 
he has rejected with new ones, and by this omission leaves us without 
any precise demarcation standards for mystical experience.  
One way that Katz could combine his contextualism with his realism and 
give stability to the ‘objects’ involved in mystical experiences would be to 
assign those objects intentional properties. Indeed there are several 
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passages in Katz’s writings which indicate that he meant to say 
‘intentional objects’ when talking about the ‘objects’ of mystical 
experience. On the other hand, several objections could be raised against 
this point of view: 1) Katz’s rejection of the phenomenological method 
as well as the results derived therefrom; and, 2) his rejection of the 
phenomenal characteristics of experience, which he considers too 
general to outline what mystical experience is. Without some delineation 
of phenomenal characteristics, however, it is impossible to make claims 
of similarity and difference concerning experience. If this is so, it is 
difficult to see how Katz is advancing the understanding of the field by pleading 
for the recognition of differences. 
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Chapter 4 
The genesis of mystical experience 
 
 
 
Introduc t ion  to  chapter four  
 
Vor dem Betreten des Allerheiligsten musst Du die Schuhe ausziehn, aber nicht nur die 
Schuhe, sondern alles, Reisekleid und Gepäck, und darunter die Nacktheit, und alles, 
was unter der Nacktheit ist, und alles, was sich unter diesem verbirgt, und dann den 
Kern und den Kern des Kerns, dann das Übrige und dann den Rest und dann noch den 
Schein des unvergänglichen Feuers. Erst das Feuer selbst wird vom Allerheiligsten 
aufgesogen und lässt sich von ihm aufsaugen, keines von beiden kann dem 
wiederstehen.296 
Franz Kafka 
 
Altered states of consciousness297 (ASC) are generally accepted as a 
characteristization of mystical experience, and even though not all altered 
states are ‘mystical’, all mystical experiences seem to involve a ‘different’ 
mode of experiencing. The truism that all peoples have in common 
certain characteristics that transcend their contextual borders is the basis 
for all philosophical investigation, whether phenomenological, 
naturalistic or hermeneutical. It is also an assumption that forms the 
                                                
296 “Before entering the Ultimate Holyness you must remove your shoes, and not only 
your shoes but everything: your travel clothes and luggage, and beneath these your 
nakedness, and everything underneath that nakedness, and everything beneath that, and 
then the core, and then the core of the cores, and then the rest and what is left and then 
also the Light from the inextinguishable Fire. Only the Fire can be absorbed by the 
Ultimate Holyness and alows itself to be absorbed, none of the two can resist this.” (My 
translation.) 
297 See Charles Tart’s (ed.) Altered states of consciousness, 1969.   
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basis of epistemology, ethics and semantics; without it none of these 
disciplines would make sense. Epistemological considerations of any 
kind must assume that certain general structures are involved in man’s 
cognitive functioning, and it is these the epistemologist aims to classify 
and clarify in terms of function and content. To initiate a classification of 
those structures that are relevant to cognitive functioning, William James 
proposed that 
Normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but 
one type of special consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the 
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely 
different.298 
What James means by “normal waking consciousness” can be translated 
into any conceptual framework, interpretational pattern or language, 
since it is a common feature of all mankind to differentiate between 
states of sleep and states of wakefulness, and these are also ascribed a 
difference in cognitive status.  
In different contexts the cognitive status of dreams and the cognitive 
status of wakeful states have been given different values. In this 
connection, however, it must be mentioned that in the modern Western 
paradigm the “rational” state is regarded as the ‘highest’ and most 
‘cognitively’ rewarding state of consciousness, and that to which 
scientific judgements are entrusted.  
The possibility of a rich spectrum of ‘types’ having different cognitive 
statuses so enchanted James that he set about experimenting with nitrous 
oxide. Nitrous oxide introduced James to one state that might be 
classified as ‘wakeful’ yet cognitively altered. James considered these 
altered states to be informative with respect to epistemological issues 
surrounding ‘normal’ experience. That is, he thought that these ‘other’ 
states, whether we choose to call them ‘intoxications’, ‘psychosis’, 
‘hallucinations’ or ‘delusions’, could be cognitively valuable and 
informative regarding our foremost ‘instrument’ of knowledge: 
consciousness.  
                                                
298 James 1902, p. 298, quoted from Batson/Schoenrade/Ventis 1993, p. 119. 
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While nitrous oxide and other mind-altering substances may be viewed 
as short-cuts to the achievement of altered states, various other 
consciousness-altering methods are described in the mystical literature of 
the world. In most shamanistic cultures and among many mystics, states 
of consciousness that are generally viewed by modern psychiatrists as 
illusory or deceptive are considered to be cognitively higher than so-
called normal states. According to the interpretive pattern of most 
modern psychiatrists, the ‘normal’ wakeful state is generally seen as the 
‘highest’ or most ‘rational’ cognitive state; this point, however, invariably 
carries the implication that any unusual or non-ordinary or otherwise 
altered ‘state’ is cognitively untrustworthy by comparison. 
The lists of phenomenal characteristics discussed in chapter three refer 
to states in which the qualitative features of experience match the labels 
on the list. Exactly how these ‘states’ that have been identified as 
mystical are related to specific models of facilitation is unclear, although 
there is extensive empirical research spread over a number of disciplines 
aiming to find out. The various disciplines (ranging from the cognitive 
sciences, psychology and neurobiology to the interpretative and 
philosophical sciences) evince an interest in finding correlations between 
‘states’ (phenomenological or psychological interpretations of 
experience) and empirically observable (measurable, predictable and 
controllable) phenomena.299 These correlations can be found between 
states achieved through different methods of facilitation (such as 
comparisons between ayahuasca-induced states, meditative states and 
states achieved through electromagnetic stimulation), and between the 
observable differences that may occur when the same method of 
                                                
299 See for instance Michael Persinger’s controversial study Neuropsychological bases of God 
beliefs (1987). Persinger’s study is mainly focused on electromagnetic stimulation of 
central areas of the brain to elicit a ‘sense of presence’. For an interdisciplinary study, 
see also “Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness”, Dieter Vaitl et. al. in 
Psychological Bulletin 2005, vol 131, No. 1, 98-127. The authors review current research 
results concerning alternative states of consciousness. For a philosophical and cognitive 
sciences perspective on the issue, the anthology Neural correlates of consciousness, Metzinger 
T. (ed.), MIT Press, 2000, provides a good description of the central issues in these 
disciplines as well as the problematic nature of clarifying how subjective experience is 
correlated with neurobiological events.  
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facilitation has been practiced.300 The correlational projects aim at 
extending the understanding of the field of experience in general and 
mystical experience in particular. 
The importance of correlative research findings lies in their potential 
contribution to the establishment of an ‘objective’ science concerning 
these relatively unknown phenomena. This is important to mysticism 
and the interpretation of mystical literature because the cognitive value 
assigned to states that can be phenomenally described as mystical varies 
according to different interpretive models. Thus the methodology and 
conceptual apropriateness of these interpretive models are of important 
concern, especially since agreement on this matter is difficult to find, 
even within the same research area. In Western psychiatry and 
psychology, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) is the standard against which most practitioners 
and theorists of psychology judge these altered states to be ‘delusional’ 
and cognitively equal to hallucinations. This particular interpretive model 
commonly views mystical experience as a psychological disorder as well, 
reducing the possibility that such experiences will receive serious 
attention and open-minded evaluation. On the other hand, several 
psycho-sociological accounts present a more positive account of mystical 
experience that sees creativity and the enhancement of certain cognitive 
structures as its outcome, contradicting the view that mystical experience 
is cognitively meaningless and perhaps even harmful to the psyche.301  
The various views on mystical experience and altered states of 
consciousness both within and between these numerous scientific and 
academic disciplines are also aspects of Katz’s ‘context’ – aspects that 
may have subtle political, social, medical, pedagogical and may even have 
                                                
300 See, for instance, Echenhofer 2004.   
301 Batson/Schoenrade/Ventis 1993, for instance, analyse mystical experience in terms 
of the reality-transformative processes occurring during creative episodes. We could 
contrast this with various Freudian perspectives (among others) in which religious 
experience (religiousness in general) is seen as psychopathological – i.e., disconnected 
from reality (Batson/Schoenrade/Ventis 1993, p. 232). William Farthing (1992) 
presents a different view, claiming that the changes in higher level thought processes 
are merely experienced as creatively enhanced when in fact “…often their solutions are no 
better, and perhaps worse, than normal, but in the ASC they have a delusion that they 
are more creative than usual.” (Farthing 1992, p. 209)  
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an effect on our everyday conception of the world; thus they represent a 
further potential means of understanding the wellsprings of Katz’s 
thought. Indeed he is known to have discussed many of these issues 
publicly and has explicitly rejected some of the views mentioned above – 
an issue to which we shall return in the chapters to come. These 
considerations are of primary concern when it comes to assessing the 
potential of Katz’s theory to extend the understanding of the field. Judgements 
concerning this must be based partly on Katz’s position and partly on 
the nature of the current understanding of the field.  
Although the question of Katz’s position relative to the cognitive 
outcome of mystical experience will not be broached until chapter five, it 
is here appropriate to enquire as to his view concerning the connection 
between the facilitative aspects of mystical experience and the cognitive 
status of altered states that are interpreted as mystical experiences. Are 
there altered states of consciousness with cognitive aspects that equal or 
transcend the ‘normal’ cognitive state of wakeful consciousness? If the 
‘normal’ state is viewed as the highest cognitive form of consciousness – 
the state in which reality is represented with greatest accuracy – it would 
appear that the cognitivity of any alternative state of consciousness could 
only be valued as ‘lower’ than this.  
The one experience that Katz seems to acknowledge as being genuinely 
mystical is that which results from an “act of God or the 
transcendent”302 with “no prior or technical preparation”.303 This 
understanding of mystical experience, however, runs into difficulties as 
soon as ‘states’ such as ‘illumination’ or nirvana are involved and God or 
the transcendent may not have been involved at all. If Katz insists that 
the experiences of mystics are necessarily ‘externally oriented’, or 
directed towards an ‘object’ in a transcendent reality, this implies that 
Katz devalues the validity of the self-understanding of Buddhists and 
other similar practitioners. This view also entails the need for a 
metaphysical system according to which the boundary between 
‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ reality is explicitly defined; and there is a 
wide variety of understandings among metaphysical systems regarding 
                                                
302 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12 
303 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12 
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where this boundary is to be drawn. The question of interest is: when 
Katz claims that mystical experiences are always directed towards a 
transcendent reality, which metaphysical system is he taking into account 
– his own or that of the mystic he is interpreting?  
Katz believes that his view of mystical experience as an “act of God or 
the transcendent that requires no prior or technical preparation”304 
complements the view that mystical experience is, or can be, facilitated. 
A question that emerges here is whether or not an experience that is 
caused by an act of the transcendent excludes the possibility that this 
experience is either phenomenally or cognitively different from ‘normal’ 
states of consciousness. And if ‘the transcendent’ causally interacts with 
the mystical experiencer thus opening fresh possibilities of experience 
that are not encountered in ‘normal’ states, how is this different from the 
various facilitative methods practiced in different religious and mystical 
traditions? What is the difference between an altered state caused by 
God and an altered state caused by, for example, neurochemical 
stimulation? And are the above mentioned causal factors mutually 
exclusive? 
The ‘cognitive’ aspects of the ‘states’ that James studied and considered 
informative with respect to consciousness and cognitivity have been 
treated with a great deal of suspicion by many modern investigators, 
especially in cases where those ‘states’ have been facilitated by the 
ingestion of mind-altering substances that are commonly viewed as being 
distortive of reality. Even such conditions as disease and sensory 
deprivation have been known to cause hallucinations. This, of course, 
has resulted in the invalidation of the cognitive elements in these 
experiences as well. This matter is of importance because Katz’s position 
exhibits certain indications that this is how he views mystical experiences 
that are facilitated: non-cognitive and without relevance to religious 
phenomena or traditions. The remainder of this chapter consists of an 
examination of this possibility as well as its consequences for Katz’s 
theory in terms of our evaluative criteria.  
                                                
304 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12 
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When it comes to the idea of altered states of consciousness, Katz does 
not explicitly deny their possibility, although he limits the methods of 
facilitation to language and its ‘transformative character’:     
In that the mechanisms of knowing necessarily impinge on, even create, the 
substantive knowledge gained in mystical experience no less than in the 
more mundane epistemological contexts, language is a, if not the, key 
issue in reforming those structures required for obtaining mystical 
awareness. Language creates, when used by the mystical adept – the guru 
in the training of his disciple, or the mekubbal or Sufi in their meditative 
practices – the operative process through which the essential epistemic 
channels that permit mystical forms of knowing and being are made 
accessible.305 
Language thus functions to create the process that permits “mystical 
forms of knowing”, but it is important to note that it does not do this in 
a way that is different from the way it functions in “more mundane 
epistemological contexts”. The problem with this account – and the 
reason there is a conflict between Katz and the perennialists – is that 
according to the perennialists (and some mystics) it is precisely in the 
area of language (concepts) that one finds the difference between 
mystical and ordinary states. Language, along with its possible 
transformative character, is undone, the conditioning pattern of everyday 
experience is reduced or extinguished, and the mystical forms of knowing 
differ from the ordinary by being (at least to a large extent) non-
conceptual. It should be pointed out, however, that this seems to reflect 
the attitude, shared with Katz, that all concepts are tied to language, 
which is not necessarily the case.  
As far as we can understand from Katz’s writings, the language that 
transforms the mystical consciousness is religious language; and although 
we do not know precisely what this is in Katz’s theory, it seems to 
consist in certain terms or modes of expression found in religious 
literature and typical of the specific religious tradition in question. Thus 
it appears that for Katz, religious language forms the mystic’s 
consciousness on what the mystic can experience, and without this 
language there can be no religious experience.  
 
                                                
305 Katz 1992a, p. 8. 
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4.1. The facilitation of mystical experience 
We have briefly mentioned psychiatry’s interest in non-regular modes of 
experiencing and how some psychiatric frameworks interpret these 
experiences as instances of psychopathology. The association of 
mysticism with psychological deficiency and non-cognitive or delusional 
states is neither new nor uncommon, and it mainly rests on a naturalistic 
interpretive pattern in which an external Reality plays a causal role in our 
experiences. According to DSM-III, a ‘delusion’ is: 
…a false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external 
reality and firmly sustained in spite of what everyone else believes and in 
spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious evidence to the 
contrary.306  
And a hallucination is: 
…a sensory stimulus without external stimulation of the relevant sensory 
organ307 
These definitions presuppose an ontology that clearly states the nature of 
‘external reality’, what causal relations there are between this ‘external 
reality’ and the experienced reality, what constitutes a piece of ‘evidence’, 
and the epistemological criteria for determining what constitutes a 
‘correct’ or ‘incorrect inference’. If this ontology, for instance, denies the 
existence of certain elements of reality (such as God), the experience of 
an encounter with such elements can only be interpreted as an illusion, 
hallucination or other type of experience with low cognitive status. Take, 
for example, the case in which the epistemological criteria for correct 
and incorrect inferences is that ‘experience’ concerning the nature of 
‘external reality’ cannot be trusted, and that emphasis should thus lay on 
commonsensical accounts of ‘external reality’ instead – e.g., that it is 
necessarily material and basically what ‘most people’ think it is. In such a 
circumstance, experiential claims concerning an immaterial reality or 
                                                
306 Lukoff 1985, p. 356.  Lukoff quotes DSM-III. Lukoff’s aim is to find criteria 
according to which psychotic (or psychotomimetic) experiences can be given a positive 
interpretation. 
307 Lukoff 1985, p. 356. Lukoff quotes DSM-III.  
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those that contradict the prevailing view would be interpreted as 
‘delusional’ or ‘hallucinatory’. 
Researchers influenced by the perennial school often emphasise the 
epistemological advantages that may be hidden in altered states of 
consciousness, and also that there may be scientific interest in the 
psychological and emotional advantages that some of these states may 
lead to. The problem is, as always, that of differentiation. It would seem 
that Katz’s offer of assistance to mystics and interpreters of mysticism 
would be achieved if he were able to provide a method for 
differentiating between cognitive and non-cognitive experiences. To ask 
this of any epistemological approach, however, would also be asking it to 
form some set of ontological presuppositions, since, in naturalistic 
approaches, ‘knowledge’ requires a correlation between experience and 
objective reality. Since Katz claims cognitivity for mystical experiences, 
he ought to make explicit the underlying premises that he uses to 
determine which experiences are non-delusional (in the sense that they 
inform the mystic about ‘external’ reality) and those that are delusional. 
We shall return to Katz’s views on cognitivity in mystical experience in 
chapter five. Having thus noted the relation between issues of cognitivity 
and the facilitative aspects of mystical experience as well as their 
importance for the enhancement of our understanding of mystical 
experience and mystical claims, we now focus on Katz’s understanding 
of the facilitative aspects of mystical experience and altered states of 
consciousness.  
It is widely accepted in philosophical contexts that when certain of an 
individual’s biochemical structures and neural areas are stimulated, this 
infallibly results in certain corresponding phenomenal and physiological 
alterations that constitute alternative states of consciousness. The matter 
of which physiological alteration produces a specific type of 
physiological change is a question for neural science. On the other hand, 
answers to questions concerning which neural alteration produces a 
specific phenomenal change in the individual requires a report of 
phenomenal changes for comparison.308 Alterations in perception, 
                                                
308 In Vaitl et al. 2005, the authors review the research on ASC by classifying 
experiences in terms of ‘causes’. The experience-types can be caused by (a) physical and 
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memory, cognitive functioning, emotional involvement, motivation of 
activity, etc., are all possible candidates for having caused an altered state 
of consciousness.309 Tests built on empirically measurable changes (e.g., 
observations of changes in behaviour, intelligence tests that measure 
changes in cognitive functioning, and so on) are constructed to correlate 
these empirically measurable features of different states to phenomenally 
experienced changes. This correlation requires a phenomenological 
classification of ‘experienced states’ – the phenomenological 
classification that Katz has rejected as insufficient on account of its 
generality.  
Whatever status one may ascribe to the results of these correlative 
approaches, they require reports of phenomenally experienced changes. 
But it is not only the phenomenal (reported) characteristics that Katz 
views as fallible in terms of discerning the common characteristics of 
experience; the neurological aspect of the correlated pair is also rejected 
because it is seen as being incapable of outlining similar (or same) 
experience:   
Mysticism is not a matter of brainwaves. Mysticism makes an ontological 
claim to some experience with ultimate reality. So that to reduce it to 
brainwaves is not to deal with it. […] The fact is that the brainwave is not 
the same thing or equal to ecstasy or love or encounter or loss of self or 
whatever. It may be that these different states have the same oscillation 
                                                                                                              
physiological stimulation, (b) psychological methods of induction, (c) disease, (d) 
pharmacological induction, and (e) spontaneously induced (includes experiences like 
sleep, dreaming, hypnagogic states, daydreaming, etc.). These methods of induction are 
then correlated with elements listed in one of the four phenomenological dimensions of 
ASC, namely changes in: activation, awareness span, self awareness and sensory 
dynamics.  
309 Arnold M Ludwig lists: Alterations in thinking, Disturbed time-sense, Loss of 
control, Change in emotional expression, Body image change, Perceptual distortions, 
Change in meaning or significance, Sense of the ineffable, Feelings of rejuvenation, and 
Hypersuggestibility. (In Tart 1969, pp. 13-16) William Farthing lists the following 
cognition-related characteristic changes during ASC: Changes in attention, Changes in 
perception, Changes in imagery and fantasy, Changes in inner speech, Changes in 
memory, Changes in higher-level thought processes, Changes in the meaning or 
significance of experiences, Changed time-experience, Changes in emotional feeling and 
expression, Changes in level of arousal, Changes in self-control, Changes in 
suggestibility, Changed body image, and Changed sense of personal identity. (Farthing 
1992, pp. 208-212)  
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on your brainwave meter, but they’re not the same thing. The fact is, we 
can have different emotions produced by different circumstances. So, for 
instance, we can cry out of joy and we can cry out of pain, and to think 
that merely the fact that we might register on a machine that we’re 
undergoing crying is sufficient to explain this phenomenon seems to me 
to be extremely reductionistic and a position to be avoided.310 
Here Katz appears to reject not only the equation of ‘brainwaves’ with 
phenomenally experienced reality (criticizing the reductive character of 
such equations), but also those correlations that can be made between 
‘states’ of the central nervous system and ‘states’ of consciousness. The 
above quotation also appears to indicate that Katz has in some way 
misunderstood the reasons why researchers register brainwaves to begin 
with. The main purpose of registering or mapping neurological activity is 
not to explain a phenomenon like crying (which generally does not need 
a ‘machine’ to ‘register’ it). It is to register measurable empirical 
concomitants of alternative states of cognitive functioning (if there are 
any) and, of course, to enhance prediction and control. Although it is 
perfectly legitimate to criticize conclusions drawn in the rash manner 
described by Katz, this is not the attitude one finds in most of the 
correlative approaches. Rather, there seems to be widespread sensitivity 
to the complexity of neural systems, phenomenal experience, and the 
levels of meaning in reports of subjective experience.  
It also remains unclear whether Katz’s statement that “mysticism is not a 
matter of brainwaves” is meant to suggest that the mystic need not have 
an altered ‘state’ in order to have a mystical experience – i.e., that a 
mystical experience does not imply an altered state of consciousness. 
The fact that mystical claims refer to experiences with ultimate reality 
does not necessarily imply that the experiences do not involve an altered 
state. Whether the states involved are similar or not is another question. 
The brain can be in a condition that severely impairs or improves 
cognitive processes, those same processes that Katz refers to as 
formative of the mystical experience. Whether or not Katz also considers 
the experiences to be phenomenally different (or similar) as a 
consequence of differences (or similarities) in their neural basis, cannot 
be determined from what has been said above. However, we do have 
                                                
310 Katz 2000, response to Gregory, in Gregory 2006, p. 33 
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indications that Katz considers the mystic’s report to mirror the 
phenomenally experienced reality with no necessary connection to 
neurobiological processes.  
The idea that similar means of altering cognitive patterns of 
interpretation lead to similar types of experience may not be what Katz 
intends to contradict here. Some distinctions, however, may facilitate our 
analysis of Katz’s position. Concerning the correlative methods, we need 
to distinguish between the various ‘phases’ of an experience that are 
correlated in the chain: facilitation – neurobiological changes – phenomenal 
experience – report of experience.  
As a first step, we need to determine the link between methods of facilitation 
and physical/neurobiological changes. This includes the question of whether 
different activities (methods of facilitation like fasting, rhythmic dancing, 
pharmaceutical ingestion, etc.) can cause the same neurobiological 
condition, or, alternatively, whether the same activity can cause different 
neurobiological conditions. The second step concerns the relation 
between the neurobiological state and the characteristics of phenomenal 
experience. This includes the question of whether the same neurological 
condition will always cause phenomenal experiences of the same type. A 
third step on the correlational ladder concerns the relationship between 
phenomenal experience and the report of this experience. The central 
question concerning this pair is whether phenomenal experience stands 
in a one-to-one correlation with reported experience.  
These distinctions are not made by Katz, which is one reason that his 
position on the matter is difficult to determine. Many perennial 
interpreters that Katz addresses seem to neglect these different stages of 
correlation as well. As a result they draw certain conclusions about the 
report, and even the experience, based upon the type of method used; or 
they conclude, like Stace, that similar descriptions imply similar 
experiences:        
…if the phenomenological descriptions of the two experiences [i. e. drug-
induced and not drug-induced] are indistinguishable, so far as can be 
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ascertained, then it cannot be denied that if one is a genuine mystical 
experience the other is also.311 
Here Stace appears to claim that knowing the ‘method’ or ‘cause’ that 
induces a particular experience does not help in terms of enabling us to 
draw conclusions about the type experience it is. On the other hand, he 
considers similar reports to indicate similar experiences, which implies that 
he believes there is a one-to-one correlation between an experience and 
its report. 
Stace not only set the standard for identification of ‘similar’ experiences, 
he also provided a list of characteristics to help identify the 
phenomenally experienced reality of mystics, as well as the criteria used 
by contemporary empirical investigators to identify similar experiences 
by stimulation of relevant areas of the brain.312 Concerning the 
relationship between an experience and its report, Stace thought that 
experience could be to some degree distinguished from interpretation, 
implying, it would seem, that the process by which the experiencer 
translates her experience into a meaningful report can be analysed, 
investigated and conceptually clarified. For Katz, on the other hand, the 
distinction between experience and interpretation is more or less 
impossible to draw (as has been briefly discussed in chapter three), so 
                                                
311 Stace quoted from Havens 1964, p. 218. See also Huston Smith’s argument that “we 
are considering phenomenology rather than ontology, description rather than 
interpretation, and on this level there is no difference [between drug induced 
experiences and ‘genuinely’ religious experience]. Descriptively, drug experiences can 
not be distinguished from their natural religious counterpart.” [Smith 1968, p. 162.] The 
choice of the words “natural counterpart” is supposedly used to address the critical 
remarks that (for different reasons) have rejected drug-experiences as ‘religiously 
important’.  
312 The most recent being Griffiths, Richards, McCann, and Jesse’s investigation 
“Psilocybin can occasion mystical type experiences having substantial and sustained 
personal meaning and spiritual significance”, published in Psychopharmacology, Springer-
Verlag 2006, in which Hood’s m-scale (Hood 1975) is the main instrument of 
measuring the degree of “mysticism” in the experiences. In 2003 a Swedish team of 
doctors presented their conclusions on the issue of “The serotonin system and spiritual 
experiences”: “This finding in normal male subjects indicated that the serotonin system 
may serve as a biological basis for spiritual experiences” (in American Journal of Psychiatry 
2003). For the relationship between the serotonin system and LSD see N. Goodman in 
“The serotonergic system and mysticism: could LSD and the nondrug-induced mystical 
experience share common neural mechanisms?” (in Journal of psychoactive drugs 34, 2002).  
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there would be no point in attempting to understand what goes on 
during the interpretation (or ‘conceptualization’) of experience. The 
relationship between an experience and its report is, in Katz’s view, a 
one-to-one relation. His reasons for thinking this are based partly on the 
assumption that it is language that creates the reported experience and 
partly on the assumption that it is impossible to undo the cognitive 
(linguistic) frameworks that invariably impinge, not only on the 
interpretation but on the experience itself. We will return to the issue of 
facilitation by language in the next section; however, before doing so, we 
take a quick look at some of the problems encountered by the 
correlation-theorists.    
  
4.1.1. Katz and the correlational approaches  
If we first look at the correlations between specific causal factors and 
neurobiological changes, we find constant connections between certain 
types of activities and specific psychophysical consequences. Running, 
amphetamines and emotional agitation are all separate factors that 
invariably cause an increase in heart rate. Thus someone who has 
experienced physical effort, amphetamines and emotional arousal, has 
also experienced what it is like to have an increase in heart rate. Likewise, 
activities such as meditation, fasting, extreme environmental 
circumstances, respiratory manoeuvres and sensory deprivation all have 
certain, although not necessarily the same, physical and biological effects. 
How these actively sought alterations of psychophysical functioning can 
be correlated to specific changes in brain chemistry and functioning 
remains to be mapped by natural science.313 What can be said is that 
certain effects on a neurobiological system are – on a scale from ‘likely to 
occur’ to ‘certain to occur’ – consequences of specific environmental 
conditions that can be voluntarily or involuntarily produced. How these 
                                                
313 Extensive research has been done on this area; see for instance the review of Vaitl et 
al. on the attempts to correlate different causal factors to changes in brain functioning. 
The authors also recognize the category of ‘disease’ among the listed causes of altered 
brain states. Disease (such as schizophrenia and epilepsy, but also brain tissue damage) 
as a specific cause of altered brain states is more complex to discuss in terms of 
‘mystical experience’ partly because they are generally not voluntarily induced and partly 
because they are intimately linked to severely impaired cognitive processes (Vaitl et al. 
2005, p. 114.)   
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brain states and the general physical condition of a person relate to 
phenomenally experienced reality is a much more complex issue which 
we turn to next. With respect to Katz’s extending the understanding of the 
field, it is very unlikely that the claim, “we can have different emotions 
produced by different circumstances”, has any explanatory value relative 
to this particular area of correlational research. It cannot, for example, 
help to determine whether the same circumstances ‘produce’ either the 
same or different emotions, or whether different circumstances ‘produce’ the 
same emotions. 
It is not our aim to contradict Katz’s assertion that “we can have 
different emotions produced by different circumstances”, but we have to 
ask what this means in the specific context of interpreting mystical 
experience. The correlation of certain brain states with conscious 
experience requires much more conceptual clarification than the 
correlation between environmental causes and various states of the brain. 
First of all, in order to determine a correlation between brain states and 
states of consciousness, the two cannot be identified with each other. We 
can view them as ‘aspects’ of one and the same ‘thing’, or consciousness 
as a ‘product’ of the brain, but, as Katz puts it, “the brainwave is not the 
same thing or equal to ecstasy or love or encounter or loss of self”.314 We 
do not experience ‘brainwave’ changes (or chemical imbalance, tissue 
damage, hypo- or hyper-synchronization, etc.), but rather heightened or 
lowered activity (as in epileptic fits or sleep states), loss of motor control, 
enhanced or lowered mood, and so on. Likewise, an individual report of 
some specific experience is not given in terms of ‘tissue damage’ or 
‘enhancement of serotonin levels’, but rather in terms of pain or 
pleasure.315 Yet even if brain is not ‘the same’ as consciousness (just as 
activities used to alter brain states are not equal to those brain states) 
there seem to be several correlational points between events or changes 
in brain structure and phenomenal events or changes in consciousness 
states.  
                                                
314 Katz 2000, quoted by Gregory in Gregory 2006, p. 33  
315 In order to discuss these issues without having to determine the exact relations 
between brain and consciousness, Veitl et al. express this difference in terms of ‘space’. 
B-space is their term for brain events, while C-space is used to designate consciousness 
events.  
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In medicine, mood alterations have been traced to such causes as altered 
hormonal constitution or neurotransmitter imbalance. This, of course, 
cuts both ways: if we desire an alteration of mood, this can be attained 
by chemical manipulation of our hormonal constitution or transmitter 
substance. Caution must characterize our conclusions, however, since 
the complexity of both CNS and phenomenal experience do not permit 
us to draw simplistic or rash conclusions in either direction. The 
conclusion that, for instance, mood elevation can be obtained by an 
increase of serotonin levels (through manipulation of neurochemistry) 
can be wrong in many ways. Introducing serotonin to a neural system 
may not provide the desired results, and the effects may be much more 
complex than elevation of mood. Serotonin enhancement may have 
phenomenally experienced effects other than mood enhancement or it 
may not enhance mood at all, but only eliminate the ‘depth’ or ‘intensity’ 
of the ‘mood’ or ‘emotional state’ (so that a ‘negative’ as well as a 
‘positive’ mood could be simply ‘unintensified’). This means that it is not 
possible to conclude, merely from the fact that serotonin levels have 
been raised (by whatever method), that the experiences of the individual 
undergoing this process are tinged with an elevated mood. Likewise, an 
elevated mood may not indicate that something is different in the 
serotonin level of an individual. This, however, is beside the point. The 
point is that when an experience is facilitated or caused in a specific way, 
there is no guarantee that the same specific method will cause a similar 
experience if applied again to a different person or even to the same 
person at a later point in time. How, then, do we go about finding out 
whether or not a mood has been elevated? Or more generally, how do 
we know what an experience is like, so that we can compare two 
experiences in terms of similarity and difference?      
William James may have altered his neural chemistry in ways he could 
not have imagined or conceptualised; yet, even if he had gained precise 
knowledge of the changes to his brain chemistry caused by the inhalation 
of nitrous oxide, this would not have given him any more information 
about the phenomenal character of the experience of inhaling nitrous 
oxide than he had already attained by actually inhaling it. This is not the 
place for an extended discussion regarding James’s view of how the 
method of inducing a certain state affects the actual experience of that 
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state, but Katz seems to imply that certain methods lead to certain types 
of experience: 
The fact is that mystical experience is not about having highs that are 
merely subjective. They’re not about having exalted experiences like drug 
experiences … Mystical experience is specifically a kind of experience 
which at its profoundest wants to put us in touch with ultimate realities, 
so that the Christian mystic doesn’t want to have a brain experience. The 
Christian mystic wants to have a love experience in the sense of meeting 
Christ or God as an Other … The Jewish mystic, the Sufi mystic, the 
Hindu mystic, all want to go outside themselves in the sense of making 
touch with something Other – whatever that other might be within the 
system. … But in all cases it has to be a connection to something outside 
ourselves. …mystical experience is a special kind of experience that is 
denied by an ontological circumstance. That is to say, the nature of 
mysticism is not what goes on inside you only, but it makes a claim to 
putting you into touch with ultimate realities. …there’s an ontological 
element, an element of a certain kind of metaphysical condition. That’s 
why, for example, I would insist that it’s very different than drug 
experiences…316 
‘Drug experiences’ are here depicted as a type of experience with certain 
features (like being ‘exalted’), while mystical experience cannot fit into 
this category since it aims to “put us in touch with ultimate realities” and 
“has to be a connection to something outside ourselves”. What confuses 
here is that Katz attempts to compare what, in his view, are two types of 
experiences, and yet appears to classify each according to a different set 
of criteria. The ‘drug experience’ is classified according to method of 
induction and characterized as ‘inner’ experience (“brain experience”), 
while the ‘mystical experience’ is characterized by its making the claim of 
“putting you in touch with ultimate realities”. This characterization of 
mystical experience appears to be based partly on what type of claim the 
experiencer makes and partly on the nature of the experience itself – i.e., 
on it being “a connection to something outside ourselves”. Does this 
mean that a person under the influence of a certain drug has no fair 
chance of having a genuine mystical experience because that experience 
is externally directed and drug experiences do not allow, or even prevent, 
authentic contact with a transcendent reality? This type of interpretation 
                                                
316 Katz in a response to Gregory, 2000, see in Gregory 2006, p. 34. 
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would exclude the possibility that the participants in a Native American 
peyote ceremony are able to reach ‘outside’ themselves and come in 
touch with ultimate reality “whatever that [reality] might be within the 
system”.317 What would Katz recommend that Native Americans do in 
order to contact the spirits of their ancestors or perform a ‘curative’ 
session (which is also directed ‘outwards’)? Not to ingest peyote before 
performing the ceremony? If this is indeed what Katz intends as an 
outcome of his perspective, it would appear that he has failed to show 
regard for the validity of Native American self-understanding. However, it is also 
possible that we have misunderstood Katz on this point, in which case 
he could help by clarifying his view of the relationship between what is 
the cause of something and what is the effect (i.e., the experience). 
Katz’s shedding more light upon these matters would also be helpful 
with respect to his expressed desire to extend the understanding of the field.  
We now come to the final correlational threshold: that of the relation 
between the actual experience and its report. This, as we have said, is a 
relation that Katz cannot analyse since he rejects the possibility of a 
distinction between experience and interpretation. For Katz, the report 
of an experience is a reflection of the experience, which in turn is a 
reflection of pre-experiential conditioning. This is because: 
Mystical experience(s) are the result of traversing the mystical way(s), 
whatever specific way one happens to follow, e.g. the Jewish, Sufi, or 
Buddhist. What one reads, learns, knows, intends, and experiences along 
the path creates to some degree (let us leave this somewhat vaguely stated 
as yet) the anticipated experience made manifest. That is to say, there is an 
intimate, even necessary connection between the mystical and religious 
text studied and assimilated, the mystical experience had, and the mystical 
experience reported. In each mystical tradition, as in each of the larger 
religious communities in which the mystical traditions inhere, there is an 
                                                
317 R.E. Schultes and A. Hoffman describe in “Tracks of the little deer” (1992) the 
variety in American Indian peyote-ceremonies (differences between tribes as well as 
within the tribes): “A member may hold a meeting in gratitude for the recovery of 
health, the safe return from a voyage, or the success of a Peyote pilgrimage: it may be 
held to celebrate the birth of a baby, to name a child, on the first four birthdays of a 
child, for doctoring, or even for general thanksgiving.”.  
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inherited theological-mystical education which is built upon certain agreed 
sources.318 
We have already mentioned that Katz considers language to be the sole 
facilitator of mystical experience: the language that the mystic inherits 
from his religious community.319 But here Katz seems to confirm once 
again that the method (the “way”) necessarily leads to a certain specific 
result. The nature of that specific result ultimately depends on what 
language the mystic has inherited (what texts he has read), and although 
Katz never specifies the “intimate, even necessary connection” that links 
the ‘way’ with the experience, and further with the report of the 
experience, it appears that they are practically indiscernible. The report 
of an experience mirrors the method applied, and both method and 
report reflect the nature of the experience.  
If we listen to the mystic’s reports, Katz argues, we can hear that their 
experiences are different in that they report experiences of different 
‘others’, of different ‘ontological conditions’.320 The Sufi reports 
experiencing Allah and the Christian reports experiencing God, so their 
experiences cannot be similar. To understand how Katz can determine 
which experiences are different from or similar to one another, we must 
again consider not only the ‘way’ (different ways in different religious 
traditions), but also the specific ontological conditions in terms of which 
the experiential report should be analysed. Katz’s realism demands that 
the reports of the mystics are taken as descriptions of the realities 
encountered. He rejects the perennial proposition that one and the same 
                                                
318 Katz 1983a, p. 6. 
319 In “Mystical speech and mystical meaning” (1992), Katz presents different functions 
of language. Language is “transformational” according to Katz (pp.5-15) since it 
transforms the mystic consciousness; it is “power” (pp. 20-24) as it “directly aids in 
mystical ascents to other worlds and realms of being” (p. 20); and, finally, it is 
“information” in that it informs the mystic on the nature of the experience had, i.e. 
“language, in a variant of William James’s attribution of a noetic quality to mystical 
states, operates informatively” (p.24). This is where Katz explains what ‘noetic’ element 
there is in mystical experience: “It is used to describe, however this term is qualified – 
and it is, of course regularly so qualified – that ‘knowledge’ that is gained in the mystical 
moment.” (p. 24). 
320 Compare this to the conclusion in chapter three that contrary to Gregory’s 
interpretation, Katz does populate reality with an “entire pantheon of metaphysical 
entities”. Gregory 2006, p. 271. 
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reality is encountered and that descriptions differ because of the 
different conceptualizations that different religious communities have of 
the same reality. In his view, since the ‘objects’ of mystical experiences 
partially determines those experiences, the experiences are ‘different’ 
from one another because their objects are different from one another. 
In attempting to understand the source of Katz’s certitude on this point, 
one is left with the conclusion that it must come either from the reports 
or from some other source. In terms of the former of these alternatives, 
it could be that because the relationship between the experience and its 
report is never problematized in Katz’s philosophy, he may conclude 
that since the reports seem to have different objects, and since these 
objects may very possibly be ‘real’ (in an “ontological condition” sense), 
they could reflect different ontological conditions as well. (It is unlikely 
that Katz believes the experiences of mystics to be different because they 
come from different religious traditions; such a position would exclude 
the type of realism Katz proposes, reducing his contextualism to mere 
constructivism – a label that he has consistently resisted.)321 We return to 
the problem of Katz’s realism in chapter five. Before that, however, we 
focus on another factor in Katz’s position that appears to contribute to 
his apparent view that the method, the experience and its report are in a 
one-to-one relationship.  
It is difficult to ascertain whether the state of the experiencer’s 
consciousness is of significance in Katz’s approach, or how he believes 
different states affect an experience independent of whether the content 
of experience is the same or different. If we relate this to Katz’s view 
that “language creates … the operative processes through which the 
epistemic channels that permit mystical forms of knowing or being”322 
and look to his note on this method (or ‘way’), we find that the 
alternative to language as a facilitator is the ultimate reality described by 
the mystic’s tradition. In other words, the alternative to the altering of 
consciousness so as to achieve the opening of epistemic channels would 
be to view 
                                                
321 Or, perhaps this is just another effect of the general problem Katz has in combining 
his realist position with the contextualist.   
322 Katz 1992a, p. 8. 
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…mystical experience as an act of God or the transcendent that requires 
no prior or technical preparation, and that explains the specialness of such 
experience by reference to the specialness of the object of such experience 
– for example Allah or Brahman.323  
In this view, it is Allah or Brahman (or Nirvana?) that ‘causes’ the 
mystical experience; in other words, the mystic’s consciousness either 
becomes transformed by God, etc., or it is not transformed at all, in 
which case he ‘knows’ his ‘object’ according to the epistemic channels of 
everyday experience. This explanation is perfectly all right (except, 
perhaps, in the case of the Buddhist and many Hindus): just as any 
causative factor might affect an experiencer, an interventionist God 
might also. But if this is Katz’s position, the question is how he can 
know that the experiences are different rather than similar, and on this 
basis plead for the recognition of difference. This brings us to a 
discussion about that ‘other source’ of certitude mentioned above. 
As we see it, there are two possible explanations for Katz’s rejection of 
the perennialist claim that mystics experience the same ontological 
condition but only dress it differently according to conceptual 
preconditions: either he ‘knows’ that the ontological conditions are 
different (i.e., Allah is a different ‘ontological condition’ than Brahman), 
in which case he would have to explain how he ‘knows’ this; or, he is led 
to draw unwarranted conclusions about ultimate reality by his conviction 
that experience and interpretation cannot be distinguished. The 
necessary impact of language on mystical experience ought to imply that 
the ‘reality’ encountered is in some way interpreted by the mystic – 
regardless of whether it is the same reality or different realities that ‘act’ 
to cause an experience in the mystic. If one adopts the position that the 
interpretation of an experienced ‘reality’ cannot be distinguished from 
the experience of that ‘reality’, then one has adopted a position from 
which it is impossible to determine whether the encountered realities are 
the same of different. If mystical experience is determined and created 
by the language of the mystic without the involvement of an ultimate 
reality (or if we merely do not know the degree to which ultimate reality 
is involved), then the ‘object’ of experience cannot be used as the means 
                                                
323 Katz 1992a, p. 35, n. 12 
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of differentiating between either the reports of mystical experiences or 
the experiences themselves. Nonetheless, it appears that this is precisely 
what Katz has attempted to do, resulting in a theory that is, in various 
ways, both confusing and difficult to comprehend.  
 
4.2. Facilitating techniques and Katz’s reactions 
Katz’s rejection of the perennialist perspective hints at how to 
understand some of the initially confusing elements of his approach. We 
have seen in the previous section that the different stages of correlation, 
from method to report, are not always taken into account when 
conclusions are drawn regarding the nature of the experience. We have 
also seen that both Stace and Katz draw conclusions about what a 
mystical experience is and how to categorize it from the experiencer’s 
report. The difference is that Stace, whom Katz criticises for assuming 
similarities in the experiences of mystics, concludes that if the 
descriptions of two experiences are indistinguishable – regardless of how 
they have been induced – then the experiences cannot be dissimilar. The 
main difference between the two analyses is that Stace and Katz have 
developed completely different criteria for categorizing reports of 
experience. While Stace focuses on the reported descriptions of the 
‘phenomenological’ (phenomenal in our terms) components of the 
experience in order to determine its nature, Katz focuses on the reports’ 
descriptions of the ‘object’ of experience instead. For purposes of this 
discussion, we set aside the problem that Katz’s notion of ‘object’ is 
difficult to understand, considering that it is simultaneously ‘real’ and 
constructed by conceptual pre-conditioning. Instead we focus on 
language as a facilitating technique for the achievement of states in which 
the ‘epistemic channels’ are changed into ‘mystical form’.   
It cannot be assumed that the state of a mystic’s consciousness remains 
unchanged during a mystical event and that the ‘epistemic channels’ are 
those of ordinary experience, not even in light of Katz’s alternative that 
the event has been caused by God with no prior ‘technical preparation’. 
Clearly an epistemological setting that differs from ordinary experience 
could have been caused either by God or by some other factor (perhaps 
unknown to the experiencer). While Katz seems to recognize that the 
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‘epistemic channels’ involved in mystical experience differ from those 
involved in ordinary experience, he nowhere clarifies what those 
differences are. All the indication we get is that language “operates 
informatively” and the ‘noetic’ quality of experience – “that ‘knowledge’ 
that is gained in the mystical moment”324 – is ‘language’. Of course, this 
description is applicable to ordinary sense experience as well, and thus 
we remain uninformed as to what difference might obtain between an 
ordinary ‘epistemic channel’ and one that is mystical. As such, it does not 
provide a valid means of distinguishing between ordinary and mystical 
states. Perennial accounts of the ‘epistemic channels’ involved in mystical 
experience sometimes revolve around the idea that the ‘epistemic 
channels’ of ordinary experience can be suspended or reduced and that 
mystical experience is thus relatively free from the ordinary ‘forms of 
knowing and being’. Before discussing Katz’s position concerning this 
view, we examine the validity of Katz’s main point of criticism against 
the perennialists: their failure to recognize the powerful impact of 
‘context’ on experience.    
Most perennial interpreters of mysticism do not assert that all facilitative 
methods lead to the exact same state of consciousness; rather they view 
the contextual surroundings of the experiencer as one aspect of the 
facilitative process. In Roland Fischer’s conclusions regarding the 
‘effects’ of chemical interaction, for instance, the role of the chemicals in 
inducing observed alterations seems minor in comparison with other, 
more contextual, factors:  
…set, setting, personality, expectations, and past experiences determine 
the cortical ‘effects’ of most psychoactive drugs when they are used in 
medically endorsed dosages. In fact, except for the anaesthetics and 
hypnotics, there are no drugs that selectively direct human cognitive 
(psychological, or, in our terms, cortical) functions.325 
And even before “Language, epistemology, and mysticism” was 
published in 1978, discussions regarding the relevance of ‘drugs’ for 
certain religious communities were in full bloom, with an emphasis not 
                                                
324 Katz 1992a, p. 24.  
325 Fischer 1971, p. 294. 
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only on states of consciousness, but on contextual features of 
experiencing as well. Thus in 1964 Joseph Havens wrote that: 
…the Abyss and the Unitive Consciousness are ‘knowings’ shaped by 
three factors: personality dynamics, cultural thought-forms, and the nature 
of Reality. To take a psychedelic visionary experience as direct and 
unmediated insight into cosmic Truth is, in the light of modern 
knowledge, inexcusably naïve. But to interpret the vision as simply 
psychopathology, or cultural conditioning, or some combination of these, 
is inexcusably reductive.326 
And in 1939 C. D. Broad wrote: 
Now I think it must be admitted that, if we compare and contrast the 
statements made by religious mystics of various times, races, and religions, 
we find a common nucleus combined with very great differences of detail. 
Of course the interpretations which they have put on their experiences are 
much more varied than the experiences themselves. It is obvious that the 
interpretations will depend in a large measure on the traditional religious 
beliefs in which various mystics have been brought up. I think that such 
traditions probably act in two different ways. 
(i) The tradition no doubt affects the theoretical interpretation of 
experiences which would have taken place even if the mystic had been 
brought up in a different tradition. A feeling of unity with the rest of the 
universe will be interpreted very differently by a Christian who has been 
brought up to believe in a personal God and by a Hindu mystic who has 
been trained in a quite different metaphysical tradition. 
(ii) The traditional beliefs on the other hand, probably determine many of 
the details of the experience itself. A Roman Catholic mystic may have 
visions of the Virgin and the saints, whilst a Protestant mystic certainly 
will not.  
Thus the relations between the experiences and the traditional beliefs are 
highly complex. Presumably the outlines of the belief are fixed for a 
certain place and period by the social peculiarities of the experiences had 
by the founder of a certain religion. These beliefs then become traditional 
in that religion. Thenceforth they in part determine the details of the 
experiences had by subsequent mystics of that religion, and still more do 
they determine the interpretations which these mystics will put upon their 
experiences. Therefore, when a set of religious beliefs have been 
                                                
326 Havens 1964, p 223 
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established, it no doubt tends to produce experiences which can plausibly 
be taken as evidence for it.”327   
In point (ii) Broad actually summarizes the quintessence of Katz’s 
contextual approach. Nonetheless, Broad’s view appears to be more in 
keeping with that of the perennialists since he initiates his discussion on 
contextual influences by assuming a ‘common core’ or “common 
nucleus” that is prevalent in “statements made by religious mystics of 
various times, races, and religions”. Broad also seems to recognize the 
difference between an experience and its interpretation, and also 
mentions the complexity of the relation between traditional beliefs and 
the experiences had. In point (i), he even goes so far as to claim that the 
experiences “would have taken place even if the mystic had been 
brought up in a different tradition”. In light of this, it appears that Katz’s 
criticisms regarding the methodological monism of perennialists and 
their failure to account for contextual influences on the mystic’s 
experience are not supported by actual theoretical accounts.  
In his account, Katz insists upon the necessary connection between the 
mystic’s religious context (language, expectations, etc.) and the mystic’s 
experience; in perennial models, on the other hand, the connection is not 
necessary at all. In the following quotation, Richard Havens illustrates 
how complex the issue is by noting that neither expectation nor pre-
experiential religious conditioning necessitates that one will have an 
actual experience of the expected:  
In some settings even religious persons fail to have transcendent 
experiences. Interest in or expectations of having them does not seem to 
induce them. On the other hand, in favourable setting, many subjects not 
religious in their interest or motivation find that transcendental or 
mystical terminology is the only one in which they can conceptualize what 
has happened to them. We simply do not yet understand what personality 
variables are significant in determining who, under what conditions, will 
experience a mystical state.328 
From the above discussion it appears that Katz’s interpretation of the 
perennialist approaches is mistaken in many respects, and since his 
                                                
327 Broad 1953 (1939), p. 193. On p. 194 there is also an analogy to sense-perception 
and how it is determined by beliefs.  
328 Havens 1964, p. 224. 
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contextualism has been largely constructed as a reaction to (this mistaken 
understanding of) the perennial approach, it is not surprising that certain 
of his passages are difficult to understand. His insistence that mystical 
experience is not ‘brain experience’ artificially separates differently 
facilitated experiences and this seems to confuse rather than assist the 
process of understanding, identifying and classifying mystical 
experiences.  
Katz’s recognition of the importance of context seems to have been 
already anticipated by certain perennialists, as can be seen from the 
quotation from Broad. The difference seems to be that while 
perennialists view the issue of context with a certain degree of sensitivity 
and a healthy dose of respect for its complexities, Katz does not. 
Moreover, the ‘perennialists’ seem to have developed a broader frame of 
interpretation that appears to be more ‘inclusive’ than Katz’s 
contextualism. In our view, if Katz merely accepted the distinction 
between experience and interpretation, the explanatory power of his 
approach would increase and also become more subtle: needed virtues of 
a perspective that attempts to combine both realism and contextualism in 
one approach. On the other hand, by denying this distinction he 
simultaneously denies perennial interpretations their explanatory value. 
 
4.2.1. Katz and deautomatization 
Where perennialists argue for ‘noetic’ quality in mystical experience, 
where they argue for a multiplicity of factors that, taken together in 
complex constellations, may facilitate certain states of experiencing that 
have similar (reported) phenomenal characteristics, Katz replaces these 
factors with ‘language’. Language, Katz argues in “Mystical speech, 
mystical meaning” (1992), is capable of transforming consciousness into 
mystic ways of knowing and being. By this, Katz rejects the perennial 
interpretation that mystics somehow experience reality in non-linguistic 
ways, that they somehow undo their conceptual preconditioning and 
have what may be called ‘pure’ experiences. One explanation for this type 
phenomenon is what Arthur Deikman calls ‘deautomatization’: the 
process of undoing the automatic responses to our surroundings 
(including conceptual ‘responses’) through meditation, drugs and other 
means that may have a ‘deconditioning’ effect.329 Without directly 
                                                
329 See for instance Arthur J. Deikman:”Deautomatization and the mystic experience”, 
first published in Psychiatry, Vol. 29, 1966 (pp. 324-38). Deikman claims, with respect to 
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referring to Deikman, Katz strongly rejects the notion that something 
like deautomatization is taking place when mystics use various methods 
to induce alternative forms of consciousness:    
For it is in appearance only that such activities as yoga produce the 
desired state of ‘pure’ consciousness. Properly understood, yoga, for 
example, is not an unconditioning or deconditioning of consciousness, but 
rather a reconditioning of consciousness, i.e. a substituting of one form of 
conditioned and/or contextual consciousness for another …330 
By concluding that what yoga practitioners regard as the ‘deconditioning’ 
of consciousness is really its ‘reconditioning’ instead, Katz seems to 
imply that these practitioners do not really understand what they are 
doing and/or talking about. And one might well ask how Katz has 
attained a more profound insight than yoga practitioners regarding what 
they experience. This line of argument also appears to exhibit a lack of 
regard for the validity of self-understanding.  
Apart from the issue of self-understanding, let us attempt to 
comprehend what Katz is driving at in the above quotation. It is not 
hard to understand his view of ‘deconditioning’ as a rejection of the 
possibility of gradually reducing the (automatic inset of) our interpretive 
pattern and a conviction that the results of yoga merely involve the 
supplanting of one interpretive pattern (read, ‘language’) with another. 
Thus Katz believes that rather than transcending the confines of 
‘language’, the practitioner (regardless of technique) is limited to only 
replacing one language with another. This brings to mind our example of 
the anthropologist in section 1.2.5. who, wishing to ‘go native’, confronts 
a similar problem. It also bears upon our discussion concerning the 
possibility of the phenomenological reduction.  
If the notion of ‘deconditioning’ is understood in this way, we must ask 
what ‘reconditioning’ is – i.e., how does this substitution of one 
contextual consciousness for another take place and what happens to the 
‘old’ contextual consciousness after it has been replaced by the ‘new’ 
                                                                                                              
the facilitative aspects of mystical experience, that they are also culturally conditioned 
(e.g. practices of ‘renunciation’ like fasting, poverty, isolation and the giving up of 
worldly pleasures), though the psychobiological effects give rise to similar 
characteristics in phenomenal experience. 
330 Katz 1978a, p. 57. 
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one? Whether or not ‘deconditioning’ eventually leads to ‘pure 
consciousness’ is not necessarily the point (we can never know whether it 
has occurred, who did it, nor what it felt like when actualized). If Katz 
claims that deconditioning involves the replacement of one interpretive 
pattern with another, then this can mean either of two things: either the 
‘old’ interpretive pattern is irreducible, in which case it is not replaced at 
all, but only complemented by the other; or, the ‘old’ interpretive pattern 
can be eliminated, in which case the deconditioning of consciousness 
should be hypothetically possible, with the reservation that after the 
deconditioning the experience is not necessarily unconditioned.  
Katz’s insistence on the impossibility of deconditioning thus leads back 
to the question of precisely how the so-called reconditioning of 
consciousness is thought to occur – i.e., how the process of substituting 
one interpretive pattern for another takes place. If Katz means to say 
that the ‘old’ interpretive pattern is not gone but complements the ‘new’ 
one, what effect does the old interpretive pattern have on the new one? 
If, on the other hand, he means to say that the ‘old’ interpretive pattern 
has been replaced by the ‘new’ one, he would at least have to admit that 
it is possible for an interpretive pattern to be eliminated. And if it is 
possible to eliminate an interpretive pattern in the process of replacing it 
with another interpretive pattern, why should it not be possible to simply 
eliminate it without replacing it at all? 
Since Katz does away with one type of explanation by rejecting the 
possibility of deconditioning, it would be good if he were to replace it 
with another. And if ‘reconditioning’ is proffered as that explanation, it 
would be good if Katz were to specify the characteristics of the 
reconditioned “form of conditioned/contextual consciousness” that 
makes it different from the ordinary conditioned form. In addition, we 
must ask what it is about the ‘specific-ness’ of the replacement 
interpretive pattern that makes the mystic’s experience specifically 
mystical. In other words, what is it about the ‘other’ or the ‘new’ “form 
of conditioned/contextual consciousness” that makes it a typically 
mystical form of consciousness? 
In response to this latter question, Katz might answer, ‘religious 
language’: the mystic receives training in the religious tradition through 
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the religious community and thus experiences reality through the 
language that has transformed her consciousness and informs her as to 
what has been experienced; in other words, the specific religious 
literature of each religious tradition makes possible an experience of 
transcendent realities (‘language as power’),331 thereby informing the 
mystic as to what has been experienced.332 With all this weight being 
placed on language in Katz’s account, another question naturally arises: 
how is ‘language’ acquired? What is it that the mystic must do in order to 
interpret and understand the more profound meanings in religious texts 
so as to be able to experience accordingly? How can we be sure that the 
mystic’s interpretation of the text is in line with our own, so that if we 
have a proper understanding of the text we also have a proper 
understanding of the experience? Whether, in the process of yoga, one 
interpretive pattern is either complemented or eliminated by another, any 
interpretive pattern must somehow be acquired; and if the interpretive 
patterns of persons (or the common use of ‘language’ in a given 
community) is not ‘given’, some process of acquisition must take place. 
What is it that happens during the practice of yoga that makes the 
practitioner’s interpretive pattern (or ‘language’ or ‘conditioning’) different 
from the interpretive pattern he had before practicing yoga? The fact 
that Katz makes no comment on this process could indicate that he 
considers the language to be ‘given’ and in no need of interpretation. 
This possibility will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Katz never discusses his own interpretive pattern, and what role it may 
or may not play in his interpretation of mystical reports. Because he has 
not ventured to make his own conditioned/contextual perspective 
explicit, the metaphysical presuppositions he brings to the task of 
interpretation could potentially interfere with his capacity to do full 
justice to the mystical experience reports he reviews. 
                                                
331 Katz 1992a, p. 20: “Language as power is one of the elemental employments of 
language in mystical traditions. […] In this context, words have locomotive power. 
They transport the spiritual self from the world below in the world above.”  
332 Katz 1992a, p. 24: “In addition to the transformative, magical, and theurgical tasks 
language regulatively performs in the world’s mystical traditions, language, in a variant 
of William James’s attribution of a noetic quality to mystical states, operates 
informatively.” 
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4.3. Conclusions and summary 
Our primary aim in this chapter has been to evaluate whether Katz’s 
theory can extend the understanding of the field. To this end, we have looked 
at the current attempts of various disciplines to enhance the 
understanding of mystical phenomena and have found them to be largely 
based on the perennial characteristics of mystical experience. 
Correlational approaches seek to investigate relations between 
consciousness states that are induced in certain ways, and also to find 
similarities between phenomenal qualities in experience and given 
neurobiological states. To address similarities in phenomenal qualities of 
experience, it is of course necessary to interpret the reports of subjects 
undergoing various types of physical changes. The interpretation of these 
reports is the main issue of controversy between Katz and the 
perennialists. Because Katz’s theory points us towards the linguistic 
features in these reports as well as the ‘external’ references to the 
expressions used, it bars many possibilities of interpreting mystical 
experiences in ways that show regard for the validity of self-understanding. Katz’s 
aim to extend the understanding of the field is also threatened by his rejection 
of the phenomenal characteristics of experience, since without the 
characteristics mentioned on the perennial lists the correlational 
approaches would lack the correlative point that potentially gives 
meaning to the results achieved in differentiating neurobiological states. 
This would amount to a regress rather than an extension of understanding. 
Concerning the possibility of deautomatizing interpretive patterns, 
Katz’s position appears to imply that this is not possible. The claim that 
yoga is a reconditioning rather than a deconditioning of consciousness 
appears to indicate a lack of regard for the validity of self-understanding, since 
yoga practitioners do indeed claim that they are able to decondition their 
consciousness. If interpreted as a claim that an old interpretive pattern is 
replaced by a new one, Katz’s theory appears self-contradictory because 
on the one hand it implies that language is ‘given’ to mystics and those 
that interpret mystical experience reports, and on the other hand it 
denies the possibility of uninterpreted ‘givenness’.  
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Chapter 5 
The outcome of mystical experience 
 
 
 
Introduction to chapter five 
 
…the man who comes back through the Door in the Wall will never be quite the same 
as the man who went out. He will be wiser but less cocksure, happier but less self-
satisfied, humbler in acknowledging his ignorance yet better equipped to understand 
the relationship of words to things, of systematic reasoning to the unfathomable 
Mystery which it tries, forever vainly, to comprehend. 
Aldous Huxley 
 
On the positive side, mystical experiences are regarded as having been 
beneficial relative to both the individual and the greater institutions of 
religion. Psychologists and sociologists of religion have investigated the 
positive influences of mystical experience in terms of their helping to 
‘cope’ with crises or long term stress and enabling ‘personal 
transformation’, ‘creativity’, and innovative contributions to scientific, 
philosophical and religious systems.333 And perennial philosophers have 
emphasised the moral and cognitive awakenings of religious giants such 
as Siddhartha, Moses, Saint Augustine and others – a moral awakening 
that, in turn, has had a positive cultural and religious impact on their 
societies. Robert Forman, for one, claims to have achieved a permanent 
                                                
333 See for instance Batson/Schoenrade/Ventis 1993: “A given religious experience may 
allow the individual to deal more positively and effectively with a wider range of 
experiences and people.” (p. 107)   
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dualistic mystical state as a result of the post-experiential (post-PCE) 
integration of mystical consciousness into everyday life.  
On the negative side, mystical experiences have been considered 
responsible for heresies in religious systems, antinomic and revolutionary 
thinking in socio-political systems, and pathological states of mind in 
individuals. Katz views such negative interpretations as the “incorrect 
construal” of ‘amorality’, which is 
…yet another distorted and distorting manifestation of the still more 
universal misapprehension that mystics are arch-individualists, ‘Lone 
Rangers’ of the spirit, whose sole intention is to escape the religious 
environments that spawned them in order to find personal liberation or 
salvation. Accordingly mystics are portrayed as rebels and heretics, 
antinomians and spiritual revolutionaries if not also underminers of 
existing social and religious structures.334 
Negative interpretations of mystical experiences are sometimes based on 
a particular view of the method used for their facilitation, sometimes on 
the phenomenal characteristics of a particular experience, and sometimes 
on accounts that emphasise the experience’s negative effects. The extent 
to which valid correlations can be made between a particular type of 
experience and its outcome is limited, and the reports and behaviour of 
the experiencers should play a large part in how these experiential events 
are interpreted and understood. A positively interpreted experience need 
not result in a positively interpreted outcome; and a negatively 
interpreted qualitative experience need not lead to a negatively 
interpreted outcome. Likewise, a religious experience need not lead to a 
religious life-style and a psychotic experience need not lead to a 
schizophrenic or ‘psychotic’ lifestyle. Of course, the classification of a 
specific experience in the terms mentioned above largely influences the 
type of interpretation it receives as far as facilitation and outcome are 
concerned. This role, however, is not a determinant one, as there are 
other important influences that may lead from the mystical experience to 
different outcomes.  
The social and religious context of the mystic clearly plays a major role in 
the process of differentiating between types of experiences and reports, 
                                                
334 Katz 1992b, p. 253. 
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as does the doctrinal context in which the reports appear (whether they 
are religious, psychological, political or socio-economic). And, as 
discussed in chapters three and four, Katz argues for the primary 
importance of contextual and doctrinal contributions in terms of both 
classifying the experience and understanding its causal factors. Katz’s 
emphasis on context and doctrine does not change when it comes to 
classifying the outcome of mystical experience, resulting in the view that 
mysticism is conservative with regard to doctrinal content. This chapter 
consists of an evaluation of this point of view and the extent to which it 
may or may not contribute to the interpretation of mystical experience 
and mystical experience reports.  
In chapter four we examined the question of the relationship between 
pre-experiential beliefs (context of facilitation) and the given experience, 
and attempted to challenge Katz’s view that it is a one-to-one relation. In 
this chapter we examine Katz’s views on the relationship between 
experience and post-experiential outcomes in terms of both first- and 
second-hand experience reports. And here again Katz’s realism has 
major implications with regard to how his interpretation of mystical 
reports should be understood. The theoretical inconsistency involved in 
the apparent combining of contextualism and realism makes it difficult 
to comprehend Katz’s understanding of the cognitive aspect in mystical 
experience. Since Katz rejects the criticism that his theory amounts to a 
case of non-cognitivism, we aim to investigate this claim further by 
looking at Katz’s account of the outcome of mystical experience. 
 
5.1. Mystical Knowledge 
Both mystics and perennial interpreters of mystical experience claim that 
there is a ‘noetic’ quality to mystical experience, and that this noetic 
quality is responsible for the dramatic changes in the lives of those who 
experience them, potentially leading to social, moral and religious 
reform. Renowned religious figures such as Jesus, Mohammad and 
Siddhartha have managed to transform already existing religious 
structures, and if these individuals are classified as mystics this would 
appear to contradict Katz’s claim that mysticism is a conservative 
phenomenon. Although Katz’s realism has been discussed several times 
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above, as yet there has been no clear indication regarding what he 
believes mystics know about reality.  Thus far, Katz has emphasised that 
mystics are 
…fully situated in the ontological theological and social contexts of their 
traditions. Essentially, they share the Weltanschauung of their inherited 
circumstance and seek to realise, experience, the ‘solutions’ proposed by 
their tradition.335 
From this it appears that Katz believes that mystics experience what is 
suggested to them by a given religious context – i.e., the text shapes the 
experience and the experience is mirrored in the report. Since Katz 
seems to hold that there is a one-to-one relationship between an 
experience and its report, this can only mean that the mystic’s report is a 
reflection of the ‘Weltanschauung’ of his inherited circumstance. If the 
report is ‘cognitive’ in the sense that mystics are informed by the same 
‘language’ about what they actually experience on the one hand and what 
they have experienced on the other, it would seem that ‘reality’ has no 
place in this process and Katz’s constructivism is exposed. However, 
since Katz claims possible realism for any of the reports that mystics 
provide (which when combined with his ‘cognitivity’ amounts to a type 
of cognitive realism), how are we to we understand the following: 
…no veridical propositions can be generated on the basis of mystical 
experience. As a consequence it appears certain that mystical experience is 
not and logically cannot be the grounds for any final assertions about the 
nature or truth of any religious or philosophical position nor, more 
particularly, for any specific dogmatic or theological belief. Whatever 
validity mystical experience has, it does not translate itself into ‘reasons’ 
which can be taken as evidence for a given religious proposition. Thus, in 
the final analysis, mystical or more generally religious experience is 
irrelevant in establishing the truth or falsity of religion in general or any 
specific religion in particular.336  
If the experiences of mystics are interpreted as constructed from the 
‘Weltanshauung’ of the mystic, while ‘language’ is the ‘noetic’ (cognitive) 
aspect of (and vehicle for) the experience,337 the outcome, which is 
                                                
335 Katz 1992b, p. 253. 
336 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
337 Katz 1992a, p. 24. 
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expressed in the same ‘language’, must be an expression of the religion 
or philosophy that has formed the experience. In this way, we can 
interpret Katz as saying that mystical experience does not function as a 
guarantee that religions and philosophical systems are true. This, in turn, 
could mean either that (a) religious and philosophical systems cannot be 
verified by experience because nothing really verifies them, or (b) that 
experience of the ‘contents’ in philosophical and religious systems 
cannot verify their ‘truth or falsity’ because experience (in general) is not 
verificational. Both these possible interpretations will be examined in 
what follows. 
A number of authors on religious experience have argued that if we 
consider ordinary experience foundational for belief, then we should 
consider mystical experience foundational as well. C. D. Broad, for 
example, argues this in “Arguments for the existence of God”; and 
William P. Alston affirms in several works that both ordinary and 
mystical experiences are to be perceived as justificational for religious 
beliefs. Richard Swinburne concludes that “one who has had a religious 
experience apparently of God has, by the Principle of Credulity, good 
reason for believing that there is a God”338 and that “religious perceptual 
claims deserve to be taken as seriously as perceptual claims of any other 
kind”.339 Katz has not specified the nature of the relationship between 
mystical and ordinary experience,340 but, in any case, it seems that his aim 
is to set standards for mystical and not ordinary experience.  
As far as the ‘realism’ in Katz’s philosophy is concerned, we saw in 
chapters three and four that he rejects ‘subjectivism’, which is the main 
reason that he distances himself from phenomenology, understood as a 
philosophy concerned with ‘subjective’ truths.341 Katz also claims that 
                                                
338 Swinburne 1979, p. 275. 
339 Swinburne 1979, p. 276. 
340 See A2 in section 2.2.: “…we need to recognize that mystical experience is not 
exactly like ‘experience in general.’  But it is not altogether different either.” This, 
unfortunately, does not explain how they are different or in what way they are similar.  
341 According to Katz, phenomenologists think they arrive at objective truths because 
they believe they obtain insight into metaphysical truth by intuiting the ‘given’. In his 
view, they are mistaken on this point, and all they achieve in actuality is merely 
subjective impressions. 
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the world cannot be a creation of the mind, a subjective world in which 
‘appearances’ are of ‘appearances’, this time with reference to 
Kantianism: 
Kantianism, the dominant philosophical spirit of the last two centuries, is 
in any form, and let me assert this as clearly as I can, incompatible with a 
viable Jewish philosophical outlook. … If the self creates the world it 
inhabits, then the only result can be an unacceptable subjectivism, a 
knowing only of ‘appearances’ or the ‘appearances’ of ‘appearances’.342 
This is not the place to initiate a discussion on whether or not Kant 
considered “that the self creates the world it inhabits” (although, at least 
at a first glance, it seems to be an incorrect interpretation of Kant). What 
Katz seems to say here, however, is that reality is not constructed, so if 
experience in general is affirmative or negative in relation to 
propositional truth, the above denial that mystical experience cannot ‘be 
translated into reasons’ must be read as a delimitation of mystical 
experience – i.e., that the epistemological considerations concern mystical 
experience and not experience in general. If it is a polemical assertion 
that mystics cannot validate religious truths, we must ask why? The 
above mentioned authors, among others, have invested considerable 
intellectual effort to establish that there is no reason to exclude that 
mystical or religious experiences can justify beliefs to the same extent 
that ordinary experience can. If Katz’s aim is to contradict this thesis, he 
needs to offer a firm argument showing why mystical experience does 
not have the same justificational capacities as any other experience. The 
fact that this argument is missing in Katz’s writings necessitates an 
investigation of the epistemological processes that prevent mystical 
experience from being ‘cognitive’, in the sense that I have interpreted 
this term. In our email exchange, Katz pointed out that I had 
“misinterpreted [his] view that mystical experience cannot be ‘translated 
                                                
342 Katz quoted by Gregory 2006, p. 73. Gregory explains: “… Kantianism in all its 
forms must be firmly rejected in the task of metaphysics and a realist ontology take its 
place. The empirical and historical, in other words, need to be thought of as 
fundamentally real. Kant’s basic outlook that space and time are subjective in nature and 
that the objects of human knowledge are mere appearances of the real is, in Katz’s 
view, ‘a disaster’.” Unfortunately this seems to show that Katz has not properly 
understood Kant’s position and misses the distinction between epistemology and 
metaphysics.   
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into reasons’ as meaning they are non-cognitive”.343 Accepting Katz’s 
self-understanding here, this is one mistake we do not wish to repeat. 
Nonetheless we must question what it is about mystical experience in 
particular – what type of cognitivity, what novel feature – that prevents 
mystics from expressing truths that either affirm or contradict their 
religious context. To avoid misunderstanding the meaning that Katz 
ascribes to the terms ‘veridical proposition’, ‘reasons’ and ‘truth or falsity 
of religion’, we once again quote (in a more complete form) Katz’s 
answer as to why the inability of mystical experiences to validate religious 
truths does not exclude them from being cognitive:  
No - you have misinterpreted my view that mystical experience cannot be 
"translated into reasons" as meaning they are non-cognitive. The cognitive 
nature of these claims is not the issue - one can have cognitive claims that 
are not verifiable and thus cannot serve as decisive proof of an argument.  
Cognitivity and verifiability, etc., are concepts that must be distinguished. 
You conflate them incorrectly.344 
Point well taken: ‘verifiability’ and ‘cognitivity’ are not the same – a very 
sound position that I also accept. The fact that the truth-value of a 
sentence cannot be determined does not mean that the sentence lacks 
truth conditions (meaning). The truth conditions of a sentence generated 
by mystical experience, then, are the cognitive elements of that 
experience. “Reasons”, then, does not mean truth-conditions but rather 
truth values. If we go even further and analyse this in terms of 
‘cognitivity’ and ‘knowledge’, it must mean that mystical experiences are 
cognitive, but that the propositions generated by such experiences are 
not to be classified as ‘knowledge’; that is, they are not useful as 
‘evidence’ of the truth or falsity (in a realistic, metaphysical sense, I 
assume) of any religious or philosophical system of beliefs, because these 
propositions cannot be verified.  
                                                
343 Chapter 2. Section 2.2, Answer A13 
344 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2, Answer A12 . The question was: “A final question that 
has puzzled me is whether you consider that mystical experiences are cognitive or not. 
That the mystical experience can not be “translated into reasons” I have interpreted as 
“mystical experiences are non-cognitive”. Some of your interpreters claim this is not so. 
Do you consider the mystical experiences cognitive or cognition-generating? 
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Now that we have a possible explanation of what Katz might mean 
when claiming that mystical experience is cognitive though not 
translatable into reasons, two new concerns arise: 1) Katz’s rejection of 
the ‘positivist-like’ interpretations of mystical experience, and 2) Katz’s 
use of the mystical reports as ‘evidence’ that his position is correct. We 
start with Katz’s distancing himself from “positivist-like rejections of 
[mystical] experience as ‘nonsense’”.345  
The interpretation just described does not allow us to interpret Katz as a 
positivist: if mystical experience is cognitive and can generate truth 
conditional propositions, it cannot reasonably be ‘nonsensical’ but rather 
meaningful. However, Katz leans more towards a positivist position than 
any other epistemological position that can be held, and this is because 
of his insistence upon the verifiability of mystical claims as a criterion for 
‘knowledge’. Epistemological discussions generally take their starting 
point in a notion of knowledge as true, justified belief. At first glance, this 
may seem to be a simple way of considering whether or not something is 
knowledge: the proposition ‘God is merciful’ is true if it is a correct 
ontological description (a description of an “ontological state of affairs” 
that Katz claims is a possibility); it is also a piece of knowledge if, for 
instance, Mystic Mary believes this to be true and is additionally justified in 
believing so. A ‘belief’ then, is truth conditional and, as such, cognitive 
and meaningful. However, if it lacks justification and/or is not true, it 
cannot be called ‘knowledge’. This, I assume, is how Katz wants us to 
understand his proposition that “mystical experience cannot be 
translated into reasons”.346  
As already mentioned, epistemologists like Alston, Broad and Swinburne 
consider experience to justify beliefs, so that if Mary has an experience of 
                                                
345 Katz 1978a, p. 3. 
346 See for instance Edmund Gettier’s discussion “Is justified true belief knowledge?” in 
Paul K. Moser’s (ed.): Empirical Knowledge Readings in contemporary epistemology, Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 1996). Gettier argues that the criteria are insufficient. 
Whether the fulfilment of all of these conditions is either necessary or sufficient in 
order to call a given proposition ‘knowledge’ is a constant point of controversy in 
epistemological debates. However, it is best to keep it simple here. Thus I leave for 
some other occasion a discussion regarding the necessity and/or sufficiency of ‘true, 
justified belief’ as criteria for knowledge. 
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God’s being merciful, then she is justified in believing that ‘God is 
merciful’. It is difficult to tell from the quotation above whether Katz 
considers experience to be a proper justificational basis for a certain 
religious or philosophical belief. The sentence, “Whatever validity mystical 
experience has, it does not translate itself into ‘reasons’ which can be 
taken as evidence for a given religious proposition”347 can be interpreted 
as a rejection of the evidential value of experience, though this 
interpretation may not so much depend on what meaning we ascribe to 
‘reasons’, but rather on what we mean by ‘evidence’ and who the 
‘evidence’ is for. Under ordinary circumstances we would take an 
experience of sunshine as ‘evidence’ that the sentence “The sun is 
shining” is true, and we would believe that we are justified in doing so. If 
we add to this Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity,348 we find that there 
are good reasons to think that a persons experience of sunshine would 
justify her belief that the sentence “The sun is shining” is true, and 
perhaps also consider her utterance to be ‘evidential’ for our belief that 
“the sun is shining” – unless we have reasons to believe that the person 
reporting the experience has some reason to lie or is perceptually 
distorted or incapacitated.  
Since it is unlikely that Katz believes mystics to be either hallucinating or 
lying, we can proceed by replacing ‘reasons’ with ‘verifiable propositions’ 
in the sentence, “Whatever validity mystical experience has, it does not 
translate itself into ‘reasons’ which can be taken as evidence for a given 
religious proposition.” If only verifiable propositions can be taken as 
evidence for a given religious proposition, experience becomes altogether 
irrelevant (which confirms the interpretation that experience cannot 
justify beliefs). Here we must leave the matter more or less unresolved, 
since it is difficult to imagine a single case of ‘verifying’ anything that 
does not involve ‘experience’. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Katz seems to require ‘verification’ as a 
criterion for ‘knowledge’ causes his theory to veer more to the positivist 
side. If, as Katz claims, “one can have cognitive claims that are not 
                                                
347 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
348 Swinburne 1979, p. 254. 
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verifiable”,349 it should also be possible to make truth claims that are not 
verifiable. According to classical epistemological criteria, a justified belief 
is ‘knowledge’ if it is also true (i.e., if it corresponds to some ‘ontological 
condition’ in terms of a realist correspondence theory of truth). Katz, on 
the other hand, seems to require that a belief should be ‘verified’ in order 
to “serve as decisive proof of an argument”.350   
However, the problem of verification is more fundamental than that. 
What does it mean to say that a ‘proposition’ can be verified? In Katz’s 
usage, verification is explained in this way: 
There are major, perhaps insuperable, problems involved in the issue of 
trying to verify mystical claims, if by verification we mean the strong 
thesis that independent grounds for the claimed event/experience can be 
publicly demonstrated. Indeed, it seems to me, though I will not try to justify 
this position here, that it is not possible to provide ‘verification’ of this 
sort.351 
Whatever ‘independent grounds’ may mean in this statement, it is clearly 
not possible to publicly demonstrate that a claimed event/experience has 
factually occurred, and there are various reasons why. Although this is 
not the place for the presentation of exhaustive arguments and examples 
in this connection, two general problems bear mentioning.  
First, verification, in the few cases where it is possible, occurs when a 
person, independent of the method used, verifies by having an experience 
upon which a claim is based. This takes place not by ‘public 
demonstration’, but rather through instruments of measurement used 
together with logical deductions whereby one concludes from observing 
an ‘effect’ that the ‘cause’ is highly likely to have occurred. 352 This brings 
us back to the question of why mystical experiences should be 
considered non-‘verificational’ – i.e., why a mystical experience cannot 
                                                
349 See Chapter 2. Section 2.2, Answer A12. 
350 See Chapter 2. Section 2.2, Answer A12. 
351 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
352 Ian Hacking’s Representing and intervening – introductory topics in the philosophy of natural 
science (1983) serves as background material here. In it he defines scientific natural 
realism as follows: “We shall count as real what we can use to intervene in the world to 
affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us” (p. 146.).  
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be an instance of ‘verification’ of some claimed ‘truth’, religious, 
philosophical or any other?  
Second, one must question what this has to do with mystical experience 
in particular. Even if it is true that mystical experiences cannot be 
verified, non-verifiability does not seem to be a delimitating feature of 
only these types of experiences; thus the specific claim that mystical 
experience cannot be verified seems without purpose. That is, of course, 
unless Katz means to say that the characteristic of non-verifiability only 
pertains to mystical, as opposed to ordinary, experience. In such case, 
however, he would then have to explain how ordinary experience claims 
are to be verified and why these verificational procedures do not apply to 
specifically mystical experiences. He would have to explain, in other 
words, the specific characteristics that make mystical experiences different 
from ordinary experiences in this respect.353 
Without further information or clarification regarding the problems 
depicted above, it is difficult to make sense of Katz’s assertion that a 
mystical experience must be verifiable in order for it to be viewed as 
“grounds for any final assertions about the nature or truth of any 
religious or philosophical position.”354 We now turn to another puzzling 
component in Katz’s argumentation. 
The claim that propositions gleaned from mystical experiences cannot 
serve as grounds for assertions about the truth of any religious or 
philosophical position appears at the beginning of “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism”. Indeed it is the claim that inaugurates 
Katz’s proposal for a contextual, as opposed to a perennial, 
                                                
353 Since Katz insists on rejecting ‘subjectivism’ (‘appearances’ of ‘appearances’ of 
‘appearances’) and holds that mystical experience should be analysed as a “distinctive 
ontological condition” (Katz in interview with Haberman 1994, quoted from Gregory 
2006, p. 208), we are reluctant to interpret the emphasis on non-verifiability as a claim 
that mystical experience is ‘subjective’ by nature (and in contrast to ordinary 
experience), and therefore unverifiable.  If Katz means to say that the mystical claims 
refer to ‘ontological conditions’ in other ‘realms’ or ‘ultimate realities’, it still does not 
explain why the mystical experience cannot be a confirmation (or ‘verification’) of the 
‘truths’ expressed with reference to those ultimate realities.   
354 Katz 1978a, p. 22. 
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interpretation of mystical experience. The final touch in “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism” is the claim that    
…our position is able to accommodate all the evidence which is 
accounted for by non-pluralistic accounts without being reductionistic, i. 
e. it is able to do more justice to the specificity of the evidence and its 
inherent distinctions and disjuctions than can the alternative approaches. 
That is to say, our account neither (a) overlooks any evidence, nor (b) has 
any need to simplify the available evidence to make it fit into comparative 
or comparable categories, nor (c) does it begin with a priori assumptions 
about the nature of ultimate reality.355 
The apparent ‘evidence’ that Katz refers to in these concluding words – 
the ‘evidence’ that he has presented throughout “Language, 
epistemology and mysticism” in support of his contextualist approach –
consists of a relatively small number of reports that he considers as 
indicative of mystical experiences. This manner of confirming 
contextualism does not change in Katz’s later writings. In “The 
conservative character of mystical experience” (1983), for example, Katz 
notes:  
…enough evidence and analysis has been introduced at least to throw 
suspicion on those approaches to mystical experience which treat these 
experiences in non-contextual ways.356 
Katz’s position can be viewed as a philosophical one that asserts certain 
‘truths’. For example, Katz asserts that the contextual approach to the 
interpretation of mystical experience is more accurate, more useful, more 
true to the phenomenon under study than other types of approaches. 
This is all well and good. However, can his selection of mystical 
experience reports (the ‘evidence’ he refers to) serve as a basis for final 
assertions on the ‘truths’ of his philosophical position? This question is 
quite independent of the question of whether or not the propositions 
generated from mystical experiences can be verified. And if Katz’s 
contextual approach is to have any genuine content, either mystical 
experience reports can generate propositions that can serve as ‘evidence’ 
for the efficacy of that approach (which, however, contradicts the 
proposition that began his analysis), or mystical experience reports cannot 
                                                
355 Katz 1978a, p. 66. 
356 Katz 1983a, p. 51. 
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generate propositions that can serve as ‘evidence’ for the efficacy of that 
approach (in which case Katz’s analysis fails to prove or explain anything 
because it is based on unverifiable propositions).  
The final section of this chapter examines other possible outcomes of 
mystical experiences that are related to the ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognitivity’ 
aspects of mystical claims. In this regard, the claim is frequently made by 
mystics and perennial interpreters that the ‘knowledge’ acquired  through 
mystical experience is associated with a certain ‘radicality’ or ‘novelty’, by 
which they mean that it is not merely a confirmation or repetition of 
previously held beliefs, doctrinal understandings and/or traditional 
views, but something religiously new and original. Such ‘additions’ hold 
the possibility of being either confirming of or contradictory to 
traditional beliefs; in the latter case, this can lead to allegations of heresy. 
On a less grandiose scale, there are also strong, if not necessary, 
indications that one who has a mystical experience undergoes some form 
of personal transformation in which her moral consciousness and 
behaviour is positively changed. The ‘new’ cognitive content of the 
mystical consciousness is said to be responsible for this positive change; 
it is also seen as a factor that distinguishes genuine mystical experiences 
from other forms of altered consciousness – e.g., pathologically induced 
experiences like psychoses.357 Katz throws new light on these views by 
claiming that mystical experience conserves traditional religious beliefs, 
and that in the end ‘visions’ and ‘auditions’ cannot be trusted. We now 
examine both perspectives on these intriguing possible outcomes of 
mystical experience. 
 
5.2. Moral awakenings 
Clearly the ‘religious radicalism’ of mystics has been highly emphasised 
in the accounts of perennial philosophers; and mystics have been 
frequently depicted as those who may yet save the world from misery by 
putting an end to separation, egocentricity and inequality.358 Katz 
describes the perennial account as follows: 
                                                
357 Veitl et al. 2005, suggest that the psychopathologically induced experiences are likely 
to result in non-cognitive interpretive structures.  
358 See Huxley, for instance. Zaehner disagrees. 
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It is commonplace of the study of mysticism to see it as the paradigm of 
religious individualism and radicalism. The mystic, it is said, is the great 
religious rebel who undermines the orthodox establishment, placing his 
own experience above the doctrines of the accepted authorities, and who 
not infrequently engenders serious opposition even to the point of being 
put to death for heresy. The martyrdom of Al Hallaj and similar episodes 
are highlighted in almost all descriptions of mysticism.359 
To counterbalance what he sees as a one-sided conception of mysticism, 
Katz places emphasis on the conservative character of mystical 
experience instead: 
These incidents [the martyrdom of many mystics] must not be taken as 
presenting the entire account, however, nor even as representing the 
typical relation between mysticism and established religion, for the 
relationship(s) of the two are far more varied and dialectical than is usually 
appreciated. This paper will examine this dialectic, showing in the process 
that, while it is true that mysticism, in its many different guises, contains 
elements of radical challenge to established religious authority and 
tradition, at the same time it also embodies characteristics which are 
anything but radical. And it is on these normally neglected features, which 
I have chosen to label ‘conservative,’ which this study will focus. Let me 
assert my position clearly lest misunderstanding arise: it is not my 
intention to argue that mysticism, or more accurately mysticisms, is only a 
conservative phenomenon; rather, the aim of this paper is to reveal the 
two-sided nature of mysticism, that it is a dialectic that oscillates between 
the innovative and traditional poles of religious life.360   
In section 1.4 we discussed how heresy and obedience are consequences 
not only of the character and content of a given mystical experience, but 
of a combination of these with the social and religious system of which 
the experiencer is a part. As can be seen from the above passages, Katz 
clearly thinks that it is in the nature of mysticism to oscillate between the 
traditional and the innovative poles of religious life, and that both 
conservatism and radicalism are characteristic of mystical experience. In 
this way, however, it is easy to overlook other important factors that can 
contribute to the rise of ‘heresies’ and ‘radicalism’,361 factors like: the 
                                                
359 Katz 1983, p. 3. 
360 Katz 1983, p. 3. 
361 Although Katz does not deny the radical potential of mystical experience, in reading 
through his article, it is difficult to find much discourse on the radical side of the 
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degree to which liberty of interpretation is accepted within the mystic’s 
religious system, the manner in which society interprets both the 
religious system and the mystic, the strictness of the ‘laws’ within a 
specific religious tradition and many other contextual circumstances.362 
Taking such conditions into account when claiming that an experience is 
‘heretical’ or ‘conservative’ would imply taking into consideration the 
interpretive pattern of the social environment of the mystic as a basis for 
making either claim. Katz apparently bases these claims on his own 
implicit definition of religion and mysticism, which could indicate that he 
is not taking the total context of the mystic into consideration, despite his 
contextualist approach. This line of argumentation notwithstanding, we 
return to Katz’s less ‘contextual’ notion that mystical experience is 
intrinsically non-heretical and conservative in character, and shift our 
attention to his article, “The conservative character of mystical 
experience”, which unveils his theory of models.  
The argument in “The conservative character of mystical experience” is 
similar to the one in “Language, epistemology and mysticism”. It begins 
by reasserting Katz’s original epistemological assumption that there are 
no pure (unmediated) experiences; this is followed by a variety of 
examples from religious traditions and mystical literature intended to 
prove Katz’s point. From an examination of these reports, Katz 
concludes that: 
…models play an important role in providing our map of reality and of 
what is real and, thus, contribute heavily to the creation of experience – I 
                                                                                                              
‘phenomenon’. As the title “The conservative character of mystical experience” would 
suggest, Katz seems overly concerned with the ‘conservative’ characteristics of his 
subject and thus leaves little space for a discussion of its more radical features.  
362 For an analogous problem, see Jeremy Gunn’s discussion in “The complexity of 
religion and the definition of ‘religion’ in international law” (2003). Here Gunn shows 
that in asylum cases involving persecution because of religious beliefs, the courts often 
base their decisions on scholarly definitions of religion that may have nothing to do 
with either the persecutor’s or the victim’s views on what constitutes a religious belief. 
Gunn argues that in order to determine whether an act of religious discrimination has 
taken place, the courts cannot take their starting place in the scholarly definitions of 
religion, but must consider the implicit definitions of the persecutors. We need not 
emphasis that injustice and unfair treatment in asylum cases would otherwise be the 
result. 
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repeat to the creation of experience. This is a fact to be pondered, and 
pondered again.363  
Katz explains how he uses the term ‘models’: 
By ‘model’ here I do not mean a theoretical construct as in the physical 
sciences, but rather the nature of ‘individuals’ who become norms for their 
tradition in a variety of ways. Such individuals become Ideals; their 
individuality becomes categorical; their biographies didactic. The 
normative individual is the medium of a universal teaching; the instrument 
for the revelation of more general truths. Every religious community, and 
every mystical movement within each community, has a ‘model’ or 
‘models’ of the ideal practitioner of the religious life. These paradigmatic 
figures can be either human or divine and either male or female, with 
examples of each of these types to be found in the sources.364 
According to Katz, ‘models’ have various functions, among which are: 1) 
to provide an “instantiation of the proper attitude and practice to be 
approximated or imitated by the faithful”; 2) to serve as an “existential 
representation of the ‘tradition’”; 3) to serve as “’proof’ of the 
continuing presence of the reality of the tradition”; 4) to “bring a new 
revelation, e.g. Muhammad.”; 5) to “bring a new doctrine, e.g. the 
Buddha”; 6) to “reveal an interpretation of an older doctrine”; 7) to serve 
as “a ‘Founder’ of a religious community”; 8) to provide an 
“authoritative picture of reality”; 9) to show “what it is to be ‘human’”; 
10) to over-bridge ‘above’ and ‘below’; and, 11) to serve as a “moral 
paradigm”.365 Along with “texts” and “ontologies”,366 these models are 
said to be responsible for the creation of ‘experience’ that preserves the 
religious tradition in the faithful follower. By imitating the ‘models’, the 
mystic is conserving tradition; in this way, mystical experience becomes 
conservative in character.  
What Katz calls ‘models’, we, in keeping with William James, call ‘people 
of religious genius’. In this regard, some of the individuals particularly 
mentioned by Katz are Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, Buddha, Krishna and 
Confucius. Mystics are thought to imitate and idolize these individuals. 
                                                
363 Katz 1983a, p. 51. 
364 Katz 1983a, p. 43. 
365 Katz 1983a, pp. 43-46. 
366 Katz 1983a, p. 51. 
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This is why Katz believes that study of these models (along with text and 
ontology) will greatly enhance the “full and accurate understanding of 
mystical experience in both its radical and conservative modalities”.367 
For Katz, these personalities serve as normative maps to transcendental 
realities that are followed by the mystics that come after. Thus he 
considers that a thorough study of these models and their maps should 
be informative as to the experiences of mystics. In light of Katz’s theory 
of ‘models’, a number of interrelated issues are in need of clarification 
and, also, correlation with the other aspects of Katz’s philosophy. Some 
of these clarifications and correlations require a contextualization of 
Katz’s theory.    
 
5.2.1. Katz’s theory in context 
The leading questions in the following discussion concern the double 
nature of Katz’s theory – the combination of contextualism and realism 
– and how this relates to Katz‘s theory of models. First there is the 
question of whom or what has inspired the ‘models’. Unless Katz’s 
‘models’ are exceptions to the contextual understanding that the mystic’s 
religious context influences her experience, we here appear to encounter 
an infinite regress that cannot be historically validated. And if it is Katz’s 
position that the ‘models’ are somehow exceptions to his contextual 
understanding of mystical experience, their experiences would seem to 
have been unmediated in some sense. We discuss this possibility further. 
Consider, for instance, Moses, whom Katz has listed as a ‘model’. 
Regardless of whether or not Katz considers Moses a mystic, Moses had 
an experience that has played a significant role in the history of three 
major religious systems: that of having received the Ten 
Commandments. When applying Katzian contextualism to the 
circumstance of Moses going up Mount Sinai and coming back with the 
Ten Commandments, the outcome appears to contradict the traditional 
religious account of the event. First of all, both the Jewish and the 
Christian traditions inform us that the Commandments were given to 
Moses as a foundation for the Law to which those committed to the 
God of Abraham should be obedient. The fact that the Law was directly 
                                                
367 Katz 1983a, p. 51. 
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given by God precludes the possibility that Moses had himself derived 
this particular set of rules in meditative contemplation under the 
influence of the religious tradition to which he was attached. It also 
appears to preclude the possibility that Moses was given an ‘x’ which he 
then interpreted and evaluated in accordance with the contextual 
conditions of his time. From Katz’s realist perspective, Moses 
experienced God. However, if there are no ‘givens’ that are not also 
shaped by acts,368 how then, are we to understand Moses’ reception of 
the Commandments without invoking the perennial interpretation of 
experience? The impossibility of ‘givenness’ in Katz’s account seems at 
odds with his account regarding the role of ‘models’. 
There is, however, an alternative: Moses represents an exception to the 
rule that governs human nature,369 and the Law was given to him in a 
‘pure’ way. As will soon be seen, this appears to be the most plausible 
interpretation of the Katzian perspective, although it contradicts Katz’s 
initial assumption that there are no pure experiences. But what does this 
account tell us about mystical experience? The idea that Moses, whether 
as mystic or ‘model’, may have had a ‘pure experience’ of God tell us 
little more about mystical experience then that one must wait to be 
chosen or made exceptional by the Lord. If the mystics of the Christian 
or Jewish tradition idolize and imitate Moses, what does this say about 
them? Moses’ life and activities are extraordinary by any standards and 
certainly no supplanting set of laws has been presented since his original 
reception of the Ten Commandments. Moreover, if becoming one like 
Moses is what mystics are intended to achieve, it can be safely said that 
no one has been able to accomplish this to date.  
In the tradition of Islam, it is indeed customary to ‘imitate’ the actions of 
Muhammad, but this is largely connected with orthodox religious 
practice and does not explain the longstanding conflict between Islam as 
a religious system and Sufi mystical practice. Altered states of 
                                                
368 Katz 1978a, p. 59. “All ‘givens’ are also the product of the process of ‘choosing’, 
‘shaping’, and ‘receiving’. That is, the ‘given’ is appropriated through acts which shape it 
into forms which we can make intelligible to ourselves given our conceptual 
constitution” 
369 See Katz’s claim that “because of the sorts of beings we are” we are prevented from 
having ‘pure experiences’ (Katz 1978a, p. 26).  
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consciousness are matters of controversy within Islam; as a result, the 
Sufis often have been marginalized because they indulge in repetitive 
‘group prayer’ and contemplation: practices believed to hold the 
potential to alter consciousness. Although it is impossible to know 
whether or not Muhammad experienced a change in consciousness prior 
to his receipt of the Qur’an, it is generally regarded in Islam that he 
received the verses from the angel Gabriel without any formal 
preparation on his part – in a manner that resembles Moses’ receipt of 
the Ten Commandments. How the practice of dhikr within the Sufi 
community can be explained or described by reference to the life and 
practices of Muhammad is not entirely clear; this, in turn, indicates that 
Katz needs to further elucidate what the ‘models’ of each tradition 
actually explain about mystical experience per se.  
Turning to the Christian traditions, it is clear that a more or less similar 
relation holds between the more orthodox ways of following Jesus and 
the experiences of Christian mystics. It must be said, however, that 
Christianity does not appear to stress as much as does Islam the 
importance of strictly following the ‘way’ of the ‘model’. In the accounts 
of Jesus’ life there is no mention of his having had a consciousness 
transforming experience that enabled him to perform miracles or resolve 
contemporary conflicts that had arisen from different interpretations of 
the Law. As with Muhammad, merely studying the life of Jesus does not 
appear to shed much light on what it is that Christian mystics experience 
or what they do to have such experiences. What, for instance, do either 
the Sufi’s or the Christian’s mystical experiences of unity and loving 
devotion to Allah or God have to do with either Muhammad or Jesus? 
For all the talk of recognizing differences, Katz’s particular slant on 
interpretation does not appear to illuminate either the differences within 
the religious traditions themselves or those that obtain between the 
mystical and the religious accounts of each tradition. 
Katz, however, expresses the wish to study this issue further; thus at the 
end of “The conservative character of mystical experience” he explains 
that:   
In future research I hope to extend this analysis to other features of the 
mystical quest such as the role of Gurus, the function of ‘discipleship’ and 
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the nature of mystical communities. In the interim, however, enough 
evidence and analysis has been introduced at least to throw suspicion on 
those approaches to mystical experience which treat these experiences in 
non-contextual ways and which choose to concentrate solely on the 
radical side of the phenomena. The thesis that mysticism has strong, if not 
dominant, conservative characteristics has at least begun to be 
demonstrated.370 
Although Katz’s analyses of the other ‘features of the mystical quest’, the 
‘role of the Gurus’ and the ‘function of discipleship’ have yet to be 
presented, there is reason to believe that his point of view would not 
much differ from the ‘conservatism’ expressed in “The conservative 
character of mystical experience”. Katz does recognize that mystical 
experience is not just a conservative phenomenon. However, in his 
various writings he has chosen to leave the ‘radical side of the 
phenomena’ largely unexplained. The implications of this will be briefly 
discussed herein. 
Perhaps none of this would be of great concern if the issue were merely 
about whether the outcome of mystical experience is largely conservative 
and confirmatory or something of a more novel and radical nature. In 
cases where mystics are isolated from society at large, the particular 
character or outcome of a mystical experience would be a more or less 
private affair and of little social relevance in terms of scientific 
examination and evaluation. In cases where the phenomenon of mystical 
experience occurs within the confines of a given society, however, the 
issue of its character and outcome is one of great consequence – 
especially for those under the evaluative gaze. Questions of personal 
transformation and mental health (or illness) are at the centre of the 
debate over the outcome of mystical experience, with professionals, 
researchers and thinkers standing on different sides of the issue. For 
some, mystical experience is seen as something ‘healthy’ and ‘good’, both 
for the individual and for society at large; for others, it is seen as 
‘pathological’ and ‘bad’.371 The apparent variety of disparate 
                                                
370 Katz 1983a, p. 51. 
371 As an example of negative interpretation, there is the case of psychiatrist Bo Gunnar 
Johnson at Lillhagen Hospital, who has apparently assessed nine cases of “meditation 
psychosis” and concludes that: “The unanimous symptoms indicate a specific 
syndrome triggered by a manipulation of consciousness. The central phenomenon is a 
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interpretations of the experiences included by different approaches (in 
terms of both first- and second-hand reports) creates an ambiguity that 
requires interpretive patterns that are at least ‘open’ to the possibility that 
the experiences are ‘positive’.372  
Of course, if one does not understand what mystical experience is, it is 
impossible to say anything about its outcome; and in the case of Katz’s 
theory, mystical experience is anything but well defined – i.e., Katz does 
not establish precise demarcation standards. This problem, however, does not 
prevent Katz from making negative judgments about certain experiences 
that contrast or conflict with the traditional beliefs and textual sources of 
the religious system in question.373 For Katz, it seems, if the experience is 
factually of ‘God’ it will have ‘good’ effects, and perhaps can also be 
classified as a ‘genuine’ mystical experience, but if it is ‘the Devil that 
                                                                                                              
special activity in the autonomous nervous system. This means an activation and 
overload of cognitive-emotional functions, which in predisposed individuals can trigger 
a process similar to psychosis and often of long duration. Since this process is risky, 
relatively unknown, and difficult to treat, it becomes important to contraindicate these 
practices, since there may be risks for activation of an uncontrollable process.” These 
findings were published in Läkartidningen 37, 1984 (my translation). Johnson also notes 
that “religious healing has not had any convincing effect – in one case it even got worse 
when paranoid delusions that ‘the healer’ stole the power were aroused”. Johnson 
further believes that the symptoms are indicative of a specific type of psychosis that can 
be directly linked to meditative practices. This conclusion appears to be based on 
similarities found between different hallucinations involving snakes and ‘kundalin’ 
enhancement in the spinal cord. With reference to a report of electromagnetic 
measurement during states described in accordance with Johnson’s criteria for specific 
‘meditation-psychosis’, Johnson concludes that “there may thus be a physiological 
foundation to the subjectively experienced activation”.  
372 See, for instance, Lukoff 1985 and Lukoff 1998. Lukoff calls for the possibility of a 
positive interpretation of psychotic experiences and argues that there is no room for 
such an interpretation in DSM-IV. Lukoff (1998) suggests a “differential diagnosis 
between mental disorders and spiritual emergencies” on the grounds that the effects of 
medication are undesirable. Lukoff is critical of the fact that many practicing 
psychiatrists are uneducated about the nature of spiritual emergencies and uninterested 
in experiential reports.  
373 Or, as will be shown, the particular example we deal with next seems to contradict 
Katz’s own system of beliefs. This is why the issue of superimposing one’s own 
interpretational pattern on the phenomenon interpreted is so important. The fact that 
Katz cannot set aside his own metaphysical beliefs when interpreting mystical 
experience reports from different religious or philosophical systems actually results in a 
reductive and dogmatic view.   
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calls’ instead, the consequences will be ‘bad’ and the experience may not 
even qualify as ‘mystical’. At least this is how Katz argues against 
Khalidas Bhattacharyya’s position, in which the suspension of ontologies 
is a way to the “rare mystic ordinance which [Bhattacharyya’s] ‘holy’ 
mind receives”374: 
How is one sure that it is the word of God and not that of the Devil that 
calls? How many obscene acts have been performed on the basis of such 
‘visions’ and ‘mystical states’? We are not Abrahams and for us the 
possibility which Bhattacharyya’s position allows of, among other things, 
the teleological suspension of the ethical, is out of the question. Let the 
‘voices’ demand what they will; we must stand firm even if we err against 
the call and let God sort out the consequences. It is an irony of history 
perhaps, but we must be cautious even to a fault when dealing with such 
‘mystic ordinances.’ As with the other self-authenticating claims, we have 
learnt to our dismay how dangerous such claims can be and how 
rationality and morality require that ‘mystic ordinances’ submit to their 
heteronomous standards if they wish to go beyond the ecstatic state itself 
and become efficacious in the real world of human interdependencies. If 
people do not fully understand this argument we should just take them to 
‘Homes’ full of people who have ‘experienced’ that they are Napoleon or 
Jesus – and if they persist perhaps just leave them there!375 
What is the actual point of this argument? According to Gregory, Katz 
means to say that:  
In the task of arriving at judgements about metaphysical truth and ethical 
behaviour, the evidence of experience must always be subordinated to 
“rational principles and maxims” and “heteronomous standards.” 
Experience must never stand as the judge, but always itself be judged and 
validated on the basis of reason or, in the context of religious traditions, 
on the basis of established revelation. In all cases it must not be left to 
stand as the paramount authority in metaphysical and moral matters.376 
What this appears to mean is that we cannot be sure about the 
metaphysical causal source of the experience, so we must rely on the 
established interpretational basis in order to assess the outcome. ‘Calls’ 
(visions and voices) from the Devil can be conflated with ‘calls’ from 
                                                
374 Gregory quotes Bhattacharyya from Katz’s “Freedom and nature: a reply” (1976), in 
Gregory 2006, p. 222. 
375 Katz (1976) quoted by Gregory 2006, p. 222. 
376 Gregory 2006, p. 222. 
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God, and neither the mystic nor the philosopher can know which. 
Moreover, it is mistaken to assume that an experience can validate 
‘ethical’ behaviour. Instead we must rely on the textual basis – the 
“heteronomous standards” that are set by the religious tradition of the 
experiencer. This argument straightforwardly implies that experience is 
untrustworthy and that textual sources (“established revelation”) must be 
used to validate the causal reality of experience. In fact, if the content of 
the experience contradicts the content in the ‘established revelations’, we 
are advised to neglect the experience and “stand firm even if we err 
against the call and let God sort out the consequences”. Otherwise, it is 
believed, a ‘self-authenticating’ claim like Bhattacharyya’s could lead to 
very unpleasant social consequences or even be an expression of 
something pathological.377 
As has been previously noted in chapter three, experience seems to lose all 
importance in Katz’s philosophy, and one begins to think that if this is 
factually Katz’s point of view, why not go further and exclude experience 
from the interpretation of mysticism altogether. In the above quotation, 
experience seems to be classified in terms of causal source, although Katz 
never specifies what makes Abraham a ‘model’ but not Bhattacharyya. If 
the delimiting feature is the causal source of the experience, but no one 
can know anything about that metaphysical source, how can Katz know 
that the metaphysical source of Bhattacharyya’s experience is not God? 
Although Katz would likely never consider Bhattacharyya to be one of 
his ‘models’, he never really delineates the criteria by which a ‘model’ can 
be known. Is Muhammad the last of the ‘models’? What is it that an 
aspiring ‘Abraham’ needs to do or experience in order to truly reach that 
status? And how can we confirm that Abraham’s source was God and 
                                                
377 As a comment to this, Gregory explains: “…what is metaphysically ‘given’ to one in 
one’s experience may entail the violent suppression of whole classes of people if one’s 
social and ethical conditioning has taught one the acceptability of repressing, 
prejudicing, or violently mistreating others. This was the case with white southerners in 
18th century America with respect to blacks, with Brahmins in 18th century India in 
relation to outcasts, and with 20th century Germany with respect to Jews. In each of 
these historical cases, and in any number of other cases one might think of taking place 
today, the oppressors were conditioned not only to think of the other in particular 
ways, but actually to experience them in ways which directly fostered their systematic 
mistreatment” (Gregory 2006, p. 221). This is not the place to discuss these 
complicated issues in detail. However, it can be said that issues of ‘suppression’ have a 
more complex structure than simply being the result of an assumption regarding what is 
‘given’. 
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not the Devil? Did God factually ask Abraham to sacrifice his son, or 
was this merely an experience shaped by Abraham’s religious 
conditioning? Within the Jewish system of beliefs, the attempt to render a 
contextual interpretation of Abraham’s experience would be viewed as 
absurd. There is, however, an explanation as to why Katz would avoid 
‘contextualizing’ Abraham.    
According to Katz, Jews have a special place in history and thus 
represent the main ‘evidence’ for the existence of Divine Providence. 
The following quotations were taken by Gregory from a 1994 interview 
entitled, “The God I believe In” as well as from a 1983 article on post-
holocaust Jewish theology:  
…“the Jewish people manifest a qualitatively different type of historical 
existence than other nations.”[1] The sheer fact of Jewish survival alone, 
Katz claims in several places, is a kind of “objective evidence”[2] for the 
existence of God and for a special historical management or 
“transcendental selection” governing Israel’s history. “I can not imagine, 
or account for, the survival of the Jewish people apart from some kind of 
special history, Heilsgeschichte […]”[3], he states. And again, “I … find 
Israel’s very survival the strongest evidence both of its transhistorical 
vocation and the existence of Divine Providence.”[4] The modern 
recreation of the State of Israel in particular he takes as an “objective 
evidence”[5] of God’s reality,[6] providence,[7] and “saving presence”[8].378  
In Katz’s view, this ‘special history’ of the Jewish people is disconnected 
from a contextual theory of interpretation, and also from other religions:  
You have a rule about how history operates; Jewish history is always the 
exception. The Shoah comes and out of it emerges the state of Israel. The 
Jews of Russia (and America) were, according to historical 
prognosticators, supposed to disappear; they didn’t disappear. Modernity 
was meant to assimilate Jews; it didn’t. The church came and was to 
conquer, and, in turn, was succeeded by a militant Islam and crusading 
Marxism. Jewish history is quite extraordinary in its continuity and 
inexplicability.379 
                                                
378 Gregory 2006, p. 62. The statements numbered by me as [1], [4] and [8] in Gregory’s 
text are quoted from Katz’s 1983 article ”Eliezer Berkovits’s Post-Holocaust Jewish 
Theology” and the rest ([2, 3, 5, 6, 7]) are quoted by Gregory from an interview with 
Joshua O Haberman titled ”The God I believe in”, 1994.  
379 Katz quoted from the 1994 interview with Haberman (“The God I believe in) by 
Gregory, in Gregory 2006 p 61-2  
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Katz’s particular interpretation of the history of the Jewish people, as 
fascinating as it may be, reveals a fundamental problem relative to Katz’s 
interpretation of mystical experience that seems to go beyond even the 
previously mentioned inconsistencies of his contextual approach. It is 
that while Katz appears to see only ‘context’ and ‘interpretation’ with 
respect to the experiences of mystics, when it comes to the ‘exceptional’ 
history of the Jewish people, he appears to see ‘reality’ as ‘evident’ and, 
yes, ‘given’. 
However difficult or impossible it may be to distinguish between 
experience and interpretation, Katz never mentions his role as an 
interpreter of mystical experience. Clearly, Katz claims that the 
perennialists interpret mystical experience reports inaccurately, making 
assumptions on metaphysical realities and not clearly realizing the 
difficulties involved in distinguishing between experience and 
interpretation. But what about Katz’s interpretations? Does he 
distinguish between the actual events he mentions (such as the 
‘recreation of the state of Israel’) and his interpretation of them (that this 
proves the existence of God)? Put more plainly, does Katz’s own context 
– i.e., the fact that he is an explicitly Jewish philosopher with a Jewish 
metaphysical and theoretical outlook – in any way influence his particular 
interpretation of mystical experience reports? 
In chapter one, we discussed the problematic nature of interpreting one 
metaphysical system in terms of another, and how this can give rise to 
serious misunderstandings if the interpretational pattern of the 
interpreted subject is not taken into account. If one wishes to truly 
understand a ‘Weltanshauung’ that is of a particularly foreign or alien 
character, it is often necessary to ‘bracket’ or set aside one’s own 
interpretive pattern to make room for the entrance of the other. In the 
case of Katz, however, it appears that he has made no such effort and 
thus his interpretation of mystical reports is made from the perspective 
of a Jewish interpretive pattern, with all the specific metaphysical 
assumptions that this implies. In other words, it is highly likely that 
Katz’s interpretation of mystical experience reports is coloured by his 
own Jewish experience. Thus his contextual approach has little chance of 
describing the activities, experiences and reports of mystics in ways that 
do not fundamentally clash with the self-understandings of those mystics. 
Mystical experience reports are not ‘given’ to Katz, rather they require 
  
 227  
interpretation. Unfortunately, Katz’s interpretation, as interesting as it 
may be, does not seem to explain either the experiences of mystics or 
what those experiences are likely to generate in the way of personal 
transformation, knowledge, cognitivity and/or moral conduct. 
 
5.3. Conclusions and summary 
This chapter began with the claim that it is not possible to establish a 
causal connection between a certain type of experience and a specific 
outcome, nor between a method of facilitation and a specific outcome. It 
seems that in Katz’s philosophy of mysticism, the outcome of an 
experience is determined by the causal metaphysical factor that 
influences the experience.  
Section 5.1 discussed Katz’s claim that mystical experience cannot be 
verified, which, of course, is true, although it raises several issues that 
create difficulties for Katz’s philosophy: 
 It is unclear what non-verifiability is supposed to tell us about 
mystical experience in particular. No experience can be verified in 
itself, and far from all statements based on experience can be 
verified. 
 It is extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not Katz also means 
to say that mystical experience is incapable of justifying belief. If 
so, this would be in direct contrast to the views of other 
epistemologists of mysticism such as Broad, Alston and 
Swinburne. 
 Katz uses the reports of the mystics as ‘evidence’ for his 
philosophical position, contradicting his own claim that “mystical 
experience is not and logically cannot be the grounds for any final 
assertions about the nature or truth of any religious or 
philosophical position”. 
Section 5.2 discussed Katz’s theory of ‘models’. In this connection, the 
following problems raise the question of whether Katz’s contextual 
approach represents a viable option for the interpretation of mystical 
experience reports: 
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 I have asked how the models became models. Katz has no explicit 
account of what constitutes a model, except for the fact that they 
are incorporated and exemplified in traditional religious accounts.  
 If Katz’s models are those presented by various religious traditions, 
the experiences of such models must be ‘given’, since this is what 
traditional religious accounts assert. This, however, seems to 
contradict Katz’s rejection of the possibility of ‘givenness’ and 
‘pure experience’. 
 If the idolization and imitation of the models of various religious 
systems create the experiences of their mystics, and such ‘models’ 
are said to have had experiences that go beyond contextual 
conditioning, why are the mystics that follow in their footsteps 
unable to set aside their contextual conditioning and achieve such 
states as well? If the answer is that mystics are unable to imitate 
their models in this respect, then one would have to ask whether 
the notion of ‘models’ has anything at all to tell us about mystical 
experience? 
The only answer I have managed to find to these questions is that Katz 
interprets mystics from a Jewish interpretive pattern, an approach that is 
inappropriate for several reasons: 
 It results in a dogmatic interpretation of mystical experiences and 
an inability to distinguish between conflicting views within a 
religious tradition (such as, for instance, the problems that arise 
between orthodox Muslim religionists and Sufis, or between 
standard Christians and Christian mystics).  
 It is reductive and fails to account for the ambiguity of experience.  
 If taken as paradigmatic, it can result in interpretations that fail to 
meet the claims of mystics and make them intelligible. 
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Part IV: Conclusions 
 
Chapter 6 
Aftermath 
 
 
Introduc t ion  to  chapter six 
 
It appears that in this thesis I have contradicted Gregory’s conclusion 
that 
Katz’s theory is a beautifully impartial, even-handed, and respectful of all 
mystical claims without exception. It is in fact designed to uphold these 
virtues.380 
While it may certainly be the case that I have interpreted Katz’s theory in 
a critical and possibly inaccurate way, the very fact that Katz’s theory can 
receive such diverse interpretations as mine and Gregory’s indicates that 
it contains elements that are either incompatible or lacking in clarity. 
Interpreters of mysticism require far clearer directions and explanations 
than are found in Katz’s present formulations. Thus if Katz intends to 
provide the tools needed for an interpretation of mystical reports, the 
claims he presents need to be reformulated in certain fundamental 
respects and expressed in more direct and relevant terms. 
My initial aim was to find a theory that could explain and help to 
interpret the language of mystics. Unfortunately, my own encounter with 
Katz’s contextual approach has diminished rather than enhanced my 
understanding of mystical claims. On the other hand, Katz does raise a 
number of important issues that are fundamental in terms of advancing 
our understanding of mystical experience and mystical claims. Section 
                                                
380 Gregory 2006, p. 295. 
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6.1 reviews several of these central themes and section 6.2 examines 
some alternative ways of answering the questions raised by Katz. Section 
6.2 also looks at future research possibilities with respect to the study of 
mystical phenomena, as well as the relevance this may have for 
disciplines other than religious studies and vice versa. 
    
6.1. Katz’s contextual theory 
Katz’s contextual approach addresses several important issues regarding 
mystical experience that are in need of consideration:  
1) The role of theology in religious experience.  
This issue includes questions such as: what is the relation between 
(theological) language and (religious) experience; and, how and to what 
extent are the experiences of persons in various religious traditions 
influenced by the sacred texts of those traditions? 
2) Does mystical experience transcend religious borders as well as the 
borders of religious experience? 
This issue includes questions such as: how does mysticism relate to 
religion; and, are there any differences between the forms of 
expression/experience within a specific theological system (e.g., Islam) 
and the mystical forms within the same tradition (e.g., Sufism)?  
3) The epistemology of mystical experience. 
This issue includes questions such as: what role do general cognitive 
processes play in the formation and interpretation of mystical experience; 
and, would a common experiential core need the presupposition that 
there are pure experiences?   
Katz has contended that his contextualist theory provides a better 
explanation of mystical experiences than does the perennialist point of 
view. This contention has been examined in this thesis relative to the 
four evaluative criteria presented at the outset. These criteria are here 
presented once again:  
1) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must be capable of precisely identifying and demarcating the 
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phenomena it aims to interpret and/or explain. In other words, it 
must establish precise demarcation standards.  
2) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must rest upon on a coherent theoretical foundation without 
intrinsic contradictions. In other words, it must exhibit theoretical 
consistency.  
3) Any theory that chooses the ‘subjective experiences’ of certain 
mystics as its ‘object’ of study must avoid the tendency to interpret 
those experiences in ways that fundamentally distorts or disregards 
the self-understanding of those mystics. In other words, it must 
show regard for the validity of self-understanding. 
4) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must be capable of advancing current understandings relative to the 
phenomena under investigation. In other words, it must extend the 
understanding of the field. 
The question is, of course, whether or not Katz’s contextualist theory of 
mystical experience satisfies these criteria. In this thesis, I have indicated 
that the answer is no. Having said this, I should also say that I am aware 
of the possibility that this presentation may include both minor and 
major misunderstandings of Katz’s position, and that these may have 
tainted the outcome of my analysis. Certain of Katz’s assertions, 
however, are unmistakable, and they are made repeatedly and with great 
emphasis throughout his various writings.  
Included in this category would be his assertions that: 1) there is no such 
thing as a pure (unmediated) experience; 2) mystical experiences are 
fundamentally different rather than similar; 3) the perennial common core 
model is mistaken and the phenomenal characteristics of experience 
cannot successfully outline or explain what mystical experience is; 4) 
mystical experience is over-determined by religious beliefs and mystics 
cannot escape their religious context (or pre-experiential conditioning); 5) 
experience cannot be distinguished from interpretation; 6) the 
phenomenological method is inadequate; 7) mystical experience is 
cognitive; 8) experience necessarily involves direction towards an external 
object; 9) experience necessarily involves an ‘object’; and, 10) mystical 
experience conserves rather than innovates religious beliefs, and thus 
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tendencies towards heresy are not as characteristic of mysticism as is 
conservatism. 
Regarding these relatively clear and straightforward assertions, several of 
Katz’s critics have noted that they display a good deal of conceptual 
confusion. In large measure, this thesis can be seen as an attempt to sort 
this issue out. Concerning the question of ‘difference’ and/or ‘similarity’, 
for example, we have questioned how one can determine whether or not 
one thing is similar to or different from another without considering the 
phenomenal characteristics of experience. And with regard to the 
concept of ‘object’, we have explored what types of ‘objects’ might 
determine the nature of the mystical experience. Respecting Katz’s idea 
of ‘externality’, we have asked, “according to what metaphysical system?” 
And as to the concept of ‘pure experience’, we have looked into several 
of its many meanings in the mystical literature. Regarding the concepts 
‘mysticism’ and ‘religion’, we have asked how there can be a difference 
between the two, when a given form of ‘mysticism’ is perceived as being 
merely one aspect of the religious tradition of which it is a part. And in 
terms of the concepts ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenological’, we have 
attempted to understand what it is that Katz is rejecting. Concerning the 
idea of ‘cognitivity’ in experience, we have tried to determine exactly 
what the ‘cognitive’ content in a mystical experience is according to Katz. 
We have also looked into the notions of ‘experience’ (what is it?), 
‘interpretation’ (whose, and according to what interpretive pattern?) and 
‘context’ (what elements might be included other than those that are 
strictly ‘religious’?).    
The existence of so many unclear areas in Katz’s contextual approach 
makes it difficult to see how it could extend the understanding of the 
field or provide precise guidelines to those seeking to understanding the 
phenomenon of mystical experience. For his part, Katz sees the field as 
being dominated by perennial interpretations that use phenomenal 
characteristics to show that the experiences of mystics have similar 
experiential features across religious boundaries. Katz insists that this 
paradigm is mistaken and cannot successfully advance our current 
understanding of mystical experience. Katz’s main reason for drawing 
this conclusion is that the phenomenal characteristics of experience are 
too general to outline mystical experience; his aim appears to be to 
replace phenomenal characteristics with the ‘object’ as the proper 
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standard for demarcating mystical experience. The ‘object’, as we 
understand Katz, appears to be the specific ‘ultimate reality’ (God, Allah, 
Brahman, etc.) of each religious tradition in the world. As to the nature 
of this ‘object’, Katz suggests that it is to some degree ‘real’, and that 
experiences ‘containing’ this more or less ‘real’ object should be analysed 
as ‘specific ontological conditions’. On the other hand, however, he 
maintains a strong conviction (stated again and again throughout his 
writings) that the ‘object’ of the mystic’s ‘experience’ is also shaped (over-
determined) by the pre-experiential conditioning, background and 
religious context of the experiencer. These two opposite poles of 
understanding – the realist and the contextualist – are both included in 
Katz’s perspective, and it is this that seems to lead his theory into the 
theoretical inconsistencies that have been discussed in chapters three and 
five. Ironically, although a phenomenological perspective (when correctly 
understood) would enable Katz to resolve this inconsistency and 
embrace both a contextualist and a realist position, he has chosen to 
reject both phenomenology (as he understands it) as well as the 
phenomenal characteristics of experience.  
As hinted at above, Katz’s rejection of phenomenology and the 
phenomenal characteristics as methodological foundations for advancing 
the understanding of mystical experience is based on several 
misunderstandings – e.g., his assumption that phenomenology entails 
making unwarranted metaphysical claims. However, as a result of the 
various ambiguities embedded in his system, it is difficult to determine 
how and to what extent these misunderstandings have caused Katz to 
make certain (irrelevant) claims about mystical experience that have 
hampered our understanding of the field and discouraged the use of 
certain important tools. If, as Katz claims, mystical experience is 
necessarily connected to (and even shaped by) religious systems of belief 
(or specific theologies), how can we then explain phenomena like: a) 
experiences that are not connected to a specific religious system, but 
nevertheless display similarities in either facilitative aspects, phenomenal 
characteristics and/or moral features (e.g., nature experiences); b) 
similarities between experiences ‘shaped’ by different religious traditions 
(e.g., the ‘unitive’ experience); c) the differences in the experiences and 
conceptions of religious people from the same religious tradition (e.g., 
the Sufi and the orthodox Islamic believer); and, d) religious experiences 
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that have no reported external reference (e.g., the Buddhist experience). 
The methodological elements in Katz’s position thus exhibit important 
explanational shortcomings that seriously undermine his ‘contextual’ 
theory of interpretation.  
Other methodological problems encountered in Katz’s approach concern 
the ‘evidence’ he uses to support his rejection of perennial attempts to 
understand mystical experience. In this regard, Katz employs his 
contextual model of interpretation to interpret a selection of mystical 
experience reports and then uses the reports so interpreted to prove that 
his contextual model of interpretation is more correct and/or better at 
analysing mystical experience reports than the perennial model of 
interpretation. Moreover, since Katz strongly asserts that one cannot 
base theoretical judgements on mystical experience claims – i.e., that 
mystical experience cannot validate philosophical or theological truths – 
it is hard to see how he could justify his own use of mystical experience 
claims to validate the philosophical judgement that the perennial approach is 
mistaken and that differences rather than similarities are evident in 
mystical experience reports. 
Finally, Katz’s approach to the interpretation of mystical experience 
reports seems to show little regard for either the validity of the mystics’ 
self-understanding or the impact that his own interpretive pattern has on 
the judgments, analyses and interpretations he makes. To make this point 
clear, the following additional evaluative criterion is required: 
5) Any theory that purports to be a theory of mystical experience 
must clearly state the functional role of the interpreter and the 
impact that his own pre-interpretational conditioning (or 
interpretive pattern) could potentially have on the results of his 
interpretation. In other words, the theory must explicitly state the 
perspective from which the ‘object’ of investigation is apprehended and 
understood.  
If the interpretive pattern of the interpreter comes into conflict with the 
self-understanding of the interpreted subject, the elements that 
presuppose the truth of the interpreter’s metaphysical system should be 
explicitly spelled out so that the interpreters interpretation can be clearly 
seen and contrasted with (or evaluated in relation to) that of the 
interpreted subject. If adhered to, this criterion should not only enhance 
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the interpreter’s regard for the validity of her subject’s self-understanding, 
but also enable her to improve the consistency of her theory and extend 
the understanding of the field.   
The final section of this conclusion looks at future possibilities for 
extending our understanding of mystical experience reports, and also 
suggests what sort of theoretical formulation might satisfy the five 
evaluative criteria mentioned above.  
 
6.2. The way ahead 
A variety of factors need to be considered in order to advance the 
discussion on mystical experience. Some of the questions that relate to 
these factors are relevant to areas of research that are outside the 
disciplines directly involved with ‘religious’ phenomena: What do mystics 
and mystical experiences have to teach us about the cognitive processes 
involved in other types of experiences? What can mystical experience per 
se teach us about the general creative processes involved in learning? The 
phenomenon of mystical experience is also potentially relevant to 
disciplines such as psychology (e.g., the relationship between altered 
states and psychological health), psycholinguistics (e.g., language 
acquisition), pedagogy (e.g., learning processes), law (e.g., the 
interpretation of witness reports), medicine (e.g., the role of self-
suggestion), anthropology (e.g., the understanding of ritual behaviour), 
etc.  
All the above relevancies, however, depend upon the particular 
interpretation we give to mystical phenomena. And, to be frank, an 
interpretation of the type that emerges from Katz’s contextual approach 
appears unlikely to generate much new understanding or depict mystical 
phenomena in ways that would make them interesting to the disciplines 
just mentioned.381 In pondering what sort of interpretation might make 
                                                
381 Some examples of why this is so are: a) Katz associates altered states with 
pathological conditions, and thus his interpretive model is not appropriate in cases 
where the potential psychological benefits of mystical experience are of interest; b) if we 
have understood Katz correctly, language acquisition would never be an issue since 
language seems to be ‘given’ rather than acquired in Katz’s theory; c) since the notion of 
cognitivity seems quite contradictory in Katz’s theory and the so-called mystical ‘ways of 
knowing’ remain extremely unclear, it is unlikely that Katz’s perspective would 
contribute much to an understanding of learning processes; d) if the statement that 
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mystical experience more interesting and relevant to these various 
disciplines and vice versa, we would do well to consider certain aspects of 
investigating mystical phenomena.  
Research on the phenomenon of mystical experience must be 
theoretically coherent and methodologically capable of accommodating a 
plurality of approaches, including both philosophical and empirical 
investigations.382 In the study of mystical literature, it is certainly 
important to be aware of the contextual surroundings of the text, and 
also to recognize that sacred scriptures frequently are an important part 
of that context. However, it would be a mistake to focus so narrowly on 
the representative literature in the mystic’s tradition that we end in 
neglecting the report’s experiential dimension, or the explanatory value 
that this dimension potentially holds. The sacred scripture of a given 
religious tradition invariably receives different interpretations from 
contending groups within that tradition, as the example of Christianity 
has shown. It should thus be of value to study the particular 
interpretations that have informed a given mystic, as well as how that 
mystic is perceived from the perspective of traditional understanding. 
Moreover, the examination of interactional dynamics should not be 
limited to the mystic and her tradition’s sacred scriptures, but should 
extend to the social and psychological structures that also play a role in 
how that mystic is interpreted and understood. To appreciate these 
                                                                                                              
mysticism is not about ‘brain-waves’ constitutes a rejection of the possibility of 
correlating brain-states with states of consciousness, we must exclude most of the 
empirical research on cognitivity; and, e) without a classification of the phenomenal 
characteristics of experience there cannot be any correlative or intradisciplinary research.     
382 See for instance Andresen’s and Forman’s proposal of an integrated methodology for 
the field of religious studies, with the purpose of “forg[ing] a truce in the twenty-years’ 
methodological war that has been waging between constructivists [Katz and Proudfoot] 
and perennialists in the study of religion” (Andresen/Forman 2000, p. 7. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 7, No. 11-12, 2000, pp. 7-14. The article’s subtitle reads: “How the 
study of consciousness and mapping spiritual experiences can reshape religious 
methodology”) These authors suggest an integration of four different aspects of 
methodological approaches: a) “doctrinal analysis”, which includes the study of sacred 
text, dogma and theology; b) “social expression”, which includes observation of 
traditions, rituals, ecclesiastical organisations and cultural life; c) “subjective experience”, 
which includes the different types of mystical experiences like “dualistic” and “non-
dualistic” and “complex experiences”; and, d) “scientific (objective) research”, which 
includes neurobiological studies and cognitive neuroscience. Katz’s focus is on a) and 
perhaps some of b), but only if it is limited to religious contextual circumstances.  
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influences, however, requires an examination of the interpretive pattern 
of the mystic as well: i.e., how the mystic understands both the sacred 
scripture and the interpretation it has received within her societal 
surroundings. A thorough examination of a given mystic’s interpretive 
pattern requires that consideration be given to the experiential aspects that 
could be part of her interpretive pattern and concept formation. For this 
it is important to understand the phenomenological method not as a 
metaphysical system, but as a model of experience that can be non-
judgmentally applied to any metaphysical system of beliefs that the 
subjects of study hold to be true.  
As a model for the interpretation of subject-reports, the 
phenomenological model of experience is also of great potential 
relevance to neurobiological approaches that attempt to correlate states 
of consciousness with states of the brain. While the classification of the 
phenomenal characteristics of experience may yet be in want of further 
development, the main purpose of listing phenomenal characteristics is 
not to determine whether one experience is the ‘same as’ or ‘different 
from’ another, with the aim of adopting a common core, constructivist or 
contextualist stance. It is to provide an account of the differences and 
similarities of experience that can then be useful to scientists, researchers 
and others who are attempting to understand the cognitive, social and/or 
biological aspects of experience. 
It is not that difficult to ascertain whether the content of one report of 
experience differs from another when it comes to the object of reference. 
Clearly mystics claim to have had encounters with all kinds of ‘objects’, as 
do ordinary people. There is no need for a contextual theory or for the 
study of sacred scripture to determine that one mystic experiences God 
and another Allah; this becomes more than obvious from simply reading 
their reports. It is also obvious that neither God nor Allah will be 
discovered in the ‘brainwaves’ of mystics, any more than the table and 
chair in front of me will be found in mine. Thus there can be no question 
of correlating a specific brain-state with an experience of God and 
another brain-state with an experience of Allah, and a third brain-state 
with an experience of tables and chairs. A ‘unitive’ experience, however, 
can be correlated with states of the brain so as to make scientific 
statements of the type: all (or some) brain-states of the type A can be 
correlated with a subjective experience type  . In such studies, the 
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question of whether the experience involves unity with God, unity with 
Allah or unity with tables and chairs is not the focus. Nor do the 
conclusions of such studies deny either the reality of these different 
entities or the reality of the experience of unity, an important feature in 
terms of having respect for the validity of the self-understanding of the 
interpreted subject. And this is where there is need of interpretive models 
that do not merely explain away such experiences as psychopathology or 
instances of delusion, but instead take into account the possible positive 
aspects of this type of experiencing. 
Whether written, spoken or signed, language needs interpretation. To 
understand the meaning of an experience report (whether it is in a 
religious, legal, medical or psychological context), we thus require a 
model for interpreting language. This model would have to accomodate 
some form of explanation of how language is acquired (or ‘learned’). A 
central question in psycholinguistics is whether there are specific 
cognitive processes for language acquisition or whether general cognitive 
processes are involved instead. To outline an answer to this question is 
impossible in this limited context, just as it is impossible to give a one-
sentence answer to the question of how and to what extent language 
affects experienced reality. However, if we turn this around and ask how 
and to what extent experienced reality influences language acquisition 
and concept formation, it may be necessary to accept some form of ‘pure 
experience’ (i.e., an experience that is not linguistically based), or perhaps 
the ineffable hyletic material that is presented in the phenomenological 
model of experience. This is far from providing definitive answers to 
questions of interest to psycholinguistics, but it may direct us towards 
ways of untangling the complex relation between language and 
experience and addressing the explanational gaps inherent in the 
scientific approach to language acquisition.  
The phenomenological method and model of experience could also be 
useful in this context, since they allow for an examination of the 
cognitive processes involved in all experience, regardless of the 
metaphysical model of reality referred to in the reports or what the 
interpreters of the reports think about those realities. It would certainly 
be unfortunate if the misunderstandings that surround the principles and 
methods of phenomenology were to prevent its being used in various 
rewarding ways.  
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Appendix 
Quest ion s and an swer s fr om Katz , aut umn 2006 
Questions: 
I. The first set of questions that arose from my reading concerns the denial of pure 
experience. My first concern with the proposition “There are NO pure (i.e. 
unmediated) experiences.” was its general character. I have not been able to figure to 
what extent it determines the content of your theory of interpretation. You state for 
example, that mystical experience is ‘over-determined’ by contextual factors. Is this 
based on the epistemology following from the denial of ‘pure experience’, and if yes, 
should we treat experience-reports in general as we treat reports of ‘mystical 
experience’? If we can conclude that mystical experience is for instance ‘non-cognitive’ 
(or not cognition-generating) based on the denial of ‘pure experience’, can we draw the 
same conclusion about experience in general?  
These considerations have led me to the following questions: 
i) What exactly is intended by the expression ‘pure/unmediated experience’? In the 
article from 1978 there are several expressions used for this ‘phenomenon’, among 
which ‘the given’ is one. Is the notion of ‘unmediated/pure experience’ to be 
understood as ‘the given’ of phenomenology as well as the ‘intuited’ knowledge of 
Lao Tsu? And is the Erfarung without Erlebnis of Kant, as well as ‘the original 
flux’ of James also included in the denial?  
ii) In ‘Language, epistemology, and mysticism’ the denial of ‘pure experience’ is first 
labelled an ‘assumption’, then an ‘epistemological fact’ and in ‘The conservative 
character of mystical experience’ it is labelled a ‘working hypothesis’ – what label is 
most accurate? What part of the argument is it – is it a conclusion or a premise? 
What role does the assumption play in the contextual theory as a whole? Is this 
assumption/working hypothesis/epistemological fact necessary and does the 
contextual approach depend on the assumption?  
iii) How exactly does the notion of ‘pure experience’ relate to ‘mystical’ or ‘religious’ 
experience? Since the contextual theory of interpretation is addressing mystical 
experience reports, not pure experience reports, it would seem that an 
epistemology that is outlined mainly through its exclusion of ‘pure experiences’ 
would not suffice as a basis for conclusions concerning the cognitive character of 
mystical experience reports. And again, if the conclusions on the cognitivity of 
mystical experience are based on the denial of pure experience, should this not also 
affect all experience in the same way?  
II. The second set of questions concern the delimitation of ‘mystical’ in experience. 
Concerning the questions of a common core in mystical experience, you direct a serious 
amount of criticism towards the ability of ‘perennial’ interpreters of mystical experience 
to delineate mystical from other forms of experience. If I understand you correctly, you 
do not believe there is a common core in mystical experience, and prefer a list of 
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mystical-experience reports as a means of picking out the reports for interpretation. 
This leaves me wondering: 
i) Without the phenomenal characteristics of experience, how is it possible within the 
contextual model to discern mystical experience from other kinds of experience? 
There are indications in your article that it is the object of the mystic’s experience 
that makes the experience ‘mystical’, is that correct?  
ii) Is there any way to discern between a mystical experience and a religious 
experience in the contextualist approach of interpretation of mystical reports?  
iii) I have also wondered what role, if any, the denial of pure experience plays for the 
conclusion that there is no common core to mystical experience.  
III. A third important issue that has also been reflected in the critical reviewes of your 
article concerns the over-determination of experience. Keeping in mind that you 
consider experience ‘over-determined’ by contextual/historical/psychological/linguistic 
factors, I was surprised to find that you also think that “beliefs shape experience, just as 
experience shapes beliefs”. To me this seems contradictory, on account of the 
following: 
i) How can experience shape beliefs when experience is ‘over-determined’ by belief 
and other contextual factors? It seems that on the contextual approach the ‘over-
determination’ of experience stretches to encapsulate all aspects of it, including the 
autonomy that experience would require to ‘shape’ anything. What does the 
autonomy of experience consist in when it ‘shapes beliefs’?  
ii) Taking the ‘over-determination’ of experience as a dominant characteristic, I have 
also wondered what it is that the mystics interpret when they have ‘mystical’ 
experiences. What is the object of their interpretation?  
IV. A final question that has puzzled me is whether you consider that mystical 
experiences are cognitive or not. That the mystical experience can not be “translated 
into reasons” I have interpreted as “mystical experiences are non-cognitive”. Some of 
your interpreters claim this is not so. Do you consider the mystical experiences 
cognitive or cognition-generating?  
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Answers: 
Here are some thoughts in reply to the questions you posed about my views on 
mystical experience. 
1) The answer to question one in your question 1 is "yes" The answer to your second 
question in your question 1 is "no" as we need to recognize that mystical experience is 
not exactly like "experience in general."  But it is not altogether different either. 
2) I do not hold that mystical experience is non-cognitive. 
3) In answer to your question about "pure/unmediated experience" I mean to refer to a 
direct form of knowledge of "the thing in itself" without any conceptual (or other) 
mediation.  
4) I would think that calling the denial of pure experience "a working hypothesis" is 
best. I do so because I do not want to be dogmatic about the possibility I am wrong.  
(Though to date I do not think anyone has shown that I am wrong.) 
5) Whether the contextual approach in all forms depends on this "working hypothesis" 
I am not sure - For myself, however, the answer is yes. This dependency does exist. 
6) I am not sure what it is you are after in your question III.  So I will not attempt to 
reply. 
7) Yes.  I reject the "Common core" position. This, however, does not preclude 
distinguishing mystical experience from general experience. Mystical experience has, in 
each discrete instance, specific phenomenological conditions that mark it as mystical. 
8) Yes one can distinguish mystical from religious experience. There will be areas that 
seem to overlap and about which one can argue but this distinction is not hard to posit. 
9) As to your II. III: the denial of pure experience is for me, separate from, but related 
to, the denial of the common core claims insofar as these claims are usually of the pure 
experience variety. 
10) As to my view that "exp shapes belief" as well as the contrary - to deny this would 
be to deny reality, i.e., novelty, and the possibility - at least - of radical novelty.  I think, 
that one must at least allow for these possibilities in religious (as well as other) forms of 
life and experience.  
11) As to your question III.III: I do not want to deny the reality of mystical experience 
- this I grant, as a given from which one proceeds.  I begin by allowing the claim for the 
Ultimate Object - whatever that is - as claimed by the mystic.  I then ask: "Why does 
He or She know Reality (whatever it is) the way that they do?." Thus I never deny the 
object of the claims for mystical experience whatever the Object claimed is. 
12) No - you have misinterpreted my view that mystical experience cannot be 
"translated into reasons" as meaning they are non-cognitive.  The cognitive nature of 
these claims is not the issue - one can have cognitive claims that are not verifiable and 
thus cannot serve as decisive proof of an argument.  Cognitivity and verifiability, etc., 
are concepts that must be distinguished. You conflate them incorrectly. 
